


Bhāṭṭa Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā
by Dr. A. Ramulu


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


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SRI VENKATESWARA SWAMIVARU
with VAJRAKAVACHAMU

CONTENTS

Introduction	V
List of Mimamsa authors	IX
Means of Valid knowledge	1
Validity of knowledge	8
Error	12
Perception	19
Inference	30
The fallacy	43
Verbal testimony	52
Analogy	66
Presumption	74
Non-apprehension	85
Objects of Valid knowledge	92
Substance	95
Earth	98
Water	101
Light	102
Air	103
Darkness	106
Atoms	107
Ether	110
Time	112
Space	114
Nature of the soul	116
Size of the soul	121
Doctrine of many souls	123
Conception of God	124
Liberation	128
Mind	136
Sound	139

ABBREVIATIONS

BP	Bhāṣā Pañiccheda
BT	Bṛhatī
GS	Gautama Sūtra
HDS	History of Dharma Sāstra
JNMV	Jaimini Nyāya Mālā Vistara
JS	Jaimini Sūtra
KK	Kāśikā
MM	Māna Meyodaya
MNP	Mimāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa
NBT	Nyāya Bindu Tīkā
ND	Nyāya Darśana
NR	Nyāya Ratna
NRM	Nyāya Ratna Mālā
NS	Nyāya Sūtra
NS (on pp)	Nyāya Siddhi
NTV	Nyāya Tatvāvirbhāva
OIP	Outlines of Indian philosophy
PM	Prabhākara Mimāṃsā
PP	Prakaraṇa Pañcikā
PS	Pāṇini Sūtra
PV	Pramāṇa Vārttika
RV	Rju Vimalā
SBh	Sābara Bhāṣya
SC	Siddhānta Candrikā
SD	Sāstra Dipikā
SV	Sloka Vārttika
TB	Tarka Bhāṣā
TS	Tarka Saṃgraha
TV	Tantra Vārttika
VV	Vibhrama Viveka

INTRODUCTION

Truth was passionately pursued in Ancient India. The great seers of the past performed austere penance for realising truth. As the result of that, they had actually visualized the Veda, the Divine Revelation. It is an eternal light and illumines the paths of action and knowledge. The systems of Indian Philosophy which deal with the paths are two :— one upholding the teaching contained in the former portions of the Veda, particularly the Brāhmaṇas ; and the other, that contained in the latter portions of it, viz., the Upaniṣads. These two are, for this reason, respectively called Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is usually called briefly, Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā is known as Vedānta.

The term ‘Mīmāṃsā’ is derived from the root ‘Mān, to know’ with the desiderative suffix, ‘San’; and it means the desire for knowledge. The terms ‘Mīmāṃsante’, ‘Mīmāṃsā’¹ etc., occur in the Veda and refer to the discussions of meaning of vedic passages dealing with the performance of sacrifices. In due course, such discussions developed into a systematic Sāstra and owing obviously to the conspicuous development of other systems of philosophy, the Mīmāṃsā also came to be a full-fledged philosophic system with its own epistemology and ontology inaddition to being a systematization of ritual through a proper interpretation of the vedic texts.

Jaimini [300 B C] wrote the Mīmāṃsā sūtras. He refers in his sūtras to many Mīmāṃsā Ācāryas— Ātreya, Kārṣṇājani, Bādari, Bādarāyaṇa, Aśmarathya, Aitiśāyana, Kāmukāyana,

1 Utsṛjyam notsṛjyam iti mīmāṃsante T S VI-2-6-4
Saiśānandasya mīmāṃsā bhavati T U p. 2-6

Lābukāyana and Ālekhana. The surmise of the modern scholars is that these are likely to have written similar works which are lost to us. Jaimini's work contains 16 chapters. Chapters 1 to 12 are called Mīmāṃsā Kāṇḍa and 13 to 16 are called Saṅkārṣa Kāṇḍa. The latter Kāṇḍa is also called Devatā Kāṇḍa in view of the discussions regarding deities conducted here in many of its Adhikaraṇas.

Mīmāṃsā-sūtras are two thousand and seven hundred, arranged in twelve chapters. The subjects of the twelve chapters are : 1. Sources of Dharma [Pramāṇa], 2. Distinction [Bheda] of rites, 3 Ancillary [Sesha], 4 Obligatory [Prayukti], 5 Order of sequence [Karma], 6 The qualification of a sacrificer, etc. [Adhikāra], 7 Extension of items in the model yāga to its modifications (Sāmānyato'tidesha), 8 Extension of items to individual rites [Viśeṣato'tidiṣṭa], 9 Adaptation of formulas, etc. (Uḥā), 10 Exclusion (Bādhā), 11 Centralisation (Tantra) and 12 Extended Application (Prasaṅga).

The chapters are normally divided into four Pādas (pāda means a quarter) but chapters third, sixth and tenth are having Sarabha Pādas i.e., eight pādas. There are about a thousand topics of discussions (Adhikaraṇas). Each topic is treated in six parts : 1) the subject to be explained (viśaya); 2) doubt [viśaya]; 3) objection [Pūrvapakṣa]; 4) reply [Siddhānta]; 5) Purpose [Prayojana] and 6) Consistency or relevance of topic [Saṅgati]. Each topic sets forth a rule of interpretation [Nyāya] e.g. in Dharma jijñāsādhikarāṇa, the rule of interpretation or Nyāya of impropriety of imagining an unseen fruit when there is a seen fruit is enunciated. There are many such rules of interpretations. Infact, these principles of interpretations are followed to give a verdict or draw a conclusion in legal works and Dharma Śāstra treatises. Even the Vedānta, the final doctrine is established on the basis of these rules of interpretations.

The purpose served by Mīmāṃsā is threefold- 1) Evolving the rules of interpretations [Nyāyas] for the interpretation of

Vedic passages. Therefore, this system is called Vākyasāstra. 2) Giving authoritative rulings on sacrificial matters and fixing the correct procedure & the nature of sacrifices. For this reason, it is called Karma Mīmāṃsā. 3) It is also a system of Indian philosophy and hence discusses about epistemology and ontology. In this connection the contribution made by Mīmāṃsā for the discussion of non-human origin of the Vedas and self validity of knowledge are invaluable. Its concepts, of soul, liberation, each dissolution (Pralaya) preceding the other; importance of law ; secondary position of the deities ; ascertainment of meanings of words comprising the Vedas and Sāstras following the establishment meanings and words of common usage, etc., are peculiar.

Jaimini must have flourished before Pāṇini, the author of Aṣṭādhyāyī, because he has not followed Pāṇini's rules. e.g. Dyāvos tadheti cet gavyasya tadādiṣu [JS]. According to Pāṇini, Dyāvapṛthivyoḥ and gavām ayanasya should be used instead of Dyāvoḥ and gavyasya respectively.

Three Vṛttis or short commentaries by Bodhāyana, Upavarṣa and Bhavadīsa seem to have been written on J S. These are not available now. Some extracts of Upavarṣa's Vṛtti are, however, incorporated in Śabara's Bhāṣya.

The earliest commentary, which is available to us, on the J S is the Śabara-Bhāṣya by Śabaravāmin. In it there are references to previous Mīmāṃsakas who were perhaps authors of the commentaries which have not come down to us. Śabaravāmin must have flourished before Patañjali, the author of Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini sūtras, because he has not followed Patañjali's rules. In this context, Sri S. Subramanya Sāstry makes these remarks⁴— In dissolving the compound Dharmajīṇīśā Śabara adopted the caturthī vibhakti. Dharmāya jīṇīśā following Kātyāyana and not Patañjali who has condemned the Saṃsthī Samīsa in the caturthī vibhakti. Kumārila, how-

ever, following Patañjali has recommended the sixth case in dissolving the compound and interpreted the Bhāṣya text, ‘Dharmāya jījnāsā’ as giving the conclusive meaning. And Sabara’s non-mention of Patañjali¹ in this context markedly shows that he was prior to Patañjali since if he had seen Patañjali’s Bhāṣya, he would have atleast made a mention of that view.” Hence we may approximately fix the date of Sabara at about 100 B. C. Sabarasvāmin is also designated as Ādityadeva, who changed to Sabara when he disguised himself as a forester for fear of Jaina persecution². Nothing is known about the place where the Bhāṣyakāra was born but, Dr. Jha on the basis of certain passages from the Bhāṣya, suggests his being Northerner.

Bhartṛmitra (400 A. D.) wrote a commentary i.e. Tatvasuddhi on the Bhāṣya, but it is not extant now. His views are referred to and refuted by Kumārila. According to Pārthaśārathi, bhartṛmitra introduced many wrong theories into the system and thus made it an atheist system³.

The period of seventh century was the golden age in the history of Indian philosophy. The great Śaṅkara, Kumārila, Prahlāda and others were born during this century. They dedicated their lives to re-establish vedic culture which was eclipsed by Buddhism. As we know the Buddhists had severally attacked the performances of vedic rites and rituals and there was every danger of losing the influence of vedic culture for ever. It was, therefore, necessary that a revival should have taken place and the importance of the vedic rituals and rites vindicated against Buddhism. This was perhaps the reason why Mīmāṃsā was once so widely read and several scholars wrote on it in their own individual way.

1 on 1-1-5 JS Sabara mentions Pāṇini ; and 10-8-1 both Pāṇini and Kātyāyana.

2 Dr. Jha supposes Ādityadeva to be the original name of Sabarasvāmin—see P M p. 5

3 N R p. 3

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (620-703) was a versatile scholar who wrote a commentary on Śabarabhāṣya. It is in three parts: 1. Śloka-vārtika (1. 1) 2. Tantra-vārtika (1. 2 to 3. 8) and 3. Tup tīkā (4. 12). Besides, he is also ascribed to be the author of one Bṛhatṭikā and another Madhyamaṭikā. These tīkās are not available now. The main object of Śloka-vārtika was to offer a strong criticism of Buddhistic doctrines and it deals mainly with the philosophical exposition. Remaining two parts were intended for a detailed explanation of J. S. and S. Bh. Kumārila, while writing the independent commentary, founded a school of his own, which came to be recognised the Bhaṭṭa school.

Prabhākara (650-700), the founder of another school i.e. Prābhākara school or Guru school, wrote two independent commentaries on S. Bh., i. e. Bṛhatī also called Nibandhanatīkā and Laghvī, otherwise Vivarāṇa tīkā. Prabhākara criticised the doctrines propounded by Kumārila and differed from him on numerous points. The divergence starts from the very first sūtra itself. Dr. Jha is of the view that Prabhākara is more faithful to S. Bh. than Kumārila¹ and Prof. Hiriyanna also thinks that original teachingst of the Mīmāṃsā is better preserved in the writings of Prabhākara.² But so far as Bṛhatī is concerned, I cannot subscribe to this opinion. On many occasions Prabhākara has given forced interpretations and has twisted the Bhāṣya in order to suit his own views. Prof. Kuppuswami Sastry is of the view that Prābhākara school must have been represented in the anti-Kumārila period of Mīmāṃsā, by writers like Bhaṭṭa mitra.³

Opinions have been expressed regarding the teacher-pupil relationship between Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara. The title, "Guru" of Prabhākara is explained by a curious incident. Once when Kumārila had to explain an ambiguous passage, "Atrāpi noktam tatra tu noktam iti dviruktam", he could not make out of the puzzle. After sometime, one of his disciples, Prabhākara, solved the puzzle, "Atra api na uktam tatra tu na uktam iti dvīḥ uktam" and gave the

solution. The teacher was immensely pleased with it and commended Prabhākara for his ingenious explanations by conferring on him the title, 'Guru'. From that time onwards Prabhākara came to be known as Guru and his school as Gurumata.

Kumārila and Prabhākara, the founders of the two schools gave a systematic form to the Mīmāṃsā, discussing in detail all the important philosophical topics which had been incidentally dealt with by Jaimini and Śabara. Almost the entire later Mīmāṃsā literature came to be based on these two authors. Even those who, coming after them, wrote direct commentaries on the J S belonged to either of these two schools. Scholars like Maṇḍanamīśra, Umveka, Vācaspatimīśra, Pārthaśārathi and Khaṇḍadeva were the foremost among the followers of the Bhāṭṭa school. Śālikaṇṭha, Bhavaṇāṭha, Candra, Nandīśvara and Rāmānujācārya were the only followers of the Prabhākara school. A third school was added to these two in the name of Murārimīśra whose views are generally referred to as Miśramata by the later writers¹.

Dr. Umeś Miśra describes glorious past of the Prabhākara school,² thus : "Of these two schools the Prabhākara school became more and more popular. It attracted the attention of scholars from different parts of the country. There was hardly a scholar of Mīmāṃsā who did not study and write on this school. But several of these scholars pre-

¹ Murāri was a great Mīmāṃsaka who held independent views distinct from those of Kumārila and Prabhākara on several topics of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, which has led to the saying—'Murāriḥ tṛtiyāḥ panthāḥ.' He is placed between the eleventh and the twelfth centuries A.D. Two works ascribed to him are available: 1. The Tripādi nītinayana is a commentary on J S 1-2-4; 2. The Ekādaśādhyāyādhikarāṇa deals with Tantra and Āvāpa which forms the subject matter of the eleventh chapter of the J. S.

Citations in Śabara-bhāṣya p. 10

² Jha commemoration vol. p. 242.

served their own individuality and created several subdivisions under this school. The reason why this school became so popular seems to be that, unlike the Bhāṭṭa school it gave more scope for independent reasoning." Sri P. V. Kāṇe also supports the view and shows epigraphical evidences for that¹. However, later the Bhāṭṭa school became more popular than the Prābhākara school and eclipsed it. Till the publication of the Prakaraṇa-pañcikā and of Dr. Jha's thesis on this school, the details concerning this school was practically restricted to the references given by the Bhāṭṭās, etc.

In this thesis, I propose to study the problems regarding differences between Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools of Mīmāṃsā in the context of epistemology, ontology and Sāstra topics. In the course of discussions, an attempt is made to co-ordinate and evaluate the explanations regarding the differences provided by the schools themselves.

As the literature of the schools is very vast, it has compelled me to limit the study to the selected works under each of the schools, the texts which are of basic importance and have constructive value only are selected for the present study. I have selected as far as possible the works of the founders of these schools, as well as some celebrated works of each school, such as Sāstradīpikā, Prakaraṇapañcikā, etc. The manuals, which contain the elaboration or compendium of what has been said in original texts of the schools and the works of modern scholars are also consulted for a clear and critical presentation of the subject matter.

References to the concept of differences of the schools occur partly in the works dealing with particular schools or systems such as the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, Epistemology of Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, Karma Mīmāṃsā, etc., or the standard works dealing with the history of Indian philosophy. The problem however, is not studied independently

and systematically. The present work is devoted mainly to what has been written by the Mīmāṃsakas in their works. In such cases, the author cannot claim originality in the real sense of the term. But still, it is hoped that the work will fulfil a hitherto unsatisfied need of a systematic account of the nature and basis of the divergences of the two Mīmāṃsā schools.

The material presented is systemwise and topicwise. The Bhāṭṭa view is discussed first and is followed by the Prabhākara view.

In the case of Sanskrit technical terms, the usually adopted English renderings have been accepted and the original terms are given in brackets to avoid confusion. I had to depart from the accepted translation sometimes, to make the meaning as clear as possible. However, when I found no translation which can retain the original shade of meaning, I preferred to retain the original Sanskrit term only.

At the end of book I have given a list of works consulted during the preparation of this work. In most of the cases, the important passages have been quoted in original in the foot-notes. In some cases, to avoid elaboration, only the reference to the original texts is given.

In this section, I will provide a list¹ of authors of Mīmāṃsā literature with their works, to give an idea of Bhāṭṭa's predominance over Prābhākaras. The list describes about 119 authors who wrote some works on Mīmāṃsā. Of the 171 works whose titles are known to us, only 161 are available now; the remaining ones, if we know anything about them, are known through fragmentary references taken from the works of philosophers who addressed polemics toward their views. Of the 161 works available in manuscript, 79 have been edited, some more than once, and 12 have been translated wholly or partially into English.

LIST OF MIMĀṂSĀ AUTHORS AND WORKS

Date	Name	Place	Work/s
300 BC	Jaimini		Jaimini Sūtras (T)
100 BC	Upavarṣa	V	on J S
100 BC	Bodhāyana	V	on J S
100 BC	Bhavadāsa	V	on J S
57 BC	Sabaravāmin		Sābara Bhāṣya (T)
400 AD	Bhartṛmitra	V	on S Bh.

PRĀBHĀKARA SCHOOL

650-720	Prabhākara	Kerala	Bṛhati (E) Laghvī
690-760	Salikanātha	Bengal	Rjvimalā on Bṛhati (E)
			Dipasikha on Laghvī
			Prakaraṇa Pañcikā (E)
			Bhāṣya pariśiṣṭā (E)
1050-1150	Bhavanātha	—	Nayaviveka (E)

1 The list primerly based on Dr. Umesh Misra's critical Bibliography to PMIIS pp 5-68 and V. A. Ramasvami sastri's Intr. to Tattva śuddhi pp 1-149. Abbreviations used :—

T	Translated and Published	M	available in Manuscript (s)
E	Published	N	Nyāya
Bh	Bhāṭṭa	M	Mīmāṃsā
SBh	Sabara Bhāṣya	TV	Tantra Vārtika
SV	Sloka Vārtika	MNP	M. N. Prakāśa
			BD Bhaṭṭa Dipikā

1100	Candra (Gurumatācārya)	Mithila	Nayaratnākara Amṛta bindu	(M) (M)
1220	Nandīśvara		Prabhākara Vijaya	(E)
1400	Bhaṭṭa viṣṇu	?	N Tatvasangraha	(M)
1400	Ravideva	?	Viveka tatva on	
			N viveka	(E)
1500-70	Varadarāja	Tamil	Dīpikā on	
			N viveka	(M)
1750	Rāmānujācārya	Dharmapuri (AP)	Tatva rahasya Nāyaka ratna on	(E), (E),
18 C	Govinda Bhaṭṭa	?	N ratnākara	(E),
18 C	Udayapūjyapāda	Malbar	M N sangraha Adhikaraṇa	(M) (M)
			Slokārtha dīpikā	

BHĀTTĀ SCHOOL

620-680	Kumārila Bhaṭṭa	Andhra	Sloka Vārtika Tantra Vārtika Tuptikā Bṛhaṭṭikā, Madhyamaṭikā	(T), (T), (T), (T),
615-695	Maṇḍana Miśra	Mahismati	Vidhiviveka Bhāvanā viveka Vibhrama viveka M Sūtrānukrāmaṇi Spoṭasiddhi	(E) (E), (E), (E), (T)
700-760	Umveka (Bhavabhūti)	?	Commentaries on SV & Bhāvanā viveka	(E)
820-900	Vācaspati Miśra	Mithila	N kaṇikā on Vidhiviveka Tattvabindu	(E), (E)
1050-20	Pāthasārathi Miśra	,,	N Ratna Mālā Tantra ratna on Tuptikā	(E), (E), (E),
11th C	Bhavadeva	Raḍha	Sāstra Dīpikā	(T)
11th C	Sucarita Miśra	Mithila	Tautatimata tilaka on Tuptikā	(M)
			Kaśikā on SV	(E)

1170-12	Halayudha Bhaṭṭa	Bengal	M Śāstra Sarvasva (E)
1170-12	Someśvara Bhaṭṭa	—	N Sudhā on TV (E)
1200	Paritośa Miśra	Bengal	Ajitā on TV (E)
1200-00	Cidānanda	Kerala	Nītitatvāvirbhāva (M)
1230-00	Gangādhara	Salmali	N Pārāyaṇa on TV (M)
1269-69	Vedānta Deśika	Kanchi	M' pādukā (E), Seśvara M. (E)
1297-86	Mādhavācārya	Hampi	JN mālāvistara (E)
1350-00	Paramesvara I	Guruvayur	Juṣadhvam Karaṇi & Svaditam Karaṇi on N Kaṇikā (M)
1400	Anantanārāyaṇa	Bengal	Vijayā on Ajitā
1400	Parameśvara II	Guruvayur	V on Vibhrama viveka and Sphoṭasiddhi (M), Tatva vibhāvanā on Tatva biudu (E)
1400	Vallabhā Cārya	Andhra	P M Kārikas (M)
1450	Indrapati Thākur	Miṭhila	M Palvala (M)
1450	Parameśvara III	Guruvayur	M Sūtrārtha sangraha (M), V on Kaśikā (M)
1478	Govinda Thakur	Mithila	Adhikaraṇamālā (M)
1500	Laugākṣi Bhāskara	Andhra	Arthasangraha (T)
1500	Bhaṭṭa Keśava	„	M Arthaprakāśa
1500-42	Raghunatha Bh.	Bengal	M' ratna (M)
1500-75	Varadaraja	Tamil	Raṇakabhāvanā Karikāvivaraṇa (M)
1513	Narayaṇa Bh. I	Benares	V on SD (M)
1520-93	Appayya Dikṣita	Kanchi	Vidhīrasāyana with Sukhopayojanī (E) Upakrama parākrama (E) Vādanakṣatrāvalī (E) Mayūkhāvalī on SD (E) Citrapaṭa (E), Dharma (M) Paribhāṣā (M)

1520	Venkatesvara		Vārtikābharaṇa on
	Dikṣita	South	Tupṭikā (M)
1539-97	Vijayenbra Tirtha	Tanjore	N Adhvare dīpikā (M), M N kaumudi (M), Upasamhāra vijaya (M)
1543	Ramakṛṣṇa Bh.	Benares	Siddhānta chandrikā on Sastra Dipika (E)
1550-20	Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa	„	Prakaśa on SD (M) M. Bālaprakāśa (E) M. Sārasangraha (E) Vidhīrasāyana- dūṣaṇa (M)
1560-30	Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa II	Malabar	Nibandhanā on TV (M) Mānameyodaya IP (T)
1562	Devanātha Thā.	Mithila	Adhikaraṇakaumudi M
1580-50	Āpadeva	M'rastra	M N prakāśa (T) Adhikaraṇacandrikā M
1580-50	Rījacūḍāmaṇi Diksita	Andhra	Tantra Śikhāmaṇi on JS (M), Karpūra Vārtika on SD (M)
1590-60	Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa	M'rastra	Bhāvārtha on TV (M) Āloka on SD (M) Sāstramālā on JS (M)
1590-60	Dinakara Bhaṭṭa	M'rastra	Bh. Dinakarī on JS (M)
1590-60	Venkatādhvarin	Kanci	Vidhitraya pritrāṇa (M) M Makaranda (M)
1600-50	Appayya Diksita II	Kanci	Tantrasiddhānta dīpikā M Viśayasangraha dīpikā (M), Durūha Śikha (M)
1600-65	Khaṇḍadeva	Benares	Bh. Dipikā on JS (E) Bh. Rahasya (E) Bh. Kaustubha on Bhaṭṭa Dīpikā (E)
1600-70	Gopāla Bhaṭṭa	M'rastra	Vidhibhūṣaṇa (M)
1600-70	Jivadeva	M'rastra	Bh. Bhāskara (M)
1600-70	Koṇḍadeva	M'rastra	Bh. Matapradipikā (M)
1600-70	Ramakrishna- Diksita	Kumbha- konam	M N darpana on JS (M)

1600-70	Raghavendra Sv-	M'Alaya	Bhāṭṭa Sangraha	(E)
1600-70	Kavindrācārya	?	Vyākhyā on TV	(?)
1600	Venkatesvara Dī.	Tanjore	Vārikiśabharāṇa on TT	(E)
1600	Somanātha Dikṣita	Andhra	Mayūkhamaṇalikā on Sāstra dipikā	(E)
1600	Yajñanārāyaṇa Dī.	South	Prabhāmaṇḍana on SD	(E)
1625-00	Ananta deva	M'rashtra	Bhāṭṭālankāra on M Nyāya prakāśa	(E)
1630-00	Ananta Bhaṭṭa	M'rashtra	Vṛtti on Sāstramālā (M)	
			N Rahasya on JS (M)	
1630-00	Viśveśvara Bhaṭṭa	M'rashtra	Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi (M)	
			Kusumāñjali on JS (M)	
			Sivārkodaya on SV (M)	
1630-00	Kollur Nārāyaṇa Śāstry	Andhra	M Sarvasva (M)	
			Vidhi viveka (M)	
			Vidhi darpaṇa (M)	
1640-20	Sambhu Bhaṭṭa	Benares	Prabhāvalī on BD (E)	
1650	Gadādhara Bh.	Bengal	Vidhisvarūpanirṇay (M)	
1650	Vaidyanātha	?	Prabhā on	
	Tatsat		Nyāya bindu (E)	
1650	Pedda Dikṣita	Andhra	Bh. Paribhāṣā (M)	
1650	Nārāyaṇa tīrtha	Benares	Bh. Bhāṣā prakāśa (E)	
1660	Narāyaṇa Sudhi	South	Bh. Nayodaya (M)	
1660	Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita	Calicut	Mānameyodaya IIP (T)	
1675-17	Murāti Miśra	Mithila	Āngatva Nirukti (E)	
17 Cetury	Nilakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa	Benares	M N Sangraha (M)	
17 C.	Sankara Bhaṭṭa	M'rashtra	Bh. Bhāskāra on JS (M)	
17 C.	Nārāyaṇa	South ?	Vidhi Camatkāra (M)	
17 C.	Nārāyaṇa	Kerala	Viśamagranthabhedik (M)	
17 C.	Śrinivsa Dāsa	South	Vidhiratnāvali (M)	
17 C.	Ramānuja Dāsa	South	Tantralahari on JS (M)	
1700-60	Annam Bhaṭṭa	Andhra	Subodhini on TV (M)	
			Rāṇakojjivini on	
			Nyāyasudhā (M)	
			Rāṇakabhāvanā	
			krikā vivaraṇa (M)	
1700-00	Bhāskara Rāya	Andhra	Candrodaya on BD (M)	
			Vādakutūhala (M)	

1700-60	Kṛṣṇa Yajvan	Andhra	M Paribhāṣā	(T)
1700-60	Yellu Bhaṭṭa	Andhra	Sūtra dīpikā	(M)
1700-70	Rāmakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita	Malwa	Yuktisneha pūraṇī on Śāstra dīpikā	(E)
1700-70	Vāsudeva Dīkṣita	Tanjore	Adhvare M kutūhalā Vṛtti on JS	(E)
1725-75	Balaṁ Bhaṭṭa	Andhra	Piṣṭa Paśu M	(M)
1725	Brahmānanda Sa-	Bengal ?	M Candrikā on JS	(M)
1760-30	Vanceśvarayajvan	K koṇam	Bh Cintāmaṇi on BD(E)	
18C.	Aḥobila	South	Vākyārtha ratnamālā with Tātparya	
			Prakāśikā	(M)
18 C	Anantācārya		Vidhīsudhākara	(M)
18 C	Annu Śāstry	Parālam	Tantrasiddhānta saṅgraha	(M)
18 C	Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sa-	?	Nyāyāmoda	(M)
18 C	Garudadhvaja	South	Viśayasangraha dīpikā	
18 C	Mahadevavedāntin		Vyākhyā on JS	(M)
18 C	Lakṣmaṇārya	Karṇataka	Tantravilāsa	(M)
18 C	Mukundānanda	Kerala	V on Nititativāvirbhāva	
18 C	Nilakaṇṭha	Kerala	V on Nititativāvirbhāva	
18 C	Rāghavānanda		MSūtradīdhition JS(M)	
	Sarasvatī		M Stabaka	(M)
18 C	Ramakṛṣṇa Udici	South	M Achikaraṇa	
	Bhaṭṭācārya		Kaumudi	(M)
18 C	Ravi	Kerala ?	M Prameyasangraha M	
18 C	Rameśvara	?	Vidhiviveka	(M)
18 C	Subrahmaṇya		Sastropanyāsamālikā M	
18 C	Uttamaślokatīrtha		Laghu nyāya sudhā on Tūptikā	(M)
18 C	VenkaṭaNārāyaṇa	Madurai	Vidibhūṣaṇa	(M)
1850	Rāmeśvara	Benares	Vihāravāpi on JS	(M)
			Subodhini on JS	(M)
20th C	Dr. Ganganath Jha	Gandha-varī	M. Maṇḍana on M Anukramaṇikā	(E)
20th C.	D T Tātācārya	Tanjore	M Abhyudaya	(E)
			V on M Paribhāṣā	(E)
20th C	Sudarṣanācārya	Punjab	Prakāśa on SD	(E)

20th C	Kṛṣṇānātha Nyāya Pancanana	Pūrvastali	V on M N P	(E)
20th C	Cinnasvami Sastri	Madras	V on MNP	(E)
20th C	Vamana Sastri	Poona	Paśvālambhana M	(E)
	Kinja Wadekar			
20th C	Kevalānanda Sa-	Satara	M Kośa	(E)
h0th C	Vasudeva Sastri	Poona	Prabhā on M N P	(E)
	Abhayankar			
1925	P. Sūryanarayāṇa Sastri	Vijaya-nagaram	Bhavaprakāśa on Bh. Rahasya	(E)
(B) Some Critical works in English on Mimāṃsā				
A. B. Keith	Karma Mimāṃsā		Calcutta	1923
Paśupatinātha	Introduction to PM		Calcutta	1923
P. V. Kane	History of PM System		Poona	1924
Chintamani	History of PM Sastra Thesis		Madras	1933
Ganganatha Jha	PM in its sources Prabhākara school of M		Benares	1964
Govardhan P Bhat	Epistemology of the Bhaṭṭa school of PM		Benares	1970
Vacaspati	Theory of selfvalidity of Knowledge in Mimāṃsā		PhD thesis	1967
D V Gorge	Citations in Śabara-bhāṣya		Calcutta	
G V Devasthali	M. the Vākyā sāstra of Ancient India		Poona	1952
			Poona	1959
(C) Some Works, which include a chapter on Mimāṃsā				
Maxmuller	Six systems of Indian philosophy			1899
S Radhakṛṣṇan	History of Indian philosophy	London		1941
S N Das gupta	A History of Indian philosophy	Cambridge		1922
Hiriyanna	Out Lines of Indian philosophy	Britain		1932
	Essentials of Indian philosophy	London		1942
PV Kane	History of Dharma Sastra	Poona		1967
Umeś Miśra	History of Indian philosophy	Alhabad		1959
HT Cole brooke	Essays on the Religious and Philosophy of the Hindus	Delhi		1972
K K Dikṣit	Indian Logic	Vaiśāli		1915
Sivakumar	Upamāna in Indian philosophy	Poona		1986
T M Srinivasan and Sri Laxmi	Sense Perception in Scince and Sastras	Sringeri		1968

MEANS OF VALID KNOWL

PERCEPTION

We shall turn to problems of epistemology if we shall survey the ontological categories. We to treat epistemology before metaphysics because of the objects of knowledge is grounded in the me ledge only [Mānādhinā Meyasiddhiḥ]. This is r our own times, where all metaphysical problems through an analysis of knowledge ; and again, all cal criticism is usually based upon epistemological .

The term ‘Pramāṇa’ derived from the root ‘I prefix ‘Pra’) meaning ‘to measure out’. Pram designating valid knowledge. The validity of a grounded in a Pramāṇa, a means of valid knowledg ‘Pramāṇa’ has two expressed senses. One is Pra knowledge and other Pramā-karāṇa or means of Grammer admits of the formation of the word senses. According to Paṇini, the suffix here is ‘lyu’. The suffix can be used without attaching any extra that of the root. In this case the word Pramāṇa are synonyms. The suffix can also mean ‘means’, i. the word expresses the meaning of means of right In the present context, the word is used in the lat viz., means of right knowledge.

A means of knowledge is defined as the collecti conditions of right knowledge. Jaimini, the Sūtrak yes the three attributes, viz., 1) absence of defects i

[Aautpattika], 2) absense of contradictory knowledge [Avyati-reka], and 3) Previously unacquired [Arthe' nupalabhdhe],¹ to the means of Dharma. Hence it is clear that the constituents of a means of knowledge are— absence of defects in the source, absence of contradiction and the apprehension of that which was not previously known.

According to Sabarasvāmin, the bhāsyakāra, consciousness is the means of knowledge but, unlike the Buddhist, he holds that the result produced by the means of knowledge is different from the means itself. This result is knownness (Jñātatā) of the object.

The Buddhist gives definition of means of knowledge as, ‘a non contradicted experience of an object hither to uncognised’ (Anadhigatārthādhigantṛ Pramāṇam avisamvādi Jñānam)². The criticism of Kumārila and his followers is directed against the Buddhist view that this definition is too comprehencive (Atiyāpta) and too narrow (Avyāpta) as it includes some cases of memory and excludes inferential knowledges of past and future objects under right knowledge because, some cases of memory possess efficiency and the inferential knowledges lack practical efficiency.³

The Naiyayika defines means of knowledge as, ‘the instrument of knowledge’ [Pramā karaṇam Pramāṇam]⁴. Even thou there is no dispute about the definition but, we can see a controversy over the validity of restatement. The Naiyāyika do not accepts validity to restatemenīs. According to him it does not possess any difference from the previous knowledge either in the determination of facts or in empirical usage. Hence it should not be included in right knowledge. But the Bhāṣṭa accepts validity to restatements like continuous streams of knowledge [Dhārā Vāhika Jñāna].

- 1 औत्पत्तिरस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः तस्य ज्ञानमूलदेशः, अव्यतिरेकठचार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं JS, 1-1-5 औत्पत्तिकशब्देन कारणदोष निवृत्तिः । अव्यतिरेकपदेन वाचप्रत्ययनिरासः । अर्थेऽनुपलब्धे इत्यनुवादत्वम् ।
- 2 PV, 1-1. अविसंवादकं ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानम् । NBT, p, 17
- 3 KK, p, 102
- 4 प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम् । बत्र च प्रमाणं लक्ष्यं, प्रमाकरणं लक्षणम् । TB, p, 1

BHĀTTA VIEW

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa defines means of knowledge as that knowledge which is means in enabling us to apprehend that ‘special luminosity’ [Prakāśa Viṣeṣa] which abides in the objects apprehended.¹ Pārthaśārathi says that what constitutes means of knowledge is the knowledge of that which is not contradicted by a subsequent experience and which relates to something not previously apprehended [Kāraṇa doṣa bādhaka jnāna rahitam agrhitagrāhi jnānam: Pramāṇar].² One may ask that in a continuous stream of knowledge [Dhīrāvahika Jnāna] [referring to the same object], we have fixing our attention on the object, different intellections of the same object, e.g. ‘this is a book this is a book and so on’; the intellections that are subsequent to that which is the first member of the series are merely a repetition and as such they [‘the later ones’] cease to be valid. Reply of the Bhāttas to this is that, even there, there is the knowledge of each succeeding element of time like, ‘this’ ‘this’, which was unknown, and because the existence of the book in the succeeding moment is not understood by the previous knowledge.³

The Bhāttā accepts six means of right knowledge. They are : perception [Pratyakṣa], inference [Anumāna], verbal testimony [Sabda], analogy [Upamāna], Presumption [Arthāpati] and non-apprehension [Anupalabdhi]. The Materialist [Cārvāka] recognize only one means of right knowledge, viz, perception.⁴ He rejects the validity of inference on the ground that there is not sufficient warrant for believing in the truth of the pervasion [vyāpti] which forms its basis. But this argument stultifies the Materialist’s own position. His conclusion that ‘inference is not valid’ is itself the result of induction, and points to a conviction that in one case, atleast, the relation of pervasion holds true.

1 तस्माद्वृदं यदुत्पन्नं नापि संवादमृच्छति ।

ज्ञानान्तरेण विज्ञानं तत्प्रमाणं प्रतीयताम् ॥ sv, p, 103

2 SD, p, 45 3 ibid, p, 45

4 चार्वाकास्तावदेकं द्वितयमपि पुनर्बाद्वैशेषिकौ द्वौ

भासर्वेज्ञश्च सांख्यास्त्रितयमृदयनादा श्चतुष्कं वदन्ति ।

प्राहुः प्राभाकराः पञ्चकमपि च वयं तेऽपि वेदान्तविज्ञाः

षट्कं पौराणिकास्त्वष्टकमभिदधिरे सम्भवैति ह्ययोगात् ॥ MM, p, 19

Buddhists say that as there are only two kinds of objects, so there can be only two kinds of means of right knowledge to grasp each of them. And there is no third kind of object in addition to perceptible and inperceptible. There can be nothing which is neither perceptible nor inperceptible. Perception is able to grasp perceptible objects, and inference can grasp inperceptible hence, only two means of knowledge.¹ Vaiśeṣikas also accept only two. They include verbal testimony in inference. Their argument is that in the form of a inference in which the words or the meanings of words in a sentence form the subject [Pakṣa] ; the connection of meanings remembered through these words forms the probandum [Sādhyā] ; on account of group words possessing such accessories as verbal expectancy, etc., forms the reason ; even like my sentence forms the example.² Putting forward this inference, the vaiśeṣika argues that while the verbal testimony can be had through inference. But the Bhāṭṭa refutes this argument by pointing out dissimilar knowledges that arise respectively through inference and word. If the argument of the vaiśeṣikas that verbal testimony also arises through inference, then the knowledge that arises through inference must be, 'I know this by inference'. But this is dissimilar to the knowledge that rises among people, for it is observed that one gets the notion, 'I know this through verbal testimony', whenever verbal knowledge is gained. There fore, verbal knowledge is a distinct means of knowledge.

Sāṅkhyas and Bhāsarvajna accept three means of right knowledge, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony. Other means of knowledge noted by other philosophers, according to Bhāsarvajna, could be included under these three.³ He argues later with great ingenuity that his system of three means of right knowledge does not, infact, go against Gautama's

1 प्रत्यक्षमनुमानऽच प्रमाणं हि द्विलक्षणम् । प्रमेयं तत्र सिद्धं हि न प्रमाणान्तरं भवेत् ॥ प्रमाणसमुच्चय, 1st chapter.

2 वाक्यानि स्वस्मारितार्थसंसर्गवन्ति, आकांक्षाद्युत्पादकशक्तिमत्वात् मद्वाक्यवत् ।

3 Nyāya sangraha Vārttika, p, 6

system of four. Gautama first spoke of five sense organs in NS 1-1-12 and then in another place accepted the internal organ (mind) as the sixth sense organ. This shows that, according to Bhāsarvajna, Gautama's enumeration of items was not always meant to be exact or even mutually exclusive of other lists. Thus, although Gautama mentioned four means of right knowledge he would not have denied the fact there are only three.¹ This argument is not satisfactory because it was criticized by his own Naiyāyikas. Naiyāyikas accept four means of right knowledge.²

The Prābhākara adds one more means of right knowledge, viz., presumption [Arthāpatti] to the list of means of right knowledge. Their argument is that when we learn something and find it difficult to understand because of incompatibility we assume something else in order to understand it. It is different from inference, while in inference the probans (Hetu) cannot exist in the subject unless the probandum (Sādhya) does, in presumption the relation is reserved ; the Probandum cannot exist in the subject unless the probans does.

The Bhāṭṭa adds one more, viz., non-apprehension, to the list of means of right knowledge. The knowledge about non-existence of an object is got through the non-apprehension. Paurāṇikas accept Concurrence (Saṃbhava) and Tradition (Aitihya) also as distinct means of right knowledge. But the Mīmāṃsaka rejects special status to them as distinct means of knowledge on the following grounds : concurrence is knowledge of a part derived from knowledge of the whole but this is merely a kind of inference. [e.g. since there are a thousand people in the room, there are a hundred people there]. Tradition is verbal testimony if it is true, and not a means at all if it is not. Therefore six only are the means of right knowledge. Here the Rāmāyaṇa also supports the six fold theory of means of knowledge, thus, ' O Rāma ! in the world there are six means of knowledge by which, everything is comprehended'³.

1 Nyāya Sangraha Vārtika (Nyāya Sāra), p, 81

2 NS, 1-1-4

3 The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmiki, Aranya Kāṇḍa, 52-8

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

It is said that a thing or principle can be established by definitions and means of right knowledge and not by a mere statement (*Na hi Pratijnāmātreṇa Vastusiddhiḥ. Lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyāṁ Vastusiddhiḥ*),¹ or that the establishment of an object of knowledge depends upon the means of right knowledge [*Mānādhinā meyasiddhiḥ*]. Śalikanātha says that there are conflicting views among the philosophers as regards the number of means of right knowledge, etc., though the establishment of the object of knowledge through the detailed the common feature of all the systems of Indian philosophy.²

As described above, the word, ‘Pramāṇa’ has two meanings :— 1) *Pramā* or right knowledge and 2) *Pramā-Karaṇa* or means of right knowledge. The Bhāṭṭas follow the latter meaning, i.e. means of right knowledge and the Prābhākaras follow the former, i.e. right knowledge. Śalikanātha defines *Pramāṇa* as follows, ‘experience is right knowledge and it is something different from memory’ [‘*Anubhūtiḥ Pramāṇam sā smṛteranyā*’].³ Memory is regarded as invalid knowledge in as much as it stands in need of a previous knowledge. According to the Prābhākara, it is not a necessary condition of validity of knowledge that its object should be one that is not already known.

One may ask here that this definition is too comprehensive (*Ativyāpta*) as it includes error under knowledge. The reply of the Prābhākara to this is that there is no error at all, but what passes for error as two knowledges, occurring consecutively,

1 Quoted, for example, JNMV, 1-1-2

2 स्वरूपसंख्यार्थफलेषु वादिभिः यतो विवादा बहुधा वित्तेनिरे ।
ततो वशं तत्प्रतिबोधसिद्धये प्रमाणपारायणमारभामहे ॥ PP, p, 122

3 अनुभूतिः प्रमाणं सा स्मृतेरन्या स्मृतिः पुनः ।
पूर्वविज्ञानसंस्कारमात्रजं ज्ञानमुच्यते ॥ PP, p, 127

Valid knowledge is experience, and it is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises solely from the impression left by some previous experience.

neither of which is in itself erroneous. Of the knowledges one is perceptual and other is recollective as in that of a piece of nacre mistaken for silver [Sūkti-rajata]. We only forget that they are two knowledges. Actually speaking there is no wrong knowledge at all.¹

The controversy centres around the question whether a right knowledge is necessarily a new piece of information. The Prābhākara is emphatic in answering the question in the negative and the Bhāṭṭa in answering in the affirmative. The Prābhākara contends that if a means of right knowledge is rightly employed in knowing a thing, the following knowledge must be deemed valid, irrespective of whether the features thus known in the thing are familiar to us or not; the Bhāṭṭa's answer back by arguing that a thing as associated with one moment must work different from the same thing as associated with another moment, not to take knowledge of an unfamiliar feature in a thing means not to acquire right knowledge concerning this thing.

As might have become obvious us by now, the question whether memory is a case of right knowledge. The Prābhākara divides all knowledges in to those of the nature of memory and those not of the nature of memory but, unlike the Bhāṭṭa, he refuses to further subdivide the non-mnetic in to right, wrong, doubt, etc., and maintained that the non-mnetic knowledge is the nature of right knowledge. The number of means of right knowledge recognized by the systems of Indian philosophy as follows² — 1) The Materialists accept only one, viz., perception 2) The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists accept two viz., perception, and inference. 3) The Sāṃkhyas accept three, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony. 4) The Naiyāyikas recognize four, viz., perception, inference, verbal testimony and analogy.

1 ननु शुक्तिकायां रजतमिदमिति ज्ञानं PP, p, 122

2 तथा संख्यायामपि । चार्वाकाः प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं मन्यन्ते ।

प्रत्यक्षानुमानञ्च द्वे एव प्रमाण इति बोद्धाः वैशेषिकाश्च

NS on pp, 112

तत्र पञ्चविधं मानं प्रत्यक्षमनुमा तथा ।

शास्त्रं तथोपमानार्थपित्ती इति गुरोर्मतम् ॥ PP, p, 128

5) The Bhāṭṭas sanction six, viz., perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, presumption and non-apprehension. The Paurāṇikas add two more to the list, viz., probability [Sambhava] and Tradition [Aitihya]. The Prabhākaras, however, establish only five means of right knowledge, since they show that tradition can be included in verbal testimony, and probability in inference, and non-apprehension is superfluous.

Validity of Knowledge

Here, a doubt arises whether the validity and non-validity of right and wrong knowledges are self proved (Svataḥ) or proved by some other means (Parataḥ). Mīdhavācārya refers four principal views on this point, thus, “The Sāṅkhyas hold that both validity and non-validity are self-proved ; the Naiyāyikas hold that both are proved by some thing else (as inference, etc.) ; the Buddhists hold that the latter is self-proved and the former proved by something else ; the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that validity is self proved and non-validity proved by something else”¹

As we are mainly interested in determining validity only, the contest chiefly lies between the Mīmāṃsaka view of self-proof and the Naiyāyika view of proof by some other means.

NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

The Naiyāyikas say that the validity found in the apperception [Anuvyavasāya Jñāna], first, one has the knowledge, ‘This is water’. Next arises the apperception ‘I know this water’. In this apperception, water, its genus waterness (Jala-

I प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतस्सांख्याससमाश्रिताः ।
नैयायिकास्ते परतः सौगताश्चरमं स्वतः ॥
प्रथमं परतः प्राहुः प्रामाण्यं वेदवादिनः ।
प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्चाप्रमाणताम् ॥
Sarva darsana sangraha, p, 279

tva) and the relation between water and its genus -- all these three are objects, and all these are valid apprehensions. Here, their validity is not apprehended by apperception. Therefore, it is not self-proved but proved by other means [Parataḥ]. For example, first one has the knowledge of water, then one goes to take that water and finds the water. Here, the knowledge of water is valid because, this knowledge of water produces an action which in turn produces the fruit (of getting the water to drink etc.)¹

A negative example (vyatireka dṛṣṭānta) for the same is : 'That which is not like this, is not like this', i.e. 'where there is no motivation for an action that produces a fruit, there is also no validity'. In this way, the validity of the first knowledge is determined. The second and third knowledges are also determined to be valid on the strength of the example of the first knowledge. Thus, it is proved that the validity of knowledge is proved by inference (i.e. Parataḥ Prāmāṇya), a doubt arises as to what causes the production of validity in knowledge and what causes the apprehension of validity in knowledge.

Here, the discussion is as to whether validity also is caused by the causal apparatus that produces knowledge (Jñānotpādaka sāṃgrī) or by the apparatus other than the causal apparatus that produces knowledge. Here Naiyāyikas conclude that validity of perception is born of guṇa. In this case, the contact of the eye with the object capable of producing valid perception is the guṇa. If it is nonvalidity it is born of defect (Doṣajanya). In inference the knowledge of Vyāpaka (which is greater in extent) as existing in a place where there is Vyāpya (which is less in extent) is the guṇa. In analogy the knowledge of resemblance is the guṇa. In verbal testimony the knowledge of proper competency etc., is the guṇa. Thus, the causal apparatus of the validity of a knowledge being different from the causal apparatus bringing

¹ Nyāya Kandali, 91

Nyāya Kusumānjali, p, 4-1

Nyāya siddhānta muktāvali, p, 118

प्रमाणं न स्वतो ग्राह्यं संशयानुपपत्तिः ॥ Kārikāvali, 136

about a knowledge, it ought to be admitted that the production of the validity of knowledge (*jñāna prāmāṇyotpatti*) and the apprehension of validity (*jñapti*) are both caused by other sources (*parataḥ*).

BHĀTTA VIEW

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Naiyāyika view on the ground that it has to be admitted that the validity of knowledge is natural to that, for a capacity which is not natural to a thing cannot be produced in it by something else¹. Things certainly require a cause for their production, but once they are produced they perform their function all by themselves. Here Pārthasārathi comments that a jar requires clay, etc. for its production but not for its drawing water, etc. Similarly, a knowledge requires a cause for its production but it requires nothing else for its producing the function called ‘ascertainment of an object.’²

The chief objection against the Naiyāyika view is that if the validity of a knowledge is to be determined by an extra inference, the validity of that inference again will have to be ascertained by an another inference, and so on, ‘ad infinitum.’³ In this way there will be no certainty of knowledge. For that reason, to avoid the blemish ‘ad infinitum’ self-validity of knowledge is to be accepted.

The reason why it was pursued with so much interest by Mīmāṃsakas seems to be its important bearing on the question of the authority of the Vedas. If verbal testimony was self-vaid the validity of the Vedas was self-evident, and they required no external sanction to prove their claim to unflinching obedience;

१ स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां ग्रामाण्यमिति गम्यताम् ।

न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यते ॥

SV, Codanā, st, 47 ; NRM, p, 31 ; MM, p, 5

२ घटो हि मृत्पिण्डाकिं स्वजन्मन्येवापेक्षते, नोदकाहरणेऽपि तथा ज्ञानमपि
NRM, Codanā 47 ; SD, p, 97.

३ तस्यापि कारणे शुद्धे तज्जाने स्यात्प्रमाणता ।

तस्याप्येवमितीत्थं च न क्वचिद् व्यवतिष्ठते ॥

SV, Codanā, st, 51

while if verbal testimony was not self proved and proved by some other things, the Vedas required some external proof of their authority, and the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit of an author for the Vedas, hence the Veda could not be reliable.

The term, Svataḥ' means, 'both the knowledge and its validity are produced by one and the same material' (svajñāna janakasāmagritah jnaptih). The Bhāṭṭas maintain that the knowledge of knowledge is always of the nature of inferential knowledge and not of mental perception. Whenever a knowledge is produced through perception or inference, then by that knowledge a particular quality, 'knownness' (jñātatā) is produced in the known objects. As a result, we experience 'I have known the jar'. This knowledge appears only after the knowledge of jar. Prior to the production of this quality, 'knownness', we simply know 'it is a jar' by mere perception.¹

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

There is no difference, between the two systems of Mīmāṃsā, about the validity of knowledge but, the Prābhākara maintains that, in every knowledge, the knower, the known object, and knowledge itself, along with its validity are presented. They hold that knowledge is of self-illuminous nature. As a lamp first manifests the object, then itself and finally the wick, the locus of light, the knowledge also first manifests the object, then itself and finally the soul (Ātman), the locus of knowledge. Thus all perceptions include the object, the knowledge and the knower, the soul. It is known technically as 'tripuṭi-pratyakṣa'².

A comparative study of the Bhāṭṭa system and the Prābhākara system reveals the fact that both these systems have the following common points of agreement :— 1) No extra material is required in determining the validity. 2) The knowledge of the objects do not depend on the consciousness of after cognition, in which the subject is also presented [Anuvyavasāya] for its own manifestation. 3) All kinds of knowledge are

1 'Validity of knowledge in Indian Logic',
Dr. Rāghavan Felcitation Volume, p, 182.

2 Bṛhatī, p, 48

always tripartite cognition [Triputi gocara]. It would not be correct to say that only the knowledge 'I know the book' is tripartite perception because even in the knowledge, 'It is a book' we experience that this type of knowledge also includes the book, its form and its locus, the soul. It is in the fitness of the argument that this very knowledge also manifests the validity, and that the knowledge of book do not depend on any other extra material for its validity.

It may be observed here that it is only on the third point that the Bhāṭṭa differs from the Prābhākara because according to the Bhāṭṭa the knowledge being tripartite cognition could not become the cause of its own manifestation. This point of the Prābhākara appears to the Bhāṭṭa as a self contradictory one on the simple ground that the subject is always different from the object. The subject and the object are never identical. To admit knowledge as subject as well as object of manifestation would involve self-contradiction.

E R R O R

The Mimānsaka, like the Naiyāyi ka, declares that the invalidity of knowledge derives extrinsically [parataḥ] on the simple ground that wrong knowledge alway sdepends on visual defect. The vision of rope-snake [raju sarpa bhrānti] is just due to the lack of proper contact between eye and rope. This illusion, technically, called as Khyāti or error. All the systems of Indian philosophy have their own theories of error. They are:— 1) self apprehension [Ātmakhyāti] of the Idealist Buddhists [Yogacāra or Vijnānavāda Bauddhas], 2) apprehension of non being [Asat khyāti] of the Nihilist Buddhists [Madhyamika or Śūnyavāda Bauddhas], 3) non-apprehension [Akhyāti] of the Prābhākaras, 4) misapprehension [Anyathā khyāti] of the Naiyāyikas, 5) apprehension of indefinable [Anirvacaniya-

khyāti] of Advaita Vedāntins and 6) misapprehension [Viparīta khyāti] of the Bhāṭṭas.

The Idealist says that the object that is presented in an error is wholly mental, which is wrongly projected as something external. That is, in the rope-snake illusion, it is mental idea of snake that comes out and manifests as an external object after being superimposed on the rope. Thus, according to him, in an illusion, a subjective idea is cognized as an external object. They say that actually there are no external objects but only ideas [vijñānas]. Erroneous knowledge consists in the self or consciousness externalizing itself in the form of objects, such as the snake in the current example.

This theory was refuted by pointing out that the sublating knowledge, 'this is not silver' [nedam rajatam]; does not sublate the externality of the object of erroneous knowledge, nor does it establish the internality thereof¹.

The Nihilist says that the object that is presented in an illusion is wholly non-existent (Asat) i.e. in an illusion, a non-existent thing, say snake in the rope-snake illusion, is known as existent. According to him, error consists in the knowledge of a non-being as a being. In the example where the rope is cognized as snake, the person concerned knows snake, which is a non-being, as a being. Had the snake been a being the knowledge would not be an illusion. The Mīmāṃsaka criticizes it by asking how a non-being, which is of the character of the void, and is therefore devoid of all types of distinguishing characteristics, can ever be apprehended. Even if it be admitted that the knowledge of non-being is possible, then this theory does not differ essentially from the theory of misapprehension of the Mīmāṃsaka.

The Nihilist, further, on the analogy of dream knowledge, argues that, just as in the dream state, in instances of illusion arising during the waking state too, knowledge of object which is non-existent is possible. The objection of the Bhāṭṭa against to the view is that the Nihilist fails to note the real

character of the knowledge which cognizes objects in the dream state. What actually happens in a dream is that, due to several reasons, a series of past impressions lying dormant up to then become activated and give rise to the knowledge of dream objects. Hence the theory of apprehension of non-being cannot be established on the analogy of dream knowledges.¹

The Prabhākara holds that there is no illusory knowledge at all, and that which is called an illusory knowledge is made up of two elements, an experience and a recollection. When we know rope as snake we actually cognize only the qualities common to rope and snake. The qualities common to rope and snake revive the idea of snake in our mind by association. Here one is perception i.e. seeing the rope, and another is recollection i.e. remembering the snake. One of these two knowledges, recollection, is mistaken for perception. It is this non-apprehension of difference [bhedāgraha] that leads to illusory knowledge².

Here, the Bhāṭṭa argues against the theory of non-apprehension that why a person does fear while seeing the thing lying before him, if he does not take it as snake. The volitional decision could not be said to have been caused by the recollection of snake, as only the presence of the object itself, and not the recollection of it, can produce the activity; and snake is not present here. Hence the two in one theory cannot be established.

The Naivāyika view of error is what is called misapprehension or Anyathākhyāti, according to which, the error consists in taking one thing for another. That is, the object appears as ‘otherwise [anyathā]’ as some thing other than what it is. In the rope-snake illusion, for instance, rope is apprehended as otherwise i.e., as snake which exists in some other place. Thus, according to this view, illusion consists in perceiving snake not where it really is, but in the object rope.

1 ibid, pp. 119-144

2 अनन्तरञ्च रजते स्मृतिजिता तथापि च ।
मनो दोषात्तदित्यं शपरामश्वविवजितम् ॥
रजतं विषयीकृत्य नैव शुक्रितविवेचितम् ।
स्मृत्याऽतो रजताभास उपपन्नो भविष्यति ॥ PP, p. 50

The Naiyāyika's contention is that at the time of illusory perception one perceives the snake that is else where through a super-normal sense contact [jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti]. There is almost complete agreement between the Naiyāyika and the Bhāṭṭa regarding the explanation of error. But only the difference lies in the sense contact. The Naiyāyika interposes a super-normal sense contact between the visual organ and the real snake. But the Bhāṭṭa accepting the relation as given considers the relation as non-existent. If the word 'anyathā' means 'other than what it is' 'Viparita' means 'contrary to what it is'.

The Advaita philosopher says that in the current example, the illusory snake is an entirely new creation by Māyā with its two powers of projection and screening. Māyā screens the real nature of the 'this' also creates in its place a snake anew which the percipient observes. It [snake] comes into existence with the perception and goes out of existence with the cessation of perception. Thus, the snake is an entirely new creation for the time being, on the rope, by Māyā. The illusory snake is neither a positive (sat) nor a negative entity (asat). It cannot be an absolute reality as it gets sublated. For, absolute reality can never be sublated. It cannot be absolute void, because it is perceived. As the illusory snake does not admit of being definitely described as real or void, it should be called ; hence ; indefinable [anirvacaniya]¹.

This theory also does not differ much from the theory of misapprehension and in the case of delusion caused by the presence of an external adjunct [sopādhika-bhrama], the Advaitin also follows only the theory of misapprehension. The delusion may be explained thus : a man suffering from jaundice mistakes a white conch to be yellow. Here yellowness belongs to the bile and not to the conch. But the yellowness of the bile comes to be erroneously referred to the conch. That is , the illusion is possible here because of confusion between conch and the bile. Thus, illusion consists in the cognition of one thing as another thing. This is nothing but the theory of misapprehension. Hence it is clear that in the case of delusion caused by the pre-

1 Bhāmati, 1.1-4.

sence of an external adjunct, the Advaitin follows only the theory of misapprehension.

The Bhāṭṭa theory of error is known as misapprehension [viparita-khyāti]. According to it, in error, one cognizes a real object in the form of a different object which too is real. The contents of our knowledge as a complex may be false, but the several things we apprehend are true. Illusion creeps in during the synthetic activity of the mind. In the example of the rope-snake when the rope is seen as snake the erroneous knowledge that arises takes the form, 'this is a snake'. Here 'this' stands for the rope lying in front of the person, and it is first seen as something yonder lying and not as rope, the distinctive feature of rope being missed through some defect in sight. The visual perception of rope arises in the ordinary way, through the normal sense contact, between the sense organ and the object seen. The 'sakeness', which belongs to the real snake elsewhere, is presented here as the attribute of the rope seen as 'this'. It is therefore seen that the relation alone is false, the ontological status of both the subject and the predicate remaining unaltered¹.

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

The Prābhākara rejects the theory of misapprehension on the ground that if the possibility of a knowledge deviating from the true form of its object is once accepted, one would have to accept the possibility that all direct knowledge involves doubt as to its validity. In other words, even after perceiving an object, say for example, a jar, one would doubt whether it is really a jar ; for what guarantee is there that, as in the case of the rope, here also the knowledge has not deviated from the true form of its object. And if the theory of misapprehension is accepted, it would amount to accepting the proposition that in a case of illusion the knowledge reflects some thing other than the thing lying in front ; in which case the knowledge will have no object to rest upon.

Prabhākara describes the process of error as follows, "when a knowledge has for its object some thing which is similar to

1 SV, p. 245, st. 117 and p. 312, st. 160 (Com.)

another thing and when it fails to take note of the former thing's features that distinguish it from the latter, this knowledge generates memory of this latter thing in the person who is, however, ignorant of the fact that he is having a piece of memory. Thus are explained the knowledges like that of nacre as silver¹. One may rise an objection against the view that if an object must have such a nature as is revealed in a knowledge concerning itself there can be no wrong knowledges, while if there can be wrong knowledges an object need not have such a nature as is revealed in a knowledge concerning itself. The reply of the Prabhākara is that when there arises concerning rope that is similar to snake a knowledge which, on account of defective sense-organs, fails to take note of such features of the rope as are no doubt present there and distinguish it from snake, while taking note of only such of its features as are common to it and snake this knowledge gives rise to memory. On account of defect the knower does not have introspection with snake to the effect that he is having a memory.

That is why he makes no difference between the perceived thing and the recollected thing. Thus, as a matter of fact, here there take place two knowledges, viz., perception of 'it' and memory of snake, for otherwise it is impossible to say how the knowledge of snake, comes about in this case. Definitely, the knowledge of snake is not product of sense organs, for snake has not here come in contact with sense organs. It is a rule that sense organs do not produce knowledge concerning an object which has not come in contact with there, e.g., a blind person has no visual knowledges. Hence the concerned knowledge of snake is a case of memory. This is how the knowledges like that of rope as snake are explained as case of memory².

- 1 विषयान्तरसदृशमालम्ब्य अगृहीतविवेकं यदज्ञानमुत्पन्नं तत्सदृशविषयान्तरे स्मृतिहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यते स्मरामीति ज्ञानशून्यस्य । उपपन्नानि तावत् शुक्लिषु रजतादिज्ञानानि Brhati, pp. 50-51
- 2 विज्ञानद्वयं चैतत्, इदमिति प्रत्यक्षमिति । न हि तदिन्द्रियजम्, तेन सम्प्रयोगभावात् । असंयुक्ते चेन्द्रियं विज्ञानं न जनयति, अन्धस्यानुत्पादात् । स्मरणमेवेदम् । Rjvimalā, pp. 50-51

The theory of non-apprehension of the Prābhākara holds a good psychological analysis of illusion. In the sentences of D. Venkataramaiah¹, it has this advantage over the theory of misapprehension of the Bhāṭṭas in that it is true to the realism of the Mīmāṃsakas. While the Bhāṭṭas have to account for error by positing a relation [samsarga] which is non est and as such is subjective and so prove disloyal to their realistic postulate, the Prābhākaras, by cancelling error altogether and ascribing validity to all experience, can maintain their adherence to realism unimpaired.

The theory of non-apprehension of the Prābhākara seems to be an improvement upon the theory of apprehension of non-being of the Nihilist and the theory of self apprehension of the Idealist in this, that erroneous perception, according to it, does not, as it does in the view of Nihilist, lose its cognitive character altogether, nor is it reduced, as the Idealist reduces it, to a process of inner apprehension or introspection. So it is, in a sense, more satisfactory than the other two from the psychological point of view.

But according to this theory, there cannot be any verbal experience from the Vedic sentences which can deny the objects learnt already from the other sentences because, in that case, it will prove that the experience obtained from the first sentence is invalid. And this is against the Bhāṣyakāra on this point.²

- 1 D. Venkataramaiah's Eng. Translation of Sāstra Dipikā, Intro, p. XIV.
- 2 There are two kinds of such Vedic sentences. In both cases, the sentence that comes later contradicts the objects learned from the earlier one. These are called Prāptabādha and Aprāptabādha sentences. Prabhākara has to explain these two Bādhas which seem to militate against his Akhyātivāda.

Sabarāsvāmin is quite clear on this point. He urged that a certain thing experienced in one form from an earlier sentence in the Vedas is nullified by the experi-

PERCEPTION

All the systems of Indian philosophy accept that Pratyakṣa [perception] is the chief among the means of knowledge because, Inference and other means of knowledge depend on perception for their data, while perception is immediate and direct.

Perception is essentially a sensory knowledge arising from the contact of sense organs with the object. Inference, though obtained through sense organs, is different from perception as it gives the knowledge of distant objects indirectly. Similarly the remaining means of right knowledge. Perception being sensuous is evidenced by experience and convention. For, e.g. if one sees through visual organ or smells through olfactory

ence of a sentence occurring later, and thus Bādha takes place. This is called Prāptabādha. Here also Prabhākara wants to show that Śabara's words favour his own theory, and comments on the statements of the Bhāṣya stated above accordingly. He pleads that in the case of so called Prāptabādhās where the performance of certain actions is denied later at the time when it is to be performed, there is no real denial of actions learnt from the previous sentences and are brought down for performance. The rites that are once recommended as Āṅgas for execution in the Vikṛtiyāgas, are always considered as Āṅgas with reference to those Vikṛtis but their denial later means they are not needed in the performance of the Vikṛtiyāga as they are displaced by other Āṅgas. The term Bādha is used in this connection, because the Āṅgas considered as unnecessary are not performed and as a matter of fact, there is no denial of anything known already. This view of Prabhākara has been criticised by Pārtha-sārathi, and he had shown how this theory of Prabhākara militates against the unequivocal statements of Śabarāsvāmin on this point.

organ, etc., one has the knowledge of colour or smell, etc. Thus it is an experience, which is actual, resulting from the contact of sense organs with the objects.

The etymology of Pratyakṣa in the sense of means of knowledge is explained as Pratigatam akṣam or Akṣasya prati viṣayam vṛttih, the presence of a sense organ at each object. In the sense of knowledge, the same word is explained as Akṣam akṣam pratitya utpadyate or pratigatam āśritam akṣam, knowledge which is obtained through each sense organ. The perception knowledge is defined as that knowledge which is produced by the contact of sense organs with external objects.

The revered Jaimini defines perception as follows : “ Perception is a knowledge which appears in a person when there is contact of the sense organ with the object...” (Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhi-janmā tat pratyakṣam)¹. Thinking that the definition is fallacious, the commentator Upavarṣa interchanged the positions of the words, ‘Sat and Tat’ in the definition and reframed the same as follows : “ True perception is that which arises from the contact of a person’s sense organ with that object alone of which it is the perception” (Tat samprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhi-janmā tatpratyakṣam). It manifests the object actually present ; it cannot manifest the past, future, subtle, mediate and remote objects.

Sabaravamin observes, in this connection, that knowledge (of an object) arises first but is not known (object) first. It happens sometimes that even a known object is described as not known (referring to the past, for instance). Also, the form of knowledge is not apprehended without being denoted by the object. But, the knowledge as such can never be the object of perception. If the knowledge and the object were to be same, it is the knowledge that has to be denied an existence and not the object. The two are not identical in form. As a matter of fact, we infer knowledge without form (i. e. as of a particular thing), and perceive the object with form.

It is only with this intention that the Naiyāyikas not only

enumerate the six types of perception but also six fold sense-object contact. He also specifies the defects of the sense organs. They are : non contact of the sense organ with the mind, and affections of the sense organs such as jaundice, etc. The defects of the mind attachment, hatred, etc. That is right knowledge, in which are the mind, the sense organ and the object do not suffer from any kind of defects.

BHĀTTA VIEW

Almost all the philosophers indisputably accept the process of perception as described by Vātsāyana, 'The soul is united with the mind, the mind with the sense organ and this with the object. As a result of this action of contacts, perceptual knowledge is produced in the soul' [Ātmā manasā samyujyate. mana indriyeṇa Indriyam arthena, tataḥ pratyakṣam]¹. Following this process Pārthasārathi defines perception as follows, 'The knowledge that arises when there is sense-object contact is perception' [Indriyārtha samprayogajam jñānam pratyakṣam]². It is essentially a sensory knowledge arising from the contact of the sense organ with the object. E. g. if one sees through eyes or smells through nose, etc., one has the knowledge of colour or smell.

Pārthasārathi defines sense-organ as follows : ' Sense organ is that which generates a vivid and specific knowledge of the object with which it comes in contact ' [yat samprayukterthe viśadāvabhāsam vijñānam janayati tad indriyam ucyate']. It is an integral part of the body. This means that it acts in conformity with the body. That is, if favoured by the body (if the body is in good condition) it favours ; if injured, it does not work. Sense organs bring pleasure or pain to the soul by comprehending the objects. These are six, viz. visual (cakṣus), auditory (Srotra), olfactory (ghrāṇa), gustatory (jihvā) tactal (tvak) and, mind (manah). Among these, mind is the internal and the rest are external. The external organs are also different

1 Vātsāyana on GS, 1-1-4

2 SD, p. 34

3 ibid, p. 36

from one another by nature, location and function. The external organs are elemental, i.e. of the nature of elements. The olfactory sense organ is earthy, the gustatory sense organ is watery, the visual sense organ is of the nature of light, the tactual sense organ is space. Here the Naiyāyikas say that the auditory sense organ is of the nature of ether. Even the Neo-Bhaṭṭas also follow the view. Hence Nīrāyana says as follows :— What is called the visual sense organ is the light existing within the pupil of the eye ; then the water element at the tip of the tongue is the gustatory sense organ ; the earth particle within the nose is the olfactory sense organ ; the air particles distributed throughout the skin are what is called the tactual sense organ ; the auditory sense organ is only ether within the ear ; the mind, however, is all-pervasive, and it produces its effect in the body.”¹

Kumārila holds that the auditory sense organ is not of the nature of ether but, of space because the Veda says, ‘the auditory sense organ is from space [diśah śrotram]. He says that if it is absolutely necessary to deny the assertion of the Naiyāyikas, then we must seek to establish the fact of space being the sense of audition on the ground of its being laid down in the Veda.²

In respect of the elemental nature of the sense organs the Bhaṭṭas use the arguments :— for the perception of colour, the visual sense organ made of light element must be the cause because the light is also found to manifest colour ; for the perception of taste, the gustatory sense organ made of water element must be the cause because the water element is also found to manifest taste ; for the perception of smell, the olfactory sense organ made of earth element must

1 चक्षुनीम कनौनिकान्तरगतं तेजोऽथ जिह्वाग्रग-
स्तोयांशो रसतं क्षितेरवप्तवो धाणं च घोणोदरे ।
सर्वाङ्गं रसृताश्च माहतलबास्त्वड्नाम कण्ठोदरं
व्योमैव श्रवणं मनस्तु विभु तद्देहे च कार्यविहम् ॥ MM, p. 10

2 दिग्भागे तु समस्तोऽसावागपात्तु विशिष्यते ॥

be the cause because the earth element is also found to manifest smell, e.g. when the paste of margosa bark [nimba-tvak] is applied to sandal, the smell of the sandal is manifested ; for the perception of touch, the tactual sense organ made of air particles must be the cause because the air particles are also found to manifest touch. By the process of elimination the auditory sense organ is established to be of the nature of ether by the Naiyāyikās, but the Bhāṭṭas establish it to be of the nature of space, on the authority of scriptures.

Mind, which is an internal sense organ, is ubiquitous [vibhu] and is in eternal contact with the soul ; that soul and mind, in contact with each other, function only within the sphere of the body with which they happen to be associated : and that our experience is inconclusive and cannot be said to be such as would rule out the possibility of several knowledges arising at the same time. Contact is that relation between the sense organ and the object which leads to perception. This is established on the ground that remote objects are not known. The contact is actual in the case of touch and taste. It is of three kinds :— conjunction [saṃyoga], identity-with-what is conjoined [saṃyukta-tādātmya] and identity-with-what is identical-with-what is conjoined [saṃyukta-tādātmya-tādātmya]. The perception of substance is due to the contact of conjunction ; of colour, taste, smell touch etc., due to the contact of identity-with-what is conjoined ; and of colourness, tasteness smellness, touchness, etc., due to the contact of identity-with-what-is identical-with-what is conjoined.

Naiyāyikās accept that the contact is sixfold — conjunction [saṃyoga], inherence-in- what-is conjoined [saṃyukta-samavāya], inherence-in-what-is-inherent-in-what- is conjoined [saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya], inherence [samavāya], inherence--in--what-is-inherent [samaveta-samavāya] and the contact of the qualifier and the qualified [viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva]. The contact of the visual sense organ with objects like the pot, etc., is example for the first. The visual sense organ and mind have the contact of the second, when they perceive the qualities, movements, and genus of objects. The contact between the respective sense organs and the genus abiding in the qualities

and actions of substances is the third. The contact of the auditory sense organ with sound is inherence ; and that of the same with the genus ‘soundness’ is the fifth. In perceiving non-existence, the contact between the non-existence and the sense organ is the contact of the qualifier and the qualified.

According to the Bhāṭṭas sound is not the quality of the ether, but an individual substance, hence there is no necessity to accept inherence (the fourth) sense contact to perceive sound, because the contact between the sense organ and the substance is conjunction only. Like wise, the contact between the sense organ and soundness is identity-with-what-is conjoined (second one) only, hence there is no necessity to accept the contact of inherence-in-what-is-inherent (fifth one). Non-existence is known by non-apprehension (anupalabdhi), therefore, there is no necessity to accept the contact of the qualifier and the qualified (sixth one). Therefore, contacts are only of three kinds. The first three kinds of the contact of the Naiyāyikas and those of the Bhāṭṭas differ only in terminology. If the Naiyāyikas call it inherence, the Bhāṭṭas call it identity. Here the word ‘identity’ [tādātmya] is substituted for the word ‘inherence’ [samavāya]. The reason is that inherence as a form of relation, subsisting between two naturally inseparable things, is rejected by the Bhāṭṭas.

The Naiyāyikas divide perceptual knowledge into two kinds, viz., the ordinary and the extra-ordinary ; and accept three types of extra-ordinary sense contacts to perceive the extra-ordinary perceptual knowledges. These are :— 1) contact through generality [sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti], 2) contact through association [jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti] and 3) contact through meditation [yoga-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti].¹

In the perception of all individuals possessing a generic-nature, the knowledge of the generic nature constitutes the contact. This is a transcendent contact whose character is general, when, for instance, there arises in us a perception of smoke of all times and all places. The process by which this perception takes place is as follows — The contact between

1 अलौकिकस्तु व्यापारः त्रिविधः परिकीर्तिः । BP, st. 63

our visual sense organ and the particular case of smoke is an ordinary one called conjunction and that between our visual sense organ and the smokiness is also an ordinary one which is called inherence-with-what-is conjoined. But the contact between our visual sense organ and all cases of smoke is not an ordinary one. It is a transcendent contact, as there is no ordinary conjunction of our visual sense organ with all cases of smoke of all times and all places. The contact consists here of the knowledge of smokiness a generic nature which is possessed by all cases of smoke of all times and all places. This sort of contact is called the contact through generality.

The second (contact through association) is that in which one perception gives rise to another-- as when one perceives a piece of sandal wood at a distance and at once knows that it is fragrant. Here, the fragrance is not perceived by any sense organ, because the object was at a distance. It is therefore apprehended by a kind of extra-ordinary contact. The third (contact through meditation) belongs exclusively to sages who, by means of their super-human powers, can perceive objects inperceptible to others.

The Bhāṭṭas do not accept the extra-ordinary perception and for that purpose extra-ordinary contacts too. Their argument is that the universal judgement relating to smokes and fires in general terms are the result of the synthesis which a thinker's mind is capable of making. In cases like the visual perception of sandal wood as fragrant, one may see easily a jumble of visual perception of sandal wood and recollection of fragrance through association of ideas. Even in the case of contact through meditation Kumārila says thus "we never find if any person has ever improved his vision to such an extent that he could perceive sound through vision. Perception is restricted only to objects existing at present. At present we do not find any omniscient person and there is no proof that such a person ever existed¹.

1 न लोकव्यतिरिक्तं हि प्रत्यक्षां योगिनामपि ॥

प्रत्यक्षत्वेन तस्यापि विद्यमानोपलभन्म् । SV, pratyakṣa, st. 28-29

Perception is of two kinds, viz., indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*savikalpa*). When the mind comes into contact with an external object, only a skeletal knowledge is produced through the sense organs at the first moment and the particular features of the object are not noticed. Indeterminate perception is a knowledge which does not involve any attribute or adjunct.¹ It resembles the perception of infants, dumb persons and animals. The Grammarians do not accept the indeterminate perception because, according to the Grammarians, there is no knowledge without denotation by a word. Bhartṛhari says, thus —

॥ अस्ति ।

“ There is no knowledge in the world
which is not accompanied by words.”²

Against the Grammarian's view, Kumārila argues that the denial of indeterminate perception is against the well-established fact because, experience proves that on the contact of a sense organ with an object the knowledge that arises in the first place is indeterminate perception.³ The indeterminate perception consists in the direct and simple awareness of an individual object [*vyakti*] and its generic attribute [*jāti*] which arises immediately after the sense organ comes into contact with them ; and that it misses the definite feature of the genus as being common to several individuals belonging to a particular class and the specific character of the individual as being different from others [i. e. the element of continuance [*anuvṛtti*] in the latter case]. Kumārila, in his description of it, compares it to the unverbalised dumb experience of a child or of a dumb person.

After the indeterminate perception, through the exercise of mental analysis, the object is perceived as possessing a definite nature, form, etc. Determinate perception is a knowledge which involves an attribute or adjunct. The Buddhists do

1 अस्ति ह्यालोचनज्ञानं प्रथमं निविकल्पकम् ।

बालमूरादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ॥ SV, Pratyakṣa, st. 112

2 न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यशशब्दानुगमादृते । Vākyapadiya, 3

3 SV, p. 161

not accept determinate perception and consider all determinate perceptions are erroneous. But the Buddhists view is also against the well-settled fact because, experience proves that a class character also is an object of perception.¹

The determinate perception appears in five ways with the attributes of genus [jāti], substance [dravya], quality [guṇa], action [kriyā] and name [nāma],² e.g. he is a cowherd, he with the flute, he is blue, he sings, he is Govinda. Some people accept recognition as the sixth kind of determinate perception. Their argument is that even animals on the very day of their birth first become aware of their mother, the next moment they have the knowledge 'This is that' and so without the necessity of any word-relation are capable of recognition. Hence recognition is the sixth kind of determinate perception. Against this view Pārthaśārathi argues that the recognition undergoes in the fifth kind i.e. name only. Hence determinate perception appears in five ways only.

The determinate perception, on the other hand, gives the object with each of its explicated particulars such as the genus etc., [viz. the individual, the relation between generic attribute and individual and so on]. The argument of the Mīmāṃsakas is that though at the first instant non-determinate perception gives only the vague inclusive whole it should also possess the rudiments of determinate perception to account for their manifestation when the object is closely perceived.

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

The Prābhākaras, who are the upholders of the doctrine of tripartite perception or triple knowledge give another definition on the ground that the Bhāṭṭa definition of perception is less extensive. Śālikanātha defines perception as follows,

' Direct apprehension is perception '
[Sākṣat pratītiḥ pratyakṣam]³ ;

1 SD, p. 38

2 ibid p. 41

3 साक्षात्प्रतीतिः प्रत्यक्षं मेयमातृप्रमासु सा ।
मेयेष्वन्द्रिययोगोत्था द्रव्यजातिगुणेषु सा ॥ PP, p. 146

According to the Prābhākaras, even recollection, inference and such other knowledges, usually considered non-perceptional in their character, are really perceptional on the subjective side, in so far as they themselves and the knower are concerned, though they are non-perceptional on the objective side, in so far as their objects are concerned.

In a perception, the cognized object is cloth, etc., the cognizer is the self and the cognition is the experience of the object as it is cognition of these three is tripartite perception. But the Bhāṭṭas say that the self, generally, is the constant conscious, substratum ; and the self is not only the apprehender always. That is, the knowership is not universal because in the ex., 'I know myself' and such the self is the object also. But the Prābhākaras do not accept the view that the soul is the object of mental perception.

Direct cognition envisaging the apprehended object proceeds directly from sense contact [sannikarṣa]. The six sense organs are well known. Among these, the mind is the internal and the rest are external. The Prābhākaras say, like the Bhāṭṭas, that the external organs are elemental— the visual sense organ is of the nature of light, the auditory sense organ is ether bound by the orifice of the ear, the olfactory sense organ is earthy, the gustatory sense organ is watery, and the tactful sense organ is aerial. Here, we have to notice that the Bhāṭṭas hold that the auditory sense organ is of the space but, the Prābhākaras, like the Naiyāyikas, hold that the auditory sense organ is of the nature of ether only.¹ In respect of other sense organs, both the schools use the same arguments to show their elemental nature.²

According to the Prābhākaras, the sense contact is three fold ; conjunction [saṃyoga], (2) inherence-in-what-is-conjoined [saṃyukta-samavāya] and, (3) inherence [samavāya]. The perception of substance is through the contact of conjunction ; of colour, taste, smell, etc., is through the contact of inherence

1 ibid p. 150

2 supra p. 22

in-what--is-conjoined; sound is through the contact of inherence. Sound is the quality of ether in this school. Non-existence, colourness, and soundness, etc., are not existing according the Prābhākaras, hence other sense contacts are superfluous. The tactful, gustatory and olfactory sense organs cause perception only when they come in actual contact with the objects. However, the reaching out to the objects [prāpyakāritva] in case of visual and auditory sense organs is proved by inference. The Prābhākaras, like the Naiyāyikas, accept mind is an eternal atomic substance.

The Prābhākaras, like the Bhāṭṭas, unlike the Naiyāyikas, do not accept the extra ordinary perceptions and the extra-ordinary sense contacts. In respect of the indeterminate and the determinate perceptions, however, there 'is' no difference between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara schools, but regarding the indeterminate perception, the Prābhākaras maintain that every knowledge, however, indeterminate it may be, involves a substantive, an attribute and their relation; that both generic attribute [jāti] and the individuality [vyaktitva] are presented in the indeterminate along with difference in the form of the individual object; and that, at the stage of the indeterminate, the knower does not realize that the generic attribute presented in his knowledge is common to all the individuals belonging to the same class and that these individuals are of different classes, and he is not, therefore, in a position to articulate his indeterminate perception, through verbal expression.

In this connection, a word may be said about the doctrine of tripartite perception or triple knowledge — perceptual knowledge includes at once the three, viz., the knowledge, the known, and the knower. In every act of knowledge, the self, object and the knowledge are revealed — knowledge, which is self-luminous, manifests both the self and the object.

INFERENCE

Anumāna (inference) etymologically means 'after knowledge'. It is 'after knowledge' in the sense that the data for inference are derived from either perception or verbal testimony and help the mind to proceed on further and add to its knowledge. All the systems of Indian philosophy (except the Cārvāka) are based on inference and no other means of right knowledge has been more so elaborately discussed in epistemology as inference. It may well be contended that, in the perception of a composite structure like a tree, only certain parts of the tree come in contact with the eye and several parts do not, infact, come into direct relation with the sense organ, and that in such cases, the experience of the whole of which, we become known, must be taken as inference.

Sabaravāmin defines inference as follows, 'Inference is knowledge arising in a person who is knower of the concomitant relation (between probans and probandum), and who perceives one of these, (viz., probans) that is in relation to the other (viz., probandum) which is not in immediate contact (with the sense organs)'. (Anumānam jñāta-sambandhasya ekadeśa-darśanād ekadeśāntare asannikṛṣṭe arthe buddhiḥ).

Further, he divides inference into the two types :—
1) inference based upon the directly perceived relationship (pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa) ; e.g., the inference of fire following from the knowledge of smoke (which is based upon the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire, which has been directly perceived in the kitchen) ; 2) inference based upon a generalised relationship (sāmānyato dṛṣṭa) ; e.g., the inference of Sun's movement following from the knowledge of change of his position. When we see that Devadatta moves from one place and reaches another, we suppose that all movements lead to some destination— Wherever there is movement there is change of position as in Devadatta— on the basis of this invariable concomitance we infer that the Sun moves from one place to another since his presence is seen in different places.¹

1 तत्तु द्विविधम्-प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं सामान्यतो दृष्टसम्बन्धञ्च ।

BHĀTTA VIEW

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, commenting the definition of Bhāṣyakāra, explains three meanings for the compound ‘jñata-sambandha-sya’ as follows :— 1) jñataḥ sambandhaḥ yena— the cogniser who has already experienced the relation— the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the probans and the probandum, both of which are conveyed by the word ‘Ekadeśa’ in the definition; or 2) jñataḥ sambandhaḥ yasmin—the subject, in which the same relation between them (the probans and the probandum) might have been experienced ; or 3) jñataḥ sambandhaḥ yayoh — both the probans and the probandum, the mutual relation of which is already known¹. The word ‘Ekadeśa’ in the definition would mean the probans.

The word ‘sambandha’ in the definition is explained thus— the invariable concomitance of the probans and the probandum. When the relation is thus spoken of, the related objects are also spoken of as the pervaded (vyāpya)— the probans and the pervader (vyāpaka)— the probandum. The pervaded is one which exists either in all the cases of the pervader or in some only, while the pervader exists in all the cases of the pervaded². Of the two, the pervaded is the probans— the chief means of inferential knowledge, and the pervader is the probandum— the object inferred³.

तत्र प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं यथा— धूमाकृतिदर्शनादगच्छाकृतिविज्ञानम् ।
सामान्यतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं यथा— देवदत्तस्य गतिपूर्विकां देशान्तरप्राप्ति-
मुपलभ्यादित्येऽपि गतिस्मरणम् । SBh, p. 32

- 1 प्रमाता ज्ञातसम्बन्ध एकदेशयथवोच्यते ।
कर्मधारयपक्षे वा सम्बन्धिन्येकदेशता ॥
द्वयं वा ज्ञातसम्बन्धमुपलब्धं परस्परम् ।
तस्यैकदेशशब्दाभ्यामुच्येते समुदायिनौ ॥ SV, Anumāna, st, 3-4
- 2 व्याप्यस्य गमकत्वं च व्यापकं गम्यमिष्यते ।
यो यस्य देशकालाभ्यां समो न्यूनोऽपि वा भवेत् ।
ibid, Anumāna, st. 5
- 3 व्याप्यांशो व्यापकांशस्य तथैव प्रतिपादकः ।
ibid, Anumāna, st. 11

Pārthasārathi explains Sabara's definition as follows:— When a person after perceiving, as unfailing, in that which serves as an example the association of particular some thing (probans, say smoke) with another particular some thing (probandum, say fire) this association being either direct or indirect¹ and anyone of the following kinds— conjunction (samyoga), inherence (samavāya), inherence-in-a-common substrate (ekārtha samavāya), cause and effect (kāryakāraṇatva) or other, should perceive that particular something (probans) in that which holds the probandum (viz., the subject, hill) there arises in him the knowledge of the other (viz., probandum, fire) which is one of the two objects related in the manner aforesaid, presuming however that it is not already known through a means of knowledge, that knowledge is inference².

The presence of the probans in the subject is usually a judgement of perception— smoke is perceived on the hill and fire is inferred. But the inference takes place only when the universal relation between smoke and fire is already known. This relation called as invariable concomitance (vyāpti). The knowledge of invariable concomitance is the result of the experiences of the co-existence of the probans and the probandum in many instances in different times and places. It is possible to experience the invariable concomitance of two properties of a general character (sāmānya-dharma) or between two concrete objects. The experience of the invariable concomitance between the genus of smoke and the genus of fire is that between two general properties³, while the experience of the invariable

- 1 Of the relations between the probans and the probandum, conjunction and inherence are direct relations, whereas the relation of inherence in a common substrate and the relation of cause and effect are indirect relations. SD (Tr.), p. 77, f.

- 2 यस्य यादृशस्य येन यादृशेन साक्षाद्वा प्रणाड्या वा यादृशसंबन्धः
SD, p. 60

भूयोदर्शनगम्या च व्याप्तिः सामान्यधर्मयोः ॥

ज्ञायते भेदहानेन क्वचिच्चापि विशेषयोः ।

कृतिकोदयमालक्ष्य रोहिण्यास्तित्वलुप्तिवत् ॥ ibid, Anu , st. 12-13

concomitance between the rise of Krittikā in the horizon and that of Rohini in succession to it is that between two concrete instances.

Invariable concomitance is natural relation¹. And naturalness is freedom from extraneous adjuncts (upādhīs). An extraneous adjunct is that which constantly accompanies the probandum, but does not always accompany the probans, e.g. "Mitrā has many sons of whom one is black, and the rest fair-complexioned. The son conceived at a time when Mitrā ate vegetables, is black, but other sons that were conceived while she did not eat vegetables but drank milk, are fair-complexioned." Here we find that 'eating vegetable' is an extraneous adjunct which accompanies Mitrā's black son, but does not accompany her fair-complexioned sons. An extraneous adjunct is not in itself a defect, but its attachment to the probans indicates that that term is erratic and the conclusion drawn therefrom wrong.

The invariable concomitance has to be ascertained carefully. Repeated observation will give the concomitance and counter argument will remove doubts regarding extraneous adjuncts. e.g. An individual sees smoke and fire together in a kitchen and begins to think as follows :— 'Are smoke and fire together only in the kitchen or do they exist together in all places at all times ? Does either of them exist without the other ?' ; He repeatedly observes that wherever there is smoke there is fire. He also observes the non-existence of smoke, and in certain places, the existence of fire without smoke. The investigator then questions as follows :— 'Is there any extraneous adjunct that is responsible for the presence of fire where there is smoke, or can it be an uncaused relation.' Then he examines the kitchen to find the attributes that pervade both fire and smoke. The attribute 'knowability' is common to fire and smoke. This cannot affect the relation of smoke to fire. There are certain other attributes that are absent from both, for instance, the attribute of being kitchen. This too cannot affect the relation

of smoke to fire. So he comes to the definite conclusion that there is no extraneous adjunct which can prove the non-existence of fire where there is smoke. Here the knowledge of invariable concomitance is determined by repeated observation of the co-existence of smoke and fire.

The Naiyāyika accepts contact through generality (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti), for the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāptijñāna) between all smokes and all fires. But the Bhāṭṭā maintains that invariable concomitance in the form of a universal generalisation, is not a necessary condition of inference. Fire is observed to be co-existent with smoke in two or three places, and smoke is never seen to be present in a place where fire is not present. When one comes to have this experience repeatedly within the sphere of one's observation, one finds one self in a position to make out invariable connection between smoke and fire in the form in which they happen to be seen in the particular instances which have come within the scope of one's observation. When one later on happens to see smoke in the same form in an unobserved place as in a place already observed, or even when one happens to see smoke in the same form in an observed place as already observed there, one's mind comes to have a knowledge of the presence of fire in that place where smoke is seen for the moment. The knowledge of fire which thus arises cannot be regarded as perceptual experience as fire is not for the moment within the range of any of the senses ; nor can it be regarded as reproduction in memory of a past experience, since the knowledge of fire which thus arises is felt to be experience having reference to the existence of fire in the present time. Universal generalisations themselves are cases of inference.

The Bhāṭṭā classifies inference in three different ways. The first classification divides inference into two types. They are¹ :— 1) Positively and negatively concomitant— (anvaya

1 तच्चानुमानं त्रिविधम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकि, केवलाभ्यर्थि, केवलव्यतिरेकि चेति ।तं च कौमारिलः प्रायो नेच्छन्ति व्यतिरेकिणम् ।
ibid, pp. 35-37

vyatireki), and 2) purely positively concomitant (kevalānvayi). Invariable concomitance indeed is of two kinds, namely, 1) positive invariable concomitance— the existence of the probandum where there is the existence of the probans ; e.g., where there is smoke there is fire ; and 2) negative invariable concomitance— the non-existence of the probans where there is the non-existence of the probandum ; e.g., where there is non-existence of fire there is non-existence of smoke.

That which admits both the types of invariable concomitance that is positive and negatively con-comitant inference ; e.g., smoke as the means of fire inference. Here we are getting two types of invariable concomitances. The positive is “wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen” ; and the negative invariable concomitance is “wherever there is no fire there is no smoke, as in the lake”.

That which admits only positive invariable concomitance that is purely positive concomitant, e.g., ‘cognition is manifested by another cognition, because it is an object, like a jar’. Here there is no negative invariable concomitance for the above inference, because all cognitions are taken as constituting the subject term.

The Naiyāyika accepts the purely negatively concomitant also, but the Bhāṭṭa maintains that what the Naiyāyika would treat as inference based purely on negative concomitance is really no inference at all and demands a distinct place as a means of valid knowledge, viz., the presumption, since it lacks the essential feature of inference — viz., direct subsumption to positive concomitance.

The positively and negatively concomitant probans has five aspects,¹ namely, being the attribute of the subject, existence in the co-subject, non-existence in counter subjects, non-sublation of its sphere and having no counter probans. Here, the subject is the mountain, where the probandum is sought to be

1 अत्र चात्मयव्यतिरेकिहेतोः पञ्च स्वेषणि पक्षधर्मत्वम् , सप्तश्च सत्त्वम् , विपक्षाद् ब्यावृत्तत्वम् , अबाधितविषेषत्वम् , असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वञ्चेति
MM, p. 60

known. Existence of the probans there is 'being the attribute of the subject'. The co-subject is the kitchen where the probandum has been ascertained. To be there is 'existence in the co-subject'. The counter subject is the lake, where the non-existence of the probandum has been ascertained. Not to be there is 'non-existence in the counter subject.' Non-sublation of the probandum is 'non-sublation of its sphere.' Non-existence of an opposite probandum is 'having no counter probans'.

But the purely positively concomitant can have no non-existence in the counter-subject, as there is no counter subject. Therefore here its aspects are four only¹.

According to the second classification, there are two types of inference. The Prābhākaras also accept the division, but their division is quite different from that of Bhāṭṭas. The Prābhākara's division is :— 1) the inference of perceptible objects (dṛṣṭa), e.g., fire from smoke and 2) the inference of non-perceptible objects (sāmānyato dṛṣṭa), e.g., the inference of the existence of the visual sense organ from the visual perception of colour, etc.

The Bhāṭṭā's division is :— 1) the particularly seen, that whose content is only the particular seen object, e.g., by seeing Kṛttikā rise, there is the inference of Rohinī, and 2) the generically seen, that whose content is general, e.g., by seeing smoke, there is the inference of fire².

Sabaravāmin explains the division as that inference based upon the directly perceived relationship (pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa-sambandha) and inference based upon a generalised relationship (sāmānyato dṛṣṭa sambandha), but Kumārila explains Śabara's pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa sambandha as the inference of one particular from another particular— where the invariable concomitance of two particulars is known— taking the word perce-

1 ibid, p. 60

2 प्रत्यक्षदृष्टसम्बन्धं यथोरेव विशेषयोः ।
गोपयेन्धनतज्जन्यविशेषादिमतिः कृता ॥

ption (pratyakṣa) in the sense of particular (viśeṣa), in contrast, with generality (sāmānya) in the latter¹. He further says that this kind of inference of a particular is acceptable to Vindhya-vāsin², who is identified with Isvarakṛṣṇa. But Isvarakṛṣṇa has admitted three kinds of inference in his Sāṃkhya-kārikā. Vācaspati miśra, in his commentary, has brought these three under two categories, namely, vita and avita, the former being held to include both Pūrvavat and Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa-anumānas and the latter only Seśavat-anumāna.

The third classification also comprises two types ; 1) inference for one's own benefit (svarthānumāna) and 2) inference for the benefit of others (parārthānumāna). A person having himself repeatedly observed, in the kitchen and other places, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, goes near a hill and sees smoke on it. He recollects that, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and there upon knowledge arises in him that 'this hill has smoke which has invariable concomitance with fire' and from which follows the knowledge that 'this hill has fire', which is called inferential knowledge. This is the process of inference for one's own benefit.

When a person, having inferred fire from smoke, demonstrates it to others by the employment of a syllogism. It is called an inference for the benefit of others. According to the Naiyāyika, the syllogism consists of five members, but the Bhāṭṭas accept that of three members.

A member is a sentence that gives rise to inferential knowledge. On the employment of the five sentences there arises, at first, knowledge from each of them separately. Then arises collective knowledge from the five sentences combined together. The members are five, viz. 1) Proposition (pratijñā) ; 2) reason (hetu) ; 3) example (udāharaṇa) ; 4) subsumptive correlative (upanaya) ; and 5) conclusion (nigamana)³.

1 Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, p. 251.

2 विशेषबृष्टमेतच्च लिखितं विन्ध्यवासिना, SV, Anumāna, st. 143

3 प्रतिज्ञा-हेतु-उदाहरण-उपनय-निगमनानि पञ्चावयवाः । TS, p. 98

The proposition is a sentence which causes knowledge whose object is the same as that of the conclusion and which contributes to the production of the entire knowledge which produces consideration (parāmarśa), e.g. 'This hill has fire'.

The reason is an expression with the ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge whose object is not the probandum but which contributes to the production of the entire knowledge that gives rise to consideration, e.g. 'because it has smoke.'

The example is an expression which, while producing knowledge of connection of the form that the locus of the probans is constantly occupied by the probandum, causes another knowledge which proceeds from the sentence expressive of application, e.g. 'All that has smoke has fire, as in a kitchen.'

The application is a member which produces consideration, e.g. 'this hill has smoke.'

The conclusion is an expression which, while causing the knowledge which gives rise to consideration, produces knowledge of the probandum as indicated by that of the probans through its invariable concomitance with the probandum and its nature of abiding in the subject, e.g. '(therefore) this hill has fire'¹.

This hill has fire—	Proposition
(Because) this hill has smoke—	Reason
All that has smoke has fire, as in a kitchen—	Example
This hill has smoke—	Application
(Therefore) this hill has fire—	Conclusion

Here, one may think that there is no difference between the proposition and the conclusion and also between the reason and the application. The sentence 'this hill has fire' occurs twice, once in the place of proposition and again in the place of conclusion. Also the sentence 'this hill has smoke' occurs twice, once in the place of reason and again in the place of

1 षर्वतो वहिमानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्वात् इति हेतुः । यो यो धूमवान् स स वहिमान्, यथा महानस इत्युदाहरणम् । तथा च अयमिति उपनयः । तस्मात्तथेति निगमनम् । TS, p. 98

application. Therefore to avoid the repetition, the Mīmāṃsakas accept only three members, either ending with the example (viz., the proposition, the reason and the example), or beginning with the example, (viz., the example, the application and the conclusion)¹.

The Buddhist accepts only two members, viz., 1) the example and 2) the application, e.g. 'all that has smoke has fire, as in a kitchen (example), and this has smoke (application)'. We may see here that it will result in the defect of the probandum element having to be imported. Therefore discarding the Buddhist's view the Bhāṭṭa accepts three membered syllogism.

Among the three members also, Sabarasvāmin, in his Bhāṣya :— 'Whatever is an act is always found to lead to a result,— the offering into fire is an act,— hence this offering also must lead to result'² saying thus, he favours the ending with the example view. But Kumārila, "All study of the Veda is preceded by the teacher's study (of it), because this is (and always has been) a universal characteristic of Vedic study just like Vedic study of the present day"³ saying thus, he favours the beginning with the example view.

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

Sabarasvāmin defines inference as follows 'When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship (of invariable concomitance) leads to the knowledge of the other factor of that relationship,— which latter is not in contact with the person's sense-organs,— this latter knowledge is inference. (Anumānam jñātasambandhasya ekadeśa-darśanād ekadesāntare asannikṛṣṭe arthe buddhiḥ⁴). According to Kumārila, the com-

1 तत्त्वं पञ्चतयं केचिद् द्वयमन्ये वयं अथम् ।
उदाहरणपर्यन्तं यद्वोदाहरणादिकम् ॥ SD, p. 64

2 अथ यत्कर्म तत्फलवद् दृष्टम् । होमोऽपि कर्म तेनापि फलवता भवितव्यम् । SBh, 2-2-11

3 वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् ।
वेदाध्ययनसामान्यादधुनाध्ययनं यथा ॥
SV, Vākyādhikaraṇa (on JS, 1-1-24) p. 366

4 SBh, p. 36

pound 'jñātasambandhasya', in this definition, does not qualify the word 'ekadeśa' in the compound 'ekadeśadarśanāt', meaning one whose concomitant-relation with another is known¹. Hence he interprets that the word 'jñātasambandhasya' denotes either the person who knows well the relationship (jñātaḥ sambandhaḥ yena) or, the subject where the relationship of probans and probandum is known (jñātaḥ sambandhaḥ yasmin).

Prabhākara rejects Kumārila's interpretation and says that there is no objection in qualifying this first word with the part of the second². Therefore Śālikanātha defines inference as follows 'when the perception of one (viz., probans) of known concomitant relationship leads to the knowledge of the other (probandum) of the relationship,— which latter is not contradicted by any other knowledge,— this latter knowledge is inference' (jnātasambanda-niyamas yaeka deśasya darśanāt ekadeśāntare buddhiḥ anumānam abādhite)³. Further he sets forth that the relationship upon which inference is based must be one that is unfailing, ever true and permanent⁴, e.g., that which subsists between the cause and the effect, between the whole and the part, between the substance and the quality, between qualities subsisting in the same substance and so forth ; for instance, the relationship between fire (cause) and smoke (effect).

As noted above, in case we happen to possess that two objects (say, the probans and the probandum) are such that probandum exists wherever probans does and also the knowledge that a particular thing possesses probans, there ensues inferential knowledge to the effect that this thing possesses probandum, even though probandum is not seen there. This invariable concomitance between probans and probandum is free from all types of limitations, that will assume the form of

1 न ह्युपसर्जनं परं पदान्तरेण सम्बद्धयते राजपुरुषवत् ।

Gramatically one word can not be used to qualify the first part of another compound word. BT, p. 91, f.

2 आकांक्षितं पूरणसमर्थं च सम्बन्धितामापद्यते । अत्र चैकदेशदर्शनादित्युक्ते कस्यैकदेशस्येत्याकांक्षा । BT, p. 92

3 PP, p. 116

4 RV, p. 49

a universal generalisation, when a person infers fire in a mountain on seeing smoke there, he is, infact, cognising again what has already been cognized and only forms part of the content of the generalisation at which he had arrived as a result of his earlier observations.

Such inference is a valid experience, even though it cognises that which is already cognised. The inferential experience is re-experience and does not involve the passage of the mind from the known to the unknown, as is commonly supposed to be the cause ; but it involves merely the passage of the mind from a known object to something that is already known to be invariably connected with it¹. The Prābhākaras take this generalisation to be of a universal type and to have reference to all the conceivable particulars— unobserved as well as observed. The Bhāṭṭas think that the invariable concomitance in the form of universal generalisation is not a necessary condition of inference ; but the knowledge of co-presence of the probandum with the probans in two or three places leads one to form an idea of invariable concomitance. The Prābhākara argues that the relation (between fire and smoke) once seen in the subject (viz., kitchen) naturally leads a person to form an idea of universal generalisation of it free from all the limitations. With the help of the generalisation one, on seeing the smoke in new places actually apprehends again the same relation of it with the fire in the same place and this is known as inference.

A single observation of probans and probandum is enough to give the knowledge of their invariable concomitance. But the doubts regarding extraneous adjuncts are removed after repeated observations only.

The Prābhākara also, like the Bhāṭṭa, classifies inference in three different ways. The first classification is the same as with the Bhāṭṭa, but the second classification is a different one. First of all, Sabarasvāmin classifies inference under two types,

1 नन्वेवं सम्बन्धनियमावसायसमय एव यावद्धूमादिभावितया अग्न्यादि-
सम्बन्धस्यावगमात्, धूमादिसत्तानिश्चयादधिकं निश्चेतव्यं नावशिष्यत
इत्यनुमानं न प्रमाणं स्यात्। PP, p. 205

viz., 1) the inference based upon the directly perceived relationship, and 2) the inference based upon a generalised relationship. Kumārila bhaṭṭa, over ruling the terminology and the illustrations of the Bhāṣyakāra, classifies in his own way. But Prabhākara, following the Bhāṣyakāra, classifies inference into two divisions¹, viz., the dṛṣṭa-svalakṣaṇa-viṣaya (that of which the specific individuality is perceived), e.g., all such things as fire and the like; and the adṛṣṭa-svalakṣaṇa-viṣaya (that of which the said feature is not perceived), e.g., such super-sensuous as the movement and the like. We may notice here that this two fold division is based on a two fold division of the objects of inference.

Movement is perceptible in other schools of Indian philosophy. But the Prabhākaras advocate the super-sensuous nature of movement; movement can not be perceived and what we actually perceive when a thing is in motion is its conjunction with one thing and disjunction with another. Then, when we observe a thing having conjunction and disjunction occasionally we infer that there must be some cause which produces them. Therefore, the cause, which is different from the productions (conjunction and disjunction), must be movement².

The third classification, (the inference for one's own benefit, and the inference for the benefit of others) is common to the Bhāṭṭas and the Prabhākaras³. Even in the inference for the benefit of others, the Prabhākaras, like the Bhāṭṭas, accept three membered syllogism, viz., the proposition, the reason and the example⁴.

1 अदृष्टस्वलक्षणविषयमनुमानमस्ति क्रियादिषु । BT, p. 98

2 PP, p. 215-218

3 द्वेषाऽनुमानमुत्पद्यते— स्वयमनुसंहितयाऽनुमानोत्पादकसामग्र्या, परप्रयुक्तवाक्योद्बोधितया वा । PP, p. 220

4 'तत्राऽबाधित' इति प्रतिज्ञा । 'ज्ञात्तम्बन्धनियमस्ये'त्यतेन दृष्टान्तवचनम् । 'एकदेशबर्णनादिति' हेत्वभिधानम् । PP, p. 220

THE FALLACY

BHĀTTĀ VIEW

Inference is described as defectless probans. Now the question arises that what are the defects of the probans. We can say that the defects are those factors which prevent us from having the knowledge intended to be conveyed by the inference, and sometimes cause uncertain and erroneous knowledge. Kumārila explains three kinds of fallacies, viz., 1] the fallacy of proposition [pratijñābhāsa], 2] the fallacy of reason [hetvābhāsa] and the fallacy of example [drṣṭāntābhāsa]¹.

The fallacy of proposition [pratijñābhāsa] is of three kinds, viz., 1] the sublation by his very words [svoktibādha], 2] the sublation by the common usage [loka-viruddha] and 3] the sublation by previous statement [pūrva-vākyabādha]². When a person says 'all my life I have been silent' then there is sublation by his words, because silent man can not speak. When a person says 'the moon [indu]' is not expressed by the word 'moon' [candra] this is opposed by the word, because it is settled in the word that the moon [indu] is expressed by the word moon [candra]. When a person who previously establishes the non-eternity of sound and after, says 'sound is eternal' then there is sublation by previous statement.

There can be six kinds of fallacies of proposition in an inference, according to the modes of sublating means of right knowledge. They are:— the sublation—by perception, by inference, by verbal testimony, by analogy, by presumption, by non-apprehension. 'Fire is not hot' is an example for the sublation by perception. Here, since fire's hotness is already established by perception the absence of hotness is sublated³. When an inference is found to be clearly stronger than the another

1 त्रिधा शब्दविरोधः स्यात्प्रतिज्ञादिविभागतः । SV, Anu. st. 61

2 प्रतिज्ञापूर्वसञ्जल्प-सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धितः ।

यावज्जीवमहं मौनीत्युक्तिमात्रेण वाध्यते ॥ SV, Anu. st. 62

3 अग्नावबाहके साध्ये.... । SV, Anu. st. 67

then there is sublation by inference in the latter, e. g., 'Mind can not be a sense organ, because it is not of the nature of an element like space'. Here, since mind is inferred to be a sense organ by the very inference which apprehends the thing called mind its being a non-sense organ is sublated.

'Sacrifice, etc. can not be the means to heaven, since they are actions, like walking' is an example for the sublation by verbal testimony. Here, since sacrifice, etc., are known to be means to heaven from Vedic texts the absence of instrumentality is sublated. 'A cow can not be like a gavaya, because it is a living being like a man' is an example for the sublation by analogy. Here, since cow is known similar to gavaya through the means of analogy the dissimilarity is sublated¹. 'Devadatta is not outside, because he is not seen there' is an example for the sublation by presumption. Here, since Devadatta's outsideness is established through the means of presumption he is not outside is sublated². 'Air has colour, because it is a substance like earth' is an example for the sublation by non-apprehension. Here, since the absence of colour in the air is established through the means of non-apprehension the air has colour is sublated.

The word 'hetvābhāsa' [fallacy of reason] is capable of two derivations and two meanings. If it is dissolved as 'hetuvad ābhāsate', that which looks like a reason, it means a fallacious reason. If it is dissolved as 'hctor ābhāsah', the word would mean a fallacy, i. e. the error which underlines the apparent reason and makes it invalid. Actually, the second derivation is appropriate in the context because, all types of fallacies are based on different kinds of errors of reasons and not on those of fallacious probans.

Pārthaśāthi accepts the fallacy [of reason] of three kinds, viz., 1] the unestablished [asiddha], 2] the inconclusive

1 न गोर्गवयसादृशं तस्य बाधोपमानतः । SV, Anu. st. 66

2 गेहावगतनास्तित्वो जीवंश्चैत्रो यदा बहिः ।

नास्तीति साध्यते बाधस्तत्रार्थपत्तिर्तो भवेत् ॥ SV, Anu. st. 67

[anaikāntika] and 3] the sublated [bādhita]¹, But Rāmakṛṣṇa bhāṭṭa², Cidānanda³, Nārāyaṇa⁴ and other Neo-Bhāṭṭas accept the fallacy of four kinds, the fourth being the uncommon [asādhārana].

The unestablished is of five kinds. They are:— 1] the unestablished in respect of itself [svārupāśiddha], 2] the unestablished in respect of its relation [sambandhāśiddha], 3] the unestablished in respect of its presence elsewhere [vyatirekāśiddha], 4] the unestablished in respect of its substratum [āśrayāśiddha] and 5] the unestablished in respect of its concomitance [vyāpyatvāśiddha].

‘Buddha is cognizant of Dharma, because he is omniscient’ is an example for the unestablished in respect of itself. Here, since omniscience does not exist anywhere, the reason ‘is omniscient’ becomes unestablished in respect of itself. ‘Fire does not burn, because it is cold’ is an example for the unestablished in respect of its relation. Here, since the relation between coolness and fire is against the experience the reason ‘is cold’ becomes unestablished in respect of its relation. ‘Cow is an animal having dewlop, because it is denoted by the word ‘cow’ is an example for the unestablished in respect of its presence elsewhere is found. Here, since the denotation by the word ‘Cow’ has no existence apart from the subject [pakṣa], the reason is denoted by the word ‘cow’ becomes unestablished in respect of its presence elsewhere.

‘Sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like a lake lotus’ is an example for the unestablished in respect of its substratum. Here, since the subject sky-lotus has no existence the reason becomes unestablished in respect of its substratum. When the reason resides only in a part of the subject, then that is known as the unestablished in respect of its invariable concomitance.

1 असिद्धिः अतैकान्तिकत्वं बाधकत्वं चेति त्रयो हेतुदोषाः
तत्रासिद्धिः पञ्चवधा.... । SD, p. 64

2 SC, p. 66

3 NTV, p. 142

4 MM, p. 78

For example, ‘Air and also space are non-eternal, because they are tangible’. Here, since the reason tangibility resides only in a part of the subject, i. e. air, not in the other part, i. e. space [because space is not tangible], the reason ‘are tangible’ becomes unestablished in respect of its concomitance. This is known by the name ‘the partly non-established’ also.

The unconclusive reason is of two kinds, viz., 1] the irregular or the common [savyabhicāra] and 2] the opposable [sapratisādhana]¹. The reason which is present in a place where there is the absence of the thing to be proved, is the irregular. For example, ‘Sound is eternal, because it is tangible’. Here, since tangibility exists in an action also where there is the absence of eternality, the reason ‘is eternal’ becomes common to normal inference and its opposite inference also.

When there are two reasons leading to conflicting inferences and there is no decision as to which of the two is the real one, it is called the opposable. For example, ‘Air is perceptible, because it possesses finite magnitude’ and ‘Air is imperceptible, because it is a substance without colour’. Here, there are two reasons 1] ‘having a finite magnitude’ and 2] ‘being a substance without colour,’ both leading to conflicting inferences. They appear to be equally cogent and it is difficult to determine whether air is perceptible or imperceptible.

The sublative [bādhita] reason, according to some Mīmāṃsakas, is of six kinds², viz. 1] the sublation of the existence of probandum [dharma svarūpa bādha], 2] the sublation of the existence of subject [dharmi-svarūpa-bādha], 3] the sublation of the existence of the both [ubhaya svarūpa-bādha], 4] the sublation of a particular property of probandum [dharma-viśeṣa-bādha], 5] the sublation of a particular property of subject [dharmi-viśeṣa-bādha] and 6] the sublation of a particular property of the both [ubhaya-

1 अनैकान्तिकत्वं द्विविधम् – सव्यभिचारं सप्रतिसाधनं च ।

नित्यः शब्दो मूर्तत्वादिति कर्मदिष्टव्यनित्यं । SD, p. 65

2 तथा बाधको नाम हेत्वाभासो यो विश्व इति ताक्तिकैराभिधीयते ।
स च षड्विध इति केचित् ।.... SD, p. 66

vi-sesha-bādha]. Some Mimāmsakas regard the sublated reason is of four kinds. They would not count the third and sixth i. e. ubhaya-svarūpa-bādha and ubhaya-viśeṣa-bādha, as independent fallacies. Some Mimāmsakas consider the fallacy is of one kind.

Actually, the sublative is of two kinds, viz. the sublation of existence of probandum and the sublation of particular property of probandum. When the reason is pervaded by the opposite of the probandum that is called the sublation of existence of probandum. For example, 'Sound is eternal, because it is produced'. Here, since the reason 'is produced' pervades the opposite of the probandum 'non-eternity', the reason is known as the sublation of existence of probandum.

When the reason is pervaded by a particular opposite of a particular probandum that is called the sublation of particular property of probandum. For example, 'Earth has a creator, because it is an effect like a jar'. Here, the reason rules out the disembodied character of the creator, because the creator in the case of a jar etc., is always seen to be an embodied being. It proves the non-existence of a particular property 'disembodiedness' of the probandum 'creator', hence it is known as the sublation of particular property of probandum.

The example [udāharaṇa] is that, where the pervasion between the probandum and the probans is grasped. This is of two kinds, viz. the positive and the negative. When positive similarity lies in pointing out the concomitance of the probans with probandum example is positive, e. g. 'What has smoke has fire, like a kitchen'. When negative similarity consists in pointing out the concomitance of the absence of the probandum with the absence of the probans example is negative, e. g. 'What has no fire, does not have smoke, like a lake'. The fallacy of example is of four kinds, viz.,¹ 1] the devoid of probandum

1. साध्यहेतुभयव्याप्तिशून्यत्वात्परमार्थतः ।

नित्यो द्वन्द्वनिरमूर्त्त्वात्कर्मवत् परमाणुवत् ॥ SV, Anu., st. 115

[sādhya-sūnya], 2] the devoid of probans [sādhana-sūnya], 3] the devoid of the both [ubhaya-sūnya] and 4] the devoid of a base [āśraya-sūnya].

'Sound is eternal, because it has no cause [what has no cause is eternal] like prior non-existence' is an example for the devoid of probandum. Here the example 'prior-non-existence' is not eternal and devoiced by the probandum 'eternity'. Hence it called the devoid of probandum. 'Sound is eternal, because it has no cause like destruction' is an example for the devoid of probans. Here, the example 'destruction' is causal, and devoiced by the probans 'causeless'. Hence it becomes devoiced by the probans. 'Sound is eternal, because it has no cause like a jar' is an example for the devoid of the both. Here, the example 'jar' is non-eternal and causal and devoiced by the both, i. e. probandum 'eternity' and probans 'causeless'. Hence it becomes devoid by the both. 'Sound is eternal, because it has no cause like a hare's horn' is an example for the devoid of the base. Here, the base for the example is 'hare's horn' which is not real. Hence it is known as the devoid of the base.

The fallacies of example having positive similarity are four as described above and having negative similarity also become another four veraities.

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

The Prābhākara, like the Bhāṭṭa, accepts the fallacy is of three types, viz., 1] the fallacy of proposition, 2] the fallacy of reason, and 3] the fallacy of example. Gautama, the founder of Nyāya school, accepts that the hurting proposition [pratijñār hāni] is different from the renouncing proposition [pratijñā-samnyāsa]. His aphorism as follows :— 'The points of defeat are the hurting proposition, the shifting proposition, the opposing proposition, the renouncing proposition'....'. Sālika-

1 प्रतिज्ञाहानि: प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासो....

nātha criticizes the view and establishes that the hurting proposition is identical with the renouncing proposition¹.

The Prabhākara accepts the fallacy of reason is of four kinds, viz., 1] the uncommon [asādharaṇa], 2] the common [sādharaṇa] 3] the unestablished [asiddha] and 4] the sublated [bādhita]². The reason which is absent from both similar instances [sapakṣa] and contrary instances [vipakṣa] is called the fallacy of uncommon [asādhīraṇa]. A similar instance [sapakṣa] is what is definitely known to be possessed of the thing to be inferred. A contrary instance is what is definitely known to be devoid of the thing to be inferred. When in a proposition like ‘Sound is transitory, because it has sound-hood’ there is doubt of transitoriness in sound, then a jar or the like constitutes a similar instance, as also a contrary instance, and sound hood is other than that ; hence it is an uncommon reason.

The reason which is present in both similar instances [sapakṣa] and contrary instances [vipakṣa] is called the fallacy of common [sādharaṇa]. The mention of similar instance is to exclude the contradictory reason. Strictly speaking, presence in contrary instances should alone be mentioned ; for although the contradictory reason is also a common reason, yet it is distinct from the latter, as the ground of its fallaciousness is different.

The fallacy of unestablished [asiddha] is of five kinds, viz., 1] unestablished in respect of itself [svarūpāsiddha], 2] unestablished in respect of relation [sambandhāsiddha] 3] unestablished in respect of presence elsewhere [vyatirekāsiddha] 4] unestablished in respect of its substratum [āśrayāsiddha] and 5] unestablished in respect of its concomitance [vyāpyatvāsiddha]³.

That which is never present in what is possessed of the thing to be inferred [the subject] is called the sublated reason

1 प्रतिज्ञासन्ध्यासाच्च प्रतिज्ञाहानिरभिज्ञैव । PP, p. 227

2 हेतोदूषणमसिद्धत्वं (स्वरूपासिद्धत्वमेकदेशासिद्धत्वं साधारणत्वं बाधितविषयत्वञ्चेति । PP, p. 225

3 supra, p. 45

[bādhita]. This fallacy is called contradictory [viruddha] by the Naiyāyikas¹.

The Naiyāyika enumerates the fallacy of the probans as five, namely, the unestablished [asiddha], the contradictory [viruddha], the unconclusive [anaikāntika] the similar to the context [prakaraṇasama], and the discarded [kālātyayāpadīṣṭa]². Some Naiyāyikas speak of the inefficient [aprayojaka] as the sixth. Bhāsarvajñā, the author of Nyāyasāra, says that the sixth is the non-determined [anadhyavasāya].

The Naiyāyika counts ‘the similar to the context’ [prakaraṇa-sama] as an independent fallacy. The Bhāṭṭa, identifying it with the second variety of the unconclusive [anaikāntika], namely, the sapratisādhana, includes it in to the unconclusive. The Bhāṭṭa’s argument is as follows— it occurs when there are two reasons leading to conflicting inferences and therefore there is no decision as to which of the two is the real one. E.g. ‘Air is non-perceptible, because it has no colour, like the mind’ and ‘Air is perceptible, because it has touch, like a jar’.

The Neo-Bhāṭṭa includes it in the defects of the subject [pakṣadoṣa]. His argument is that there can not possibly be a pair of reasons of equal strength; if it could be so, it would follow that the very same object has two opposite natures, brought about by the force of the two inferences. If there is conflict between a stronger and a weaker, the content of the weaker will be removed by the stronger, and this defect is but the defect of the subject [pakṣa-doṣa], namely ‘the sublation of the attribute’ [bādhita-viśeṣaṇa].³

The Prabhākara rejects the above views and argues that two contradictory reasons can not be equally powerful and can not be predicated of the subject simultaneously. If it were not so the resultant doubt could never be removed. In the

1 See supra p. 45.

2 ते च असिद्ध-विरुद्धानेकान्तिकप्रकरणसमकालात्ययापदिष्ट भेदात् पञ्चैव ।
TB, p. 11.

3 MM, pp. 79–80.

examples, the Prābhākara says, the latter reason is more powerful and leads to the perceptibility of air¹.

As described above the Bhāṭṭa accepts the fallacy of three kinds, viz. 1] the unestablished [asiddha] 2] the sublated [bādhita] 3] the unconclusive [anaikāntika]. The Prābhākara accepts the fallacy of four kinds, viz., 1] the unestablished [asiddha] 2] the sublated [bādhita] 3] the common [sādhāraṇa] 4] the uncommon [asādhāraṇa]. The first two are common to both the schools. Regarding the third, the Bhāṭṭa calls it as the unconclusive [anaikāntika] and the Prābhākara calls it as the common [sādhāraṇa]. Here the difference lies only in the terminology. The uncommon [asādhāraṇa] is accepted, as fourth fallacy, by the Prābhākara. The old-Bhāṭṭas do not favour to accept it as a fallacy, but the Neo-Bhāṭṭas follow the Prābhākara view and accept the uncommon [asādhāraṇa] as the fourth fallacy of reason².

Salikanātha enumerates the fallacy of example is of five kinds,³ viz., 1] the devoid of probans [sādhana-vikala], 2] the devoid of probandum [sādhyā-vikala], 3] the devoid of probans and probandum [ubhayaśūnya], 4] the devoid of invariable concomitance [sambandha-niyama-śūnya] and 5] the example whose invariable concomitance is inversely stated [viparita-niyama]. Of these, the first three are common to both the schools.

'The mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal like a pot' is an example for the fallacy of example defective in the invariable concomitance. Here, since there is no invariable concomitance or universal connection between corporeality and non-eternity, it becomes defective in the invariable concomitance. 'The mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal, whatever is non-eternal is corporeal like, a pot' is an example for the fallacy of example whose invariable concomi-

1 प्राभाकरमीमांसकास्तु-प्रकरणसमत्वं दूषणान्तरं न संभवति ।

प्रबलदुर्बलयोविरोधे ... Viṣama sthala tippaṇī on PP, p. 227.

2 See supra p. 45.

3 दृष्टान्तस्य च साध्यविकलता ... PP, p. 227.

tance is inversely stated. Here, the invariable concomitance should have been stated thus ‘whatever is corporal is non-eternal, like a pot.’

We can see here that both the schools are wrongly enumerated the fallacies of example. Because the fallacies of example are six as enumerated by the Naiyāyika. The Bhāṭṭa accepts four and leaves two, viz., example devoid of invariable concomitance and the example whose invariable concomitance inversely stated ; and the Prābhākara accepts five and leaves one, viz., the devoid of base.

VERBAL TESTIMONY

Verbal testimony is the third of the means of valid knowledge accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas. The Naiyayikas accept analogy after inference, but the Mīmāṃsakas, due to its wide recognition by a large number of disputants, give priority to verbal testimony.

The Vaiśeṣika maintains that verbal testimony is not a distinct means of valid knowledge, it is included in inference. In deriving knowledge from speech we first hear the words constituting the speech and then recollect the related things. Thus recollection, is designated as verbal knowledge. And this, according to the Vaiśeṣika, is derived through inference.

Kumārila criticises the Vaiśeṣika view on the grounds that the verbal knowledge is not, like inferential knowledge, dependent on the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the words of speech and knowledge of the mutual connection of things signified by them, but results immediately from the words as soon as expectancy [ākāṅkṣā] consistency [yogyata], etc., existing among them have been known. Again, after verbal knowledge has been produced, there arises self-consciousness of the form “I know from the speech” but not of the form “ I know through the inference.”

Sabaravāmin defines verbal testimony as follows :—
 Verbal testimony is that means of cognising the object not in contact with the senses, [i.e. dharma and adharma] which follows from verbal cognition” [Śāstram śabda-vijñānād asanni-kṛṣṭe arthe jñānam]¹. Sabaravāmin does not define verbal testimony in general, but only the particular form of that, i.e. injunction, because it is only in reference to the means of cognising Dharma, which has been declared to be injunction alone. Hence, according to him, the term ‘Śabda’ stands for the Vedic word, and ‘Artha’ for Dharma and Adharma.

The word ‘Śabda-vijñāna’ is capable of two interpretations. It means the knowledge derived from the word, [‘śabdād vijnānāt’] ‘or the knowledge which underlies the word [‘śabde vijnānat’]. The Prabhākara accepts second derivation. According to him, the word ‘Śabda-vijñāna’ stands for the knowledge of things through the words, i.e. the knowledge of some thing to be done. The Bhāṭṭa accepts both the derivations and do not restrict the verbal testimony only to Vedic injunctions, as is done by the Prabhākara.

Even though the Bhāṣyakāra has defined verbal testimony under the name of Vedic injunction [śāstra], but he does not confine verbal testimony to the Vedic injunctions only, because he says that the words in their meanings are the same in the Veda and in common parlance². Hence verbal testimony to common parlance is acceptable to him.

BHĀTTA VIEW

Kumārila’s definition of verbal testimony is as follows. “That is called verbal testimony, by which men understand what is to be undertaken and what is to be avoided, whether such injunction comes from the eternal Veda or from a human source”.³

1 SBh. p. 105

2 य एव लौकिकाशब्दास्त एव वैदिकास्त एव तेषामर्थः । SBh, 1-3-11

3 प्रवृत्तिर्वा निवृत्तिर्वा नित्येन कृतकेन च ।

पुंसां येनोपदिश्येत तच्छास्त्रमभिधीयते ॥ SV śabda, st. 4

Pārthasārathi explains Bhāsyakara's definition as follows :— The comprehension of the meaning of a sentence through the recollection of the meanings of words which are apprehended by sense of hearing, is the means of right knowledge known as verbal testimony¹.

The verbal testimony is of two kinds, viz., the human [laukika] and the scriptural [vaidika]. The human is the statement of trust-worthy persons and the scriptural is the Vedic statement which is eternal.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept eternity of the Vedas and they ascribe their authorship to God. Their argument is as follows :— ‘The Vedas are of human origins because, they are a collection of sentences, like the Mahābhārata, etc.’ this inference establishes that the Vedas must have been effected by some one. As no human origin is possible in the case of works of such transcendental wisdom, they must be the works of God. Thus the Vedas are the compositions of God.

The Mīmāṃsaka's answer to the argument is that the above inference is vitiated with the defect of adventitious condition viz., the ‘remembrance of the authorship of the work’ and if there were an author, he should certainly have been remembered. Hence the Vedas are eternal [beginningless]. And this is proved by the fact that all words and things denoted by the Vedas are eternal.

The Vedic statement is of two kinds, viz., [denotative of] existent [siddhārthaka] and [of] mandatory [vidhāyaka]. That which is denotative of some thing that is existent is called the existent and that which is denotative of a mandate is called the mandatory. The mandatory also undergoes two divisions, viz., direct teaching [upadeśa] and transfer [atideśa]. ‘Thus has it to be done’ this is direct teaching. E.g. In the common usage : ‘Devadatta should be treated to a dinner consisting of curds, ghee, lintil soup, and fine rice, etc. In the Veda ; ‘one should perform the New-moon-day and Full-moon-day sacri-

1 विज्ञाताच्छब्दात्पदार्थीभिधानद्वारेण यद्वाक्यार्थविज्ञानं तच्छाब्दं नाम
प्रमाणम् । SD, p. 72

fices after first performing the Prayāja and getting the rice by pounding, etc. ‘Like that this has to be done’, this is transfer. E.g. In the common usage ; ‘Like Devadatta Yajñadatta should be treated to a dinner’. In the Veda ; ‘Like the Āgneya sacrifice Saurya sacrifice should be performed’¹.

The direct teaching and the transfer are occupying important roles in Mīmāṃsā. The first six chapters of the Jaimini sūtras describe the direct teaching and the second six chapters describe the transfer.

Sentence is a combination of words and meaning of the sentence is obtained by the coherent construction of the meanings of words in the sentence through implication. The coherent construction of the meanings which are already got from the words is meaning of the sentence, that is to say, first the words give only unconnected meanings, and it is only after this, that the connection among the meaning is understood. Thus the meaning of the sentence as a whole is merely the synthetic construction of the meanings of the constituent words of the sentence. This theory known as ‘Abhihitānvaya vāda’. Thus, when a boy hears the sentence, ‘gām ānaya’ [bring a cow]. First the meanings of the constituent words are comprehended one after another. Thus, by ‘Gām’ is meant the cow as the object and by ‘Ānaya’ is meant the activity of bringing. This is apprehended, then, by synthesizing the meanings of these words, the synthetic meaning of the whole sentence, viz., the activity of bringing of an object known as cow [gokarmakam ānayanam].

Following the ‘Abhihitānvaya’ theory, the Naiyāyikas and Ālambārikas explain the definition of sentence as follows :— Sentence is a combination of the meanings of words which possess consistency, expectancy and contiguity². A group of

1 तच्च पुनद्विविधम्— सिद्धार्थं विधायकं चेति । विधायकमपि द्विविधम्— उपदेशकमतिदेशकं च । इत्थमिदं कर्तव्यमित्युपदेशः ।

SD, p. 72

2 वाक्यं स्याद्योग्यताऽकांक्षाऽसत्तियुक्तः पदोच्चयः ।
Sāhitya Darpaṇa, II, st. 1

letters with a suffix [sup or tin] constitutes a word¹. The co-ordinator of the meaning of a word with that of another is called consistency. Consistency consists in a word not bearing a meaning which is incompatible with the meanings of other words in speech. For instance, no verbal knowledge is derived from such a statement as 'sprinkling with fire', because it is incompatible with fire being an instrument in the act of sprinkling.

That without which a word can not produce knowledge of syntactical connection is called expectancy. A word is said to bear the relation of expectancy to another word if it cannot without the latter, produce knowledge of its interconnection in speech. For instance, 'Devadatta goes to the village' is a statement in which the word Devadattah [in the nominative case] is expectant for the word goes [the verb], and this latter in its turn is expectant for 'h', the crude word grāmam [the accusative case ending] and go [the root] for 'ti' [the verbal suffix]. A crude word and a case suffix, a root and a verbal suffix and a verb and a case are expectants for each other. The juxtaposition of words is called contiguity. Contiguity consists in the enunciation of words, without a long pause between them. For instance, the sentence 'close the door' will convey no meaning if one utters the word 'close' now and the word 'the door' after an hour.

Meaning of a sentence is called verbal judgement [śabda-bodha] in sāśric technical terms. The Mīmāṃsā view about it is that only a determinate judgement [savikalpa-jñāna] is embodied in and conveyed by a proposition ; every proposition comprises atleast a subject and a predicate : in a verbal judgement arising in the hearer's mind from a proposition, the will to do [kṛti] denoted by the ending of the finite verb plays the role of the leading concept and all the other concepts are directly or indirectly subordinated to it ; the cognition arising from a proposition is always non-perceptual ; and the meanings of the words conveyed by the words respectively but the mean-

1 वर्णः पदं प्रयोगार्हानन्वितेकार्थं बोधकः ।

ing of the whole sentence is conveyed through the implication [lakṣaṇā], not through the particular juxtaposition of words [samsarga-maryādā].

The meaning of the word will be known through the significative force [Sabdavṛtti]. It is the relation of a word and the object meant by that word which is always favourable in reviving the memory of that object. It is of three kinds, viz., the denotation [abhidhā], the implication [lakṣaṇā], and the figurative expression [gaṇī].

Denotative function is the relation of a word to its meaning. According to the old-logicians, it is of the form of a divine will that such and such a word should denote such and such a thing. The neo-logicians, however, maintain that it is not the divine will that constitutes denotative function, but any will. The Bhāṭṭas say that the relation between words and their denotation is neither the divine will nor any other's will. It is eternal without beginning or end¹.

The knowledge of it, however, is derived from grammar, companion, dictionary, statement of trustworthy persons, usage of elders, supplementary statement, paraphrase and contiguity of well-known words².

The usage of elders is prime means to understand the meaning of a word. When the first elder commands the second elder to bring a cow, the second elder goes out and brings a cow. The boy, who observes all this, concludes that the act of bringing the cow is the result of the knowledge that precedes the action. The knowledge that prompted the second elder to the activity of bringing the cow arises only on the hearing of the command from the first elder because in the absence of such a command no activity was observed.

Regarding this the Buddhas say that denotative function is with regard to distinction of all other objects from it [apoha]:

1 SD, pp. 90-97

2 शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोशाप्तवाक्याद्वचवहारतश्च ।

वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विवृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः ।

Muktāyali on Kārikāvaii, p. 550

When we hear a word such as 'pot', [they argue] we do not understand an external object, because we never really know external objects; nor the generic-attribute, because the genus is nothing more than a mere conception formed by our mind and imposed upon what we call external objects. What the word pot then really signifies is that a certain thing possesses some peculiarities which distinguish it from all other things. We never know what is pot or potness; we only know what is not, viz., that it is neither a cloth nor a wall. We have therefore only a negative knowledge of things and consequently the import of words must also be negative.

According to the old-logicians words denote individual things qualified by the generic-attribute [jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyakti]. Their argument is as follows:— when one says the sentence, 'bring a jar', the speaker does not desire the distinction of all other different objects from it, but the thing, jar, which possesses the class-notion, jarness, to be brought to him.

But according to the neo-logicians, words denote only things individual. When one says the word 'bring a jar', the speaker undoubtedly desires the thing, jar, and not the class-notion, jarness, to be brought to him. The individual 'jar' must somehow or other be implied, otherwise the hearer can never bring the object. Relying on this simple fact they say that the word, 'jar' primarily denotes the thing in individual, 'jar'. The capacity of being the subject of any act [arihakriyā-karitva] resides in the concrete object alone and hence it is the thing in individual on which the significance is made.

Regarding this the Mimāṃsakas say that the potentiality in the word 'cow' signifies the generic-attribute 'cowness' [which is common to all the cows]. If the word were to mean an individual then it must have as many potentialities as there are individuals meant by that word and without the knowledge of the class-attribute the apprehension of an individual is impossible. Thus the primary meaning of a word is with regard to the class-attribute and the apprehension of the individuals takes place subsequently by presumption [arthāpatti]. For instance, the sentence, 'a man with a stick' [dandi puruṣah]. It is well-known that without the prior knowledge of the attri-

bute, the knowledge of the individual as determined by that attribute is impossible. Unless one has the knowledge of stick, one can not arrive at the knowledge, 'man with a stick'. Similarly, the potentiality in the word 'cow' signifies only the genus and the individual is only by means of presumption.

If the word denotes a particular, we could not explain such Vedic injunctions as 'The altar is to be built like a kite', as it would be impossible for altars to be made in every case like a particular kite. Incapable of being so related, the word must be taken as denoting the generic-attribute.

What possesses denotative function is the word. It is of four kinds, viz. derivative [yaugika], conventional [rūḍha], derivatively-conventional [yaga-rūḍha], and derivative cum conventional [yaugika-rūḍha]. Where only the meaning of the component part of a word is understood, it is derivative, e.g. Pācakah [cook]. Where, irrespective of the denotative function of the component parts, a word is understood only through its collective denotative function it is called conventional, e.g. Gauḥ [cow]. Where, however, in the object denoted by the denotative function of the component parts, a word, there is also collective denotative function, it is derivatively-conventional, e.g. 'Pānkaja' [lotus]. The word 'pānkaja' conveys, by the denotative function of its component parts, the idea of some thing that grows in mud. And by its collective denotative function it conveys the idea of a lotus. Where the derivative and the conventional meanings are conveyed independently of each other, there the word is both derivative and conventional, e.g. Udbhid [a plant or a type of sacrifice]. Here the meaning conveyed is both what shoots up, such as trees and shrubs, and also a name of sacrifice.

The denotation [abhidhā] will explain only the meaning of a word not the meaning of a sentence. That [meaning of sentence] will be known through implication [lakṣaṇā]¹ only. The figurative description is based upon certain qualities. It is conveyed through the third significative power of words, i. e. Gaunī. For instance, when the term 'lion' is applied to some

1 अभिवेयाविनाभूतप्रवृत्तिरक्षणेष्यते । TV, 1.-4.-12.

other being, say a man, what is understood is that the man is having courageous action, [the quality of the lion] denoted by the word lion). Hence, it is that when a person thinks of speaking of some one as having courageous action, the intention is fulfilled, if the term lion is used for that purpose; and what happens is that the animal lion, which is denoted by the word lion, on being cognised, brings about the notion of courageous action, which is associated with that animal. In this manner, by denoting its own meaning, the word (lion) brings about the notion of the presence of the qualities associated with that meaning¹. The Ālāmkārikas include it under implication only².

The Ālāmkārikas ascribe to the Mimāṃsakas that they accept intention [tātparya] as the fourth significative force of words,³ but we do not find such discussion neither in the Bhāṭṭa texts nor in the Prābhākara texts and the both, the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras, accept it as a fourth requisite in order to convey the meaning of the word. Their argument is :— if the apprehension of the intention were not a cause of verbal comprehension, then a sentence like ‘bring Saindhava’, would not sometimes signify a Sindh horse and sometimes salt. It can not be he argued that the context and the like which help the apprehension of the intention might as well be causes of verbal comprehension: for they cannot be grouped under a common denotation. If, however, they are so grouped, as producing an apprehension of the intention, then, for the sake of simplicity, let the apprehension of the intention it self be the cause. Thus, even in the Vedas the potentiality of the speech itself consists of an idea of the form, ‘this speech directs me to perform or to desist from performing the act signified by it.’⁴

1. लक्ष्यमाणगुण्योगाद् वृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता । TV, 1-4-23.
तत्सद्वि-जाति-सारूप्य-प्रशंसा-भूमा-लिङ्गसमवायाः । JS, 1-4-12.
2. सादृश्येतरसंबन्धाशुद्धास्तास्तकला अपि ।
सादृश्यात्तु मता गौण्यस्तेन षोडशभेदतः ।
Sāhitya Darpaṇa, II, st. 9-10.
3. तात्पर्यर्थोऽपि केषुचित् । Kāvyaprakāśa, II, st. 1.
4. वेदे तु पुरुषाभावात् लिङ्गादिनिष्ठ एव । M N P, p. 194.

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

Verbal testimony is the third of the means of right knowledge accepted by the Prābhākaras. Śālikanātha defines verbal testimony as follows ‘Verbal testimony is that which is not cognised by any other means of right knowledge and proceeds from mind-soul contact aided by the knowledge of words’. [Sabdavijñānāpeksād ātma-manassannikarsād yad adṛṣṭārtha-viśayam vijnānam tat Sāstram nāma pramāṇam]¹.

The Prābhākaras say that words both the human and the scriptural, conveys a complete idea if it is related to any action [kriyā], i.e. if any thing already known in our wordly experience is conveyed by the words in a sentence, that sentence cannot be called a means of verbal testimony. Only that is a means of verbal testimony which conveys a new idea of valid character. So, according to the Prābhākara, the Vedic injunctions alone are means of verbal testimony.

Prabhākara maintains that Vedic injunctions are held to denote sacrifices such as yāga and others as duty or kārya for the persons Svarga-kāma and the rest. Here arises a discrepancy. The Yāga can not be prescribed as duty or kārya to him who is Svarga-kāma unless it is capable of producing the Svarga desired by him. Being a temporary action, it cannot produce Svarga as it does not last till one obtains Svarga. It is necessary, therefore, to accept some thing called Apūrva² as the outcome of the yāga to exist till the Svarga is attained. Vedic Injunctions denote this Apūrva as kārya or duty to the Svargakāma, and not the action conveyed by the verb in that sentence as is the case in the non-Vedic sentences. This Āpūrva is also called as niyoga because the svargakāma is asked to perform it.

The words used in our everyday conversation are not necessarily conveying new, unknown ideas, hence they are not means of verbal testimony. We do not see much difference

1 शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानाद्यदसन्निकृष्टार्थविज्ञानम् । PP, p. 229.

2 Rjuvimalā, 1-1-25.

between the Prābhākaras and the Vaiśeśikas regarding the human verbal testimony. They both reduce it to inference. Hence Śālikanātha says that the validity of human speech can always be doubted as the mere hearing of a sentence can never yield right knowledge. In the case of a person who is known to speak only after having had a perceptual knowledge the spoken sentence is invariably accompanied by a prior perceptual knowledge. That is why that sentence becomes probans for inferring that perceptual knowledge. Thus human speech, in so far as it is a mere translator of some other knowledge, can not be classed under the means of verbal testimony¹.

A group of letters with a suffix [sup or tīn] constitutes a word. A group of words having expectancy, compatibility and proximity constitutes a sentence. Expectancy is the desire to know. Compatibility is the non-existence of conflict with any means of right knowledge. Proximity is the continuous utterance of words².

In every word there are a number of letters. When the second letter is uttered the first passes out of cognition and all the letters are not presented to our cognition simultaneously, i. e. in a single moment we do not cognize all those letters together. How then is it possible for us to perceive the word as a whole? Prabhākara's contention is that the last letter in contact with the sense of hearing gives rise to the word-cognition. The sense of hearing is aided by two factors: impressions generated by the previous letters and apprehension of the previous letters³.

According to the Prābhākara there is no separate sentence meaning apart from the word meanings put together. It is true that a sentence contains not only word meanings but also their

1 पूर्वं तु लिङ्गभूतं तत् वक्तुज्ञानावधारणे ।
 वक्तुज्ञानप्रसिद्धं हि वाक्यं तत्कार्यमिष्यते ॥
 कार्यत्कारणसिद्धिश्च सर्वेषामनुमानतः ।
 पौरुषेयमतो वाक्यं न शास्त्रमभिधीयते ॥ PP, p. 37.

2 Brhati, p. 63; Rjuvimalā, p. 135.

3 Brhati, PP. 160-161.

syntactical relation with other words and its own meaning'.

The verb is the principal word in a proposition because it is the verb that forms the copula as it were to connect a number of words into a sentence. If one only says 'Devadatta....the village' we can make nothing out of those words ; they are disconnected. But as soon as the verb 'goes' is added, the whole forms a connected proposition conveying the idea of Devadatta's motion to the village. The idea of motion is the chief significance of the sentence, the words 'Devadatta' and 'village' simply serve to specify and define as it were that motion. The verb 'goes' denotes motion in general, the addition of Devadatta limits the sense to the motion of a particular individual, while the further addition of the village still more restricts this limited motion of an individual to one in a particular direction and towards a particular place. Here the verb is principal and other two expressions simply act as limiting qualifications.

Every word in a sentence conveys the meaning connected with the meaning of the other words in the sentence in a syntactic manner. Thus, when a boy hears the sentence 'bring a cow' the syntactic meaning of the whole sentence is first apprehended by the observance of the usage of elders. It is only after this that the boy tries to know the meanings of particular words through the process of insertion [āvāpa] and deletion [uddhāra]². This theory is known as Anvitābhidhāna-vāda.

According to the Prabhākara, a word does not convey meaning unless the word meaning relation is learnt ; and this relation is learnt from the usage of elderly persons. The elderly persons resort to word usage by employing sentences rather than single words. Hence what is learnt is the relation between a sentence and its meaning. And what is a sentence ?

1 पदैरेवाऽन्वितस्वार्थमात्रोपक्षीणशक्तिभिः ।

स्वार्थश्चेद्वोधिता बुद्धो वाक्यार्थोऽपि तथा सति ॥ PP, p. 377.

2 व्यवहारेषु वृद्धानां वाक्यश्ववणभाविषु ।

आवापोद्वारभेदेन पदानां शक्तिनिश्चयः ॥ ibid, p. 378.

A sentence is but words as combined together and thus conveying a meaning. The words would not combine together to convey a meaning if that operation be possible on the part of one single word, just as fuel, etc.,— which constitute the causal aggregate of cooking— jointly undertake the operation called ‘cooking’, so also do all the words of a sentence jointly undertake the operation called ‘conveying the sentential meaning’.

The Prābhākara accepts the necessity of thus apprehending each word separately before combining them in a sentence¹, when the meaning of the whole sentence can as well be conveyed at once in the form of the collective sense of all the words ; that is, according to the Prābhākara, the expressive power resides in the apprehended words and not in the apprehension itself and verbal knowledge is obtained from one word [such as, verb] but not from all the words together.

Power is the relation of a word and an object, that always serves to revive the memory of that object [whenever the word is spoken]. The Naiyāyika identifies it with the divine will that makes the convention. The Bhāṭṭa accepts it as a quality. The Prāthākara regards it as a separate category. His argument is that power is not a substance as qualities inhere [in them] ; it is also distinct from qualities and actions. It resides in genus and other categories. It must therefore be regarded as a separate category².

The Bhāṭṭa and the Naiyāyika accept the word as of four kinds, viz., derivative, conventional, derivatively conventional and derivative-cum-conventional³. And they give the word ‘Pānkaja’ [lotus] as an example for the derivatively conventional. Here the old-Naiyāyika holds that the word ‘Pānkaja’ conveys, by the denotative function of its component parts, the idea of something that grows in the mud, and by its collective deno-

1 प्राथम्यादभिधातृत्वात् तात्पर्यविगमादपि ।
पदानामेव सा शक्तिः ॥ । ibid, p. 400.

2 न द्रव्यं गुणवृत्तित्वाद् गुणकर्मबहिकृता ।
सामान्यादिषु सत्वेन सिद्धभावान्तरं हि सा ॥

3 See supra, p. 59.

tative function it conveys the idea of a lotus as a lotus. But the neo-Naiyāyika speaks that the lotus, which is known from the collective denotative function, is joined, through contiguity, the meaning of the component parts, viz., what grows in mud. Where, however, the conventional meaning is known to be contradicted, there the ‘water lily’, etc, are understood by implication. And where the intended meaning is not a water-lily as such, and at the same time the idea of a lotus as such is contradicted, there verbal comprehension [of the water-lily] takes place simply by the denotative function of the component parts of the word. Where, however, as in the case of a ‘land lotus’, the meaning of the component parts is contradicted, there the meaning conveyed by collective denotative function is a lotus. If, on the other hand, the land lotus is held to belong to a different species altogether, then the meaning is obtained by implication alone.

The Prābhākara does not accept convention [rūḍhi] and they say in Pāṅkaja, etc. there is no convention, because its application to the lotus is intelligible even through the significance of the parts. Its non-application to the lily, etc., may, however, be due to its mere non-usage with reference to them. According to the Prābhākara, the word is of one kind, viz., derivative.

The Prābhākara, like the Bhāṭṭa¹, accepts intention [tātparya] as a fourth requisite, in order to convey the meaning of the word, and not as a fourth significative force of the words as put forth by the rhetoricians. Intention is essential to have a correct understanding of the sentence. For instance, ‘Protect the curd from crows’², implies that all birds and creatures must be kept off the curd. Here the word ‘crows’ is only a suggestion implying every other bird and creature from which the curd is to be protected.

In some places the intention of the speaker is understood by supplying a particular idea to make the meaning sensible,

1 See supra, p. 60.

2 काकेभ्यो दधि रक्षताम् ।

e. g. when one says ‘door’, the idea of ‘closing’ must be supplied to get at the exact intention of the speaker, because the meaning of the sentence springs from the consistency among the words in the sentence.¹ If the idea of ‘closing’ is not supplied to the word ‘door’ to complete the sentence, there will be the absence of consistency between the words in the sentence. Consequently the intention of the speaker to close the door will not be clear. Regarding this, the Bhāṭṭa says that if one says only ‘door’ then another word ‘close’ along with the idea of closing must be supplied to get at the exact intention of the speaker. We may see here that the Prābhākara view is better than that of the Bhāṭṭa, because the latter view is sublated by the defect of following a difficult method when an easy one is available [laghūpāye sati gurvāśrayah].

ANALOGY

Analogy [upamāna] has been treated as an independent means of right knowledge by the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka. The Buddhist rejects it as an independent means of right knowledge and holds it to be a case of perception or inference, since the knowledge arising out of it can be acquired through either perception or inference. The Vaiśeṣika also rejects it as an independent means of right knowledge, and includes it under inference. Among Naiyāyikas Bhāsarvajñā, however, follows the Vaiśeṣika view.

Even though the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka accept it as an independent means of right knowledge, there is considerable difference between the concepts of analogy established by them. According to the Naiyāyika, analogy [that is, knowledge resulting from the employment of similarity²] has for its object the denotative relation between a word or a name standing for a strange object and the strange object itself, on the

1 एकपदप्रयोगे हि द्वारमित्यादावभिधानमेव । PP, p. 386.

2 प्रसिद्धसाधम्यति साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् । ND, 1-1 6

ground of the resemblance of that strange object to an already familiar one. This may be illustrated as follows :— Let us suppose that a person, who very well knows the cow, is told by another person that there is a kind of animal living in the forest which resembles the cow and is called Gavaya. He then happens to go to the forest and perceives an animal which is hitherto unknown to him, but which resembles the cow. Thereupon he comes to remember what he was told before, namely, that the Gavaya resembles the cow. And, as a result, he acquires the knowledge that Gavaya is the name of the strange animal concerned. Thus, the relation between a word and its denotation cannot be grasped, through perception, etc., but only through analogy¹.

The Naiyāyika further explains it as of three kinds ; 1) the analogy through similarity [sādharmyopamāna], 2) the analogy through dissimilarity [vaidharmyopamāna], and 3) the analogy through common characteristics [dharmaṁtropamāna]. The analogy through similarity is the means of cognising some unknown object through its similarity to a well-known object, e.g. say, a person happens to be ignorant of the meaning of the word ‘Gavaya’. From a forester, he learns that a Gavaya is similar to a cow; he goes to a forest, sees the animal, which is similar to a cow and recollects the information conveyed by the assimilative proposition. Then the assimilative knowledge ‘This is the animal denoted by the word ‘Gavaya’ arises.

Analogy through dissimilarity is the means of cognising some unknown object through its dissimilarity to a well-known object, e.g. say, a person happens to be ignorant of the meaning of the word ‘horse’. From a friend, he learns that a horse has not a cloven hoof like a cow; he sees the animal with a single hoof and recollects the information conveyed by the dissimilative proposition. Then the dissimilative knowledge ‘This is the animal denoted by the word ‘horse’ arises.

1 कीदृग्वय इत्येवं पृष्ठो नागरिकैयंदि ।

ब्रवीत्यारण्यको वाक्यं यथा गौर्गवयस्तथा ॥ SV, UPast. I

Analogy through characteristics-in-general is the means of cognising some unknown object through the statement of characteristics-in-general, e.g. ‘A camel has a long neck and drooping lips, and eats thorns’, after hearing this, one can know a camel elsewhere.¹

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa criticises the Naiyāyika view on the ground that as the knowledge of denotative relation is supposed to issue from perception of similarity, it can very well be a case of perception². He further explains that the element of remembrance is not a valid piece of knowledge.³ What induces to the knowledge of denotative relation is the sense-object contact only. This may be explained thus : After hearing the sentence, ‘the merchant has Nava (nine or new) blankets’ [Nava kambali vaṇīk], one goes to the market and, seeing nine blankets with the merchant, concludes that the purport is a particular number, and understands the meaning of the sentence. Similarly, a person who is ignorant of the object denoted by the word ‘Gavaya’ learns from a forester that Gavaya is similar to a cow. Subsequently, going to the forest, he sees the strange animal similar to a cow, gets back memory, and attains the expressed meaning of the word ‘Gavaya’ cognized through perception. Therefore the apprehension of the relation, between a name and the object denoted by it, is even possible through words assisted by perception, and so there is no need to seek a distinct means of knowledge. Thus criticising the Naiyāyika view, the Mīmāṃsaka accepts analogy as the knowledge of similarity present in the cow, for which there is no other means.

Sabaravāmin defines analogy as follows ‘Analogy is that which consists of similarity also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses’ [Upamānam api

1 एतत्साधर्म्यवाक्यार्थद्विप्रमानं समीरितम् ।

एवमेव हि वैधर्म्यातः धर्मप्रात्राच्च सम्भवेत् ॥ MM p. 115

2 यावद्वीन्द्रियसम्बद्धे तत्प्रत्यक्षमिति स्मृतम् । SV, U Pp. st. 9

3 स्मर्यमाणस्य चीशस्य विवेके नाप्रमाणता । ibid, Upa, st. 10

sādṛśyam asannikṛṣṭe arthe buddhim utpādayati]. Further he explains it with the help of example ‘just as the perception of Gavaya is the cause of remembrance of the cow’ [yathā gavaya darśanam gosmarañasya]. The compound ‘gavaya-darśanam’ is a Bahuvrihi. The word ‘darśanam’ is to be interpreted as — that in which (similarity) is experienced [dṛśyate asmin iti]. So the total meaning of the compound will be the similarity that is experienced in Gavaya. The compound ‘gosmarañasya’ means the agent who recollects the cow. The word ‘smaraṇam’ is to be taken in the sense of the agent who recollects. So the total meaning will be— The similarity experienced in Gavaya produces a knowledge ‘the cow is similar to this [Gavaya].’ According to the Bhāsyakāra, the result of analogy is right knowledge of the object not in contact with the senses. In the stock example the result is the remembrance of a cow. Here the object of remembrance is, no doubt, not in contact with the senses, but it is not a valid knowledge. Hence, this illustration of the Bhāsyakāra is rejected by Kumārila² and Sālikanātha³.

Pārthasārathi says that analogy consists in viewing an object — observed earlier and recalled now as similar to another object that is under observation now. Thus when on seeing a Gavaya’s similarity with a cow a man comments that the cow earlier seen by him in the town is similar to this Gavaya, it is only because this man is taking recourse to analogy⁴.

The psychological process involves four steps. First of all there is the knowledge or perception of points of similarity in the Gavaya. Secondly, through similarity, is revived the memory of the cow seen earlier in the village. Thirdly, there arises the knowledge that the perceptible Gavaya is like the

1 सदृशादुपजायेत या मतिस्सवृशान्तरे ।

ध्यानादिस्मृतितुल्यत्वात्सा नराणां कथं भवेत् ॥ SV, Upa st. 4

2 गोस्मरणस्येति भाष्यप्रयुक्तम् । न हि... PP, p. 107

3 SBh, 1-1-5, p. 37

4 पूर्वदृष्टे स्मर्यमाणेऽर्थे दृश्यमानोर्थसादृश्यज्ञानमुपमानम् । SD, p. 74

cow and, lastly, there is the consequent knowledge that the cow seen earlier is similar to the Gavaya seen at present, or, in other words, the cow seen is qualified by the similarity to the Gavaya seen at present.

This is not a case of perception, because the cow [which is the object of the resulting knowledge] does not here come in contact with the cogniser's senses. Nor is it a case of remembrance [the remembrance is the result of the past impressions], because the Gavaya and consequently its similarity to cow was not perceived earlier to the perception of the Gavaya. Even though we find the element of remembrance in analogy, still it can not be reduced to remembrance. In the above mentioned example, the similarity is perceived and the cow is remembered yet the combination of the two, i. e., the remembered cow as qualified by its similarity to the Gavaya and its similarity, is not known through remembrance¹.

Nor is it a case of inference. For one might suppose that man is inferring as 'The cow must be similar to Gavaya, because the Gavaya is similar to cow.' But this supposition will be illegitimate in as much as the type of knowledge we are describing can possibly be acquired even by a man who has not seen a cow and a Gavaya together, but has seen a cow earlier in the town and is seeing a Gavaya now in the forest. Thus if on seeing the Gavaya's similarity with cow this man finds it possible to have knowledge to the effect that the cow earlier seen by him in the town is similar to this Gavaya. This is because he has taken recourse to an altogether new means of right knowledge, called analogy².

The sole purpose of analogy is that it serves the purpose of replacing one object with the other similar to it in the context of the sacrificial details in case of a rite of which the details are not mentioned but are to be taken from some other rite. The Vrihis taken for a Purodāsa of a sacrifice are defiled or

1 प्रत्यक्षो गवयस्तावत् सादृश्यस्मृतिरत्र तु ।

ननु सादृश्ययुक्तेऽर्थं न स्मृतिर्नेन्द्रियाद्गतिः ॥ SV, Upa, st. 7

2 SD, p. 76

lost, Nivāra can be taken as a substitute of Vrihi with a view that the grain will be the same. This is, because the Nivāra is similar to the Vrihi¹. Similarly, where the details of procedure are not described, there they can be known through the means of analogy, e.g. the Saurya sacrifice is an ectype [vikṛti] sacrifice; here the sacrificial details are not described. Through the similarity of divinity, the details can be borrowed from the archetype [Prakṛti] sacrifice, viz. Āgneya sacrifice.

Regarding the similarity of divinity, Dr. Govardhan P. Bhat has made some remarks as follows : ‘The Saurya sacrifice is similiar to the Āgneya sacrifice in the respect that both have a common deity². But the Saurya and the Āgneya sacrifices do not have a common deity. The Saurya sacrifice was described with the injunction, ‘one desiring Brāhmīc glory, should offer cooked rice dedicated to Sūrya’ [Sauryam carum nirvapet brahma-varcasa-kāmah] with the deity of Sūrya. The Āgneya sacrifice was described with the injunction ‘one should offer puroḍāśa [baked on eight potsherds] to Agni’ [yad āgneya aṣṭākapālo bhavati] with the deity of Agni. Here the Saurya and the Āgneya sacrifices have different deities not a common deity. The similarity of divinity here is that the both sacrifices have a single deity. The Āgneya has a single deity, viz., Agni. The Saurya also has a single deity, viz., Sūrya. Due to this similarity of divinity, the sacrificial details of the Āgneya sacrifice can be transferred into the Saurya sacrifice through the means of analogy.

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

The Prābhākara criticises the Naiyāyika view on the ground that the Naiyāyika does not explain the nature of analogy as a distinct means of right knowledge. In the stock example of

1 प्रतिनिधिरपि चैवं त्रीहिसादृश्ययोगाद्-

भवति तदपचारे यत्र नीवारजातौ ॥ SV, Upa, st. 53

2 Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā,

the Naiyāyika, the first knowledge that the Gavaya is similar to the cow arises through the authoritative statement and is not the result of analogy. The knowledge of Gavaya and its similarity to the cow arising in the man who has gone to the forest, are recognition and perception¹.

Respectively, the understanding that this object is denoted by the word ‘Gavaya’ is the inferential knowledge. When a word is used in certain meaning, one comes to know the denotative relation with the object. After requiring the knowledge of the denotative relation in the forest, the final knowledge ‘the name known to me is of that animal only’ is the case of remembrance. Thus, there is no scope for analogy. It is also argued that the Naiyāyika’s concept of analogy can be reduced to the inference. The Prabhākara puts the syllogism like this : ‘the word Gavaya denotes the animal Gavaya, because it is used in the latter sense by learned man. When there is no function other than direct denotation, a term used by the learned man in the sense of particular object is regarded as denoting that object, just as the term cow.’ The term Gavaya is used in the sense of an object which is similar to a cow. Therefore, it should be accepted as denoting the animal Gavaya².

Prabhākara defines analogy as follows ‘Analogy is that which brings about the knowledge of another thing (cow) which is not in contact with the senses³, but which bears similarity to the thing [Gavaya] which has contact with the senses’³. Śālikanātha’s definition is as follows ‘Analogy is the knowledge of what is not in contact with the senses, arising from the similarity to an object that is seen’⁴. [sādṛśyād dṛśyamānād

1 यदपि वनं गतस्य गवये, तदगते च गोसादृश्ये ज्ञानम् , तदधि प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षम् । PP, p. 271

2 या त्वेतस्य गवयशब्दवाच्यतावगतिः, साऽपि गवयशब्दप्रतीगादनु-मानिकी । यस्य शब्दस्य ... ibid, p. 271

3 Brhatī, p. 107

4 Rjuvimala, p. 109; सादृश्यदर्शनोत्थं ज्ञानं सादृश्यविषयसुप्तमानम् । PP, p. 267

yat pratiyogini jāyate ; Sādṛśya-viṣayam Jñānam upamānam
tad ucyate.]

Prabhākara, like Kumārila, establishes the independent position of analogy. The knowledge of the cow qualified by its similarity to the Gavaya can not be a case of perception, because the knowledge pertains to some thing not in contact with the senses. Nor it is a case of mere remembrance, because at the time that the cow was seen in the past, the Gavaya had not been seen, and what has not been seen can not be remembred. Nor it is a case of inference also, because what brings about an inference is an invariable concomitance [vyāpti] that has been perceived several times. The analogy does not possess the relationship which is essential in an inference¹.

The Prabhākara establishes similarity [sādṛśya] as a distinct category and says that the similarity can not be a substance [dravya], because it is found in the case of the quality [guṇa] and action [karma] as well. It is neither quality nor action, since it is found with reference to the quality and action also. It is not the case of commonness. Hence it is not genes [jāti] also. It can not be included in inherence [samavāya], because the similarity is of the form of relation. The particularity [viśeṣa] is not accepted even by the all Naiyāyikas. So, thereis no question of including it in that. Hence it should be accepted as a distinct category².

The Bhāṭṭa and the Prabhākara both criticise the Naiyāyika's concept of analogy on same arguments. The Bhāṭṭa includes the analogy of the Naiyāyika in perception, but the Prabhākara includes it in inference. They both establish it as an independent means of right knowledge on the basis of Śabaravāmin's definition, i.e. Analogy is similarity [expressed in the object] generating a cognition (of the same) in another which has no contact with the senses. [Upamānam api sādṛśyam

1 किञ्च अस्त्रद्वृष्टसम्बन्धो ह्यनुमानस्य हेतुः, असजातीयव्यावृति-
त्तिसव्यपेक्षश्च, द्वयमत्र नास्तीति प्रमाणान्तरम् । Brhatī, p. 108

2 सर्ववस्तुनि संविदेकशरणानि । अस्ति चेयं सदृशा इति संवित् ।
... अतः पदाथन्तिरमेवेदम् ... PP, p. 268

asannikṛṣṭe arthe buddhim utpādayati]. Further the Bhāṣyakāra illustrates it with the example as follows : the similarity experienced in Gavaya produces the knowledge ‘the cow is similar to this [Gavaya]’. [Yathā gavaya-darśanam go-smaraṇasya].

The difference in the two interpretations turns upon the meaning of the sentence ‘Go-smaraṇasya’. Kumārila interprets the sentence as ‘Go-smaraṇasya buddhim utpādayati —’ i.e. the similitude produces the idea of the remembrance of the cow. Prabhākara interprets it as ‘Anubhūtagoḥ puruṣasya’ ‘to the man who had known the cow’. However, there is no fundamental difference regarding analogy in both the schools, but only a minor difference, viz., that the Prabhākara considers similarity to be an independent category, while the Bhāṭṭa considers it as the assemblage of common features¹.

PRESUMPTION

The word ‘Arthāpatti’ (presumption) stands for both the meanings, viz., the means of knowledge and the resulting knowledge. The etymology of the word ‘Arthāpatti’ in the sense of the means is explained as ‘Arthasya āpattih yasmāt’ the knowledge of the fact which has to be accounted for and is otherwise unaccountable — the knowledge through which the needed explanatory fact is presumptively arrived at. In the sense of the resulting knowledge, the same word is explained as ‘Arthasya āpattih’ the presumptive knowledge of the required explanatory circumstance.

Sabaravāmin defines presumption as follows : ‘The assumption of some thing not perceived when what is seen or heard would not be possible without the assumption. The assumption is called as presumption’. [Arthāpattirapi dṛṣṭah śruto vā arthaḥ anyathā nopapadyata ityarthakalpanā]². Further

1 भूयोऽवश्वसामान्ययोगे जात्यन्तरस्य तत् । SV, Upa, st. 18

2 SBh, 1-1-5, p. 38

he illustrates it with the example : It is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in his house leads to the assumption that he is somewhere outside the home¹. From this statement it is not clear whether Śabaravāmin means presumption of two forms, viz., 1) presumption from what is seen [dṛṣṭārthā-patti] and 2) presumption from what is heard [śrutārthā-patti], or a single form of it, because he mentions two words dṛṣṭa (seen) and śruṭa (heard) as the upapādya (the fact requiring explanation) which appears to refer to two forms of presumption. But he illustrates through example only one, viz., presumption from what is seen, and not two.

The Bhāṭṭa, following Śabaravāmin's definition of presumption, establishes two kinds of presumption. While the Prābhākara, following Śabaravāmin's illustration of presumption, establishes single form of presumption. In this connection Dr.Govardhan P. Bhat makes some remarks as follows : 'Śabara has given only one example of presumption, but in case he intended two forms of presumption, he should have given two instead of one'². This hypothesis, however, is against the well settled fact³ and his argument is sublated by the fallacy of Satpratipakṣa. It occurs when there are two probans leading to conflicting inferences and there is no decision as to which of the two is the real one. Here we have two arguments — 1) 'Śabaravāmin intended two forms of presumption, because he has used the two words, 'seen' and 'heard' as upapādya in his definition, which refer to two forms of presumption' and 2) 'Śabaravāmin intended one form of presumption, because he has given one example of presumption'; both the arguments lead to conflicting inferences. And they appear to be equally cogent and it is difficult to determine whether Śabaravāmin intended two forms of presumption or one form of presumption.

1 यथा जीवतो देवदत्तस्य गृहाभावदशने बहिभविस्यादृष्टस्य परिकल्पना । ibid, p. 38

2 Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa school of PM, p. 315

3 दृष्टश्रुतभेदेनाऽर्थापत्तेः द्वैविध्यं शबरमुनिनाऽङ्गीक्रियते सम । Viṣama Sthala Tippaṇī on PP, p. 278

BHĀTTĀ VIEW

Kumārila defines presumption as follows : 'When a fact ascertained by any of the six means of right knowledge is found to be inapplicable except on the basis of a fact not so ascertained, the assumption of this latter fact is presumption.'¹ For instance — If we know that Devadatta is alive (through inference) and at the same time find that he does not exist at home (through non-apprehension), there arises a conflict between his being alive and his being absent from home which can not be resolved except on the assumption that he lives outside his home.

The Naiyāyika seeks to show that presumption is indistinguishable from inference.² For instance, where aliveness is known to be a concomitant of one or the other of two alternatives, viz. being outside or being at home, there one of the two must be held be true ; and existence at home being contradicted by perception, existence outside is presented by inference². Against the Naiyāyika view the Bhāṭṭā argues that it is impossible to conceive of mere living without some specification. Before apprehending his being outside, it is not possible to think conjointly of his being alive and his not being at home. Since there is no knowledge of the probans in the form of his not being at home as equalled by his being alive, we cannot infer his existence outside'. Therefore, presumption is certainly distinct from inference.

Regarding this the Prābhākara says that when we find that Devadatta, who was generally found to be exist in his home, is not in his home we become doubtful whether he is alive or dead. This doubt will be removed through presumption by assuming that Devadatta exists outside his home. This is not a case of inferring 'Devadatta's existence outside his home'

1 प्रमाणगृह्यविज्ञातो यत्रार्थे नान्यथा भवेत् ।

अदृष्टं कल्पयेदन्यं साऽर्थपित्तिरुदाहृता ॥ SV, Arthā, st. 1

2 अर्थपित्तिस्तु नैवेह प्रमाणान्तरमिष्यते ।

व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिबुद्ध्या चरितार्थं हि सा यतः ॥ KV, st. 144

from 'Devadatta's non-existence at home.' For the latter can also be due to 'Devadatta's death'.

Pārthasārathi criticises the Prābhākara view on the ground that a mere knowledge that Devadatta does not exist in his home, nor a mere knowledge that Devadatta is not dead, will lead to the knowledge that Devadatta is existing outside his home. But these two knowledges taken together do lead to this third knowledge being inferred from the first two. For, here the third ensues as soon as the first two are heard. While in an inference the conclusion does not ensue as soon as the probans is observed, and that is because the recollection of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is the other indispensable condition of arriving at conclusion there.¹

What actually happens is that the knowledge that Devadatta is not dead and the knowledge that he does not exist at home are contradictory of each other. While their contradiction is resolved by our having the knowledge that he is existing outside home. For, to say that Devadatta is alive and yet not exists at home without the same time positing that he is existing outside home amounts to saying that Devadatta who is not existing at home, exists either at home or outside it. But that is not possible, for a thing cannot be both existing and absent at the same place. Thus the general characteristics of the case of presumption is that here we come to have two knowledges which are inconsistent of each other, while this inconsistency remains unresolved unless a third knowledge is assumed through presumption. Hence presumption is distinct.

Those, who hold that inference can be included in presumption argue thus : Suppose we have the knowledge that whatever has smoke has fire and the knowledge that a particular hill has smoke. Now in this case if the hill does not have fire either the knowledge that this hill has smoke or the knowledge that whatever has smoke has fire, will be wrong so that both these knowledges are renderd valid by our

positing that the hill has fire. And all that turns this to be a case of presumption.

To the above argument Pārthasārathi answers :— This contingency will arise only in case while inferring fire on the hill, we already somehow happen to know through some means of right knowledge other than inference that whatever (i. e. whatever particular place) has smoke has fire. But that is not the case. For here we only know that in such and such places smoke has been found to be accompanied by fire but not that whatever has smoke has fire. It is inference which makes us to know that whatever has smoke has fire. And certainly, one who has knowledge merely to be the effect that in such and such places smoke has been found to be concomitant with fire faces no inconsistency, to eliminate which one might be forced to posit knowledge to the effect that whatever has smoke has fire. Hence it is that to infer the existence of fire at a place found to have smoke is not a case of presumption. Hence inference is distinct.¹

As previously mentioned, the Bhāṭṭa recognizes two kinds of presumption: 1) presumption from what is seen [dṛṣṭīrthāpatti] and 2) presumption from what is heard [śrutīrthāpatti], according to the fact being made out through some means of right knowledge other than verbal testimony or through verbal testimony. Thus presumption from what is seen is of five kinds, viz., that based upon — perception, inference, analogy, another presumption, and upon non-apprehension.

An example for the presumption based on perception is the assumption of the existence in fire of a power to burn, without which the perception of burning cannot be explained². For instance, fire in the immediate vicinity of a particular kind of gem, or of a particular herb, does not burn, but it does burn when it is free from that. Here the conflict arises that how fire does not burn some time and does burn

1 ibid, p. 79

2 तत्र प्रत्यक्षतो ज्ञातादाहादृहनशक्तता । SV, Arthā, st. 3

some time ? This conflict is resolved by only the assumption of burning power in fire. Hence here it is inferred that the gem, etc., destroys that power of fire which helps combustion, whereas the presence of stimulating gem or the removal of the previous gem generates it. From perception it is ascertained that fire burns things.

An example for the presumption based on inference ; from the fact that the sun is in different places at different times, it is inferred that he moves from place to place and it is assumed that the movement is not possible without possessing the power for movement. Here the conflict arises how can the sun move from one place to another without having legs ? This conflict is resolved by only the assumption of moving power in the sun.

An example for the presumption based on analogy : the assuming of the cognisability of the cow by the knowledge born of the similarity between the cow and the Gavaya. Here the conflict arises how can the knowledge of the cow's similarity arise when one sees a Gavaya and not when one sees cow ? This conflict is resolved by only the assumption of some power in the cow which is manifested by perception of the counter-correlative and gives rise to the knowledge of its similarity to the Gavaya.

An example for the presumption based upon another presumption ; the assumption of the eternity of the word. We found in the knowledge of the denotative potency of the word through presumption based upon the well-known fact that it denotes certain things— and on the basis of the said presumed denotative potency,— which can not be possible without assuming eternity of the words.¹ The assumption of Devadatta's presence out side his home is at example for the presumption based on non-apprehension.²

Where, however, in an incomplete sentence there is importation of words to make out the syntactical relation, if is

1 SV, Arthā, st. 4-9

2 See supra, p. 76.

called the presumption from what is heard. For instance, some one says, 'Door'. As the word by itself can not give full meaning, we complete the sentence by adding the word, say, 'close'. This is we postulate what should have been uttered. And there, one proceeding to assume the sense of closing, etc., even along with a word, assumes only the word for the sake of economy [lāghava], since the sense can be understood from the word itself.

The Prābhākara rejects presumption from what is heard as an independent division and includes it under presumption from what is seen. Regarding the stock example, he says that what is to be assumed is only the sense of closing, there is no assumption of a word. The Bhāṭṭa criticises the Prābhākara view on the ground that if the sense alone is assumed to complete the sentence, then in the Vedic sentence, 'I offer what is pleasing to the sun [Sūryāya juṣṭam nirvapīmi]' only the sense in the form of the sun has to be supplied, not the word, 'to the sun' [Sūryāya]. But all are assuming here the word, 'to the sun' and not only the sense. Hence presumption from what is heard is distinct from presumption from what is seen.

Kumārila says that presumption from what is heard is very essential for the interpretation of the Vedic texts, thus,— The validity of the injunctions in the codes [smṛtis] of Manu, etc., enjoining Aṣṭakā śrāddha and other rites is explained by only presumption from what is heard that they are based on Smṛti injunctions and not the ordinary statements of men which may or may not be authentic. The word-meaning [liṅga] of a hymn [mantra] to convey a particular sense becomes a proof on specification of auxiliary [aṅgatva] on the basis of this presumption only. The hymn 'I cut the straw, a seat for the gods' [barhir devasadanam dāmi] which explains the cutting of sacred grass [darbha] in the Fullmoon day and New moon day sacrifices will be of no use unless we take it as an accessory of cutting of sacred grass in the sacrifice : and this can not be made out by means of word-meaning [liṅga] unless we take for granted the Vedic sentence 'his hymn should be utilised as an auxiliary of cutting of sacred grass

in this sacrifice'. The presumption of a Vedic sentence without which the means of word-meaning can not explain the relation of auxiliary and principal [āṅga-āṅgibhāva] is the result of this presumption. The supplying of the word expressing a fruit in those injunctions without special desired-end is again made possible by presumption from what is heard. For instance, no fruit is directly stated in the injunction 'He shall sacrifice with the Viśvajit' [Viśvajitā yajeta], and since a fruit must infallibly be assumed because it is impossible that an injunction could be stated unless there were a fruit, it is assumed, through presumption from what is heard, that heaven is the fruit, because it is a universal object of desire¹.

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

As mentioned earlier, among the schools of Indian philosophy, only the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta accept presumption as independent means of right knowledge. The admission of presumption is a necessity when there arises a contradiction between two well known facts followed by a demand for its resolution. Hence Śabaravāmin defines it as the assumption of unperceived fact apart from which the contradiction between two actually seen or heard facts can not be resolved. [dṛṣṭah śruto vārthah anyathā nopapadyata ityarthakalpanā²].

According to Prabhākara, the expression 'seen or heard' [dṛṣṭah śrutaḥ], in the definition, is an idiomatic one which is used in the sense of 'well known' through the means of right knowledge³. But the Bhāṭṭa interprets the expression as two different words having separate meanings : seen [dṛṣṭah] means known through the means of perception or inference or analogy or presumption or non-apprehension, 'heard' [śrutaḥ]

1 स्मृत्या स्मृतिर्या परिकल्प्यते इस्मन् लिगादिभिर्या विनियोजिका च ।

फलादिभिर्यत्परिपूरणं च सम्बन्धदृक् तत्र न काचिदस्ति ॥

SV, Arthāst. 87

2 SBh, p. 38

3 दृष्टः श्रुतो वा इत्युपलब्धेवर्त्तिकम् । Brhati, p. 115

means known through the means of verbal testimony. And the Bhāṭṭa regards that the words refer to two kinds of presumption, viz., 1) presumption from what is seen and 2) presumption from what is heard. But the Prabhākara rejects to accept two kinds of presumption and includes the latter one (presumption from what is heard) in the previous one (presumption from what is seen). Here, the expression ‘seen and heard’ stands for ‘known’ through any means of right knowledge. And in the stock example of presumption from what is seen of the Bhāṭṭa ‘door’, in order to get a syntactical relation, the Prabhākara assumes, through the means of presumption, only the sense of closing, not the word ‘close’ as accepted by the Bhāṭṭa.

Prabhākara criticises the Naiyāyika view on the ground that in presumption the knowledge of something that provides the required explanation [upapādaka jñāna] is result [phala] and the knowledge of the fact to be explained [upapādya jñāna] is instrumental cause [karaṇa], while in inference the knowledge of something that provides the required explanation is instrumental cause and the knowledge of the fact to be explained is result. And in inference the conclusion is drawn from the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum, while in presumption there is no knowledge of such a relation¹. In the stock example, ‘Devadatta who is alive is not at home’, it is not the possible falsification of the knowledge of Devadatta being alive that constitutes the means of right knowledge, called presumption. But it is the doubt regarding Devadatta being alive, which arises from the conflict, i.e. Devadatta living and existing somewhere is an established fact through the means of inference and he does not exist at his home is also an established fact through the means of non-apprehension. That serves as the means of the resultant knowledge which consists in the presumptive knowledge of Devadatta being outside his home.

1 यदि यद्येन विना नोपपद्यते तदेवावगमकं स्थात् । इह तु यन्नोप-
पद्यते तदेवावगम्यते । किं चात्र नोपपद्यते ibid, p. 112

Sālikanātha says that presumption involves an element of doubt, the doubt about the validity of two well known facts on account of their mutual contradiction. The removal of this doubt is the specific function of presumption. The recognition of doubt as an element serves the purpose of showing that this means of right knowledge is distinct from inference. Further he explains it as follows. In the case of inference the probans (say, smoke) is such that its existence is beyond doubt. So, while seeing smoke undoubtedly one can immediately infer fire. But in the case of presumption, the undoubted perception of Devadatta's non-existence at home cannot lead immediately to his unperceived existence somewhere outside his home but only mediately by way of removing the doubt about his being alive¹.

Rāmānujācārya illustrates the example as follows. We come to know, through perception or through words received from some one, that Devadatta does not exist at his home. This non-existence at home renders his being alive unaccounted unless his existence outside home is assumed. Hence Devadatta's non-existence at home is the means of presumption for the knowledge of Devadatta's existence outside home. By 'rendering something unaccounted', we understand rendering doubtful. Thus on having known that Devadatta does not exist at home; we become doubtful whether Devadatta is alive or dead. And this doubt will be removed by only the assumption of Devadatta's existence outside home².

Here one may plead that by assuming Devadatta's existence outside home we become sure that he is alive. And then Devadatta's being alive can well act as probans. To this the Prabhākara's reply is that in that case there will remain nothing to be inferred. For what was sought to be proved was Devadatta's existence outside home. But when

- 1 प्रमाणप्रतीतश्चार्थो दृष्टरूपाथन्तराभावेन संशयमापन्न
एवाऽथपित्तेर्जनक इति दर्शनबलादाश्रीयते ॥ PP, p. 275
- 2 यथा जीवन् देवदत्तो गृहे नास्ति इत्यत्र गृहाभावे दृष्टे श्रुते वा ।
तत्रासति बहिर्भविकल्पने ... TR, p. 12

this very existence outside home is assumed nothing remains to be inferred. Nor can bare non-existence at home act as a probans, because here, for such non-existence is possible even in the case of a dead person or a person not yet born.

Thus there is no scope for inference in the case under consideration. This is how the Prābhākara defends his position that a fact that renders another fact doubtful is the means of presumption, in case this doubt is removed by assuming a third fact. In the case of inference, certainly, there is no such evocation of doubt as we find in the case of presumption. Hence presumption is distinct. And this is different from the Bhāṭṭa's presumption. The Bhāṭṭa describes that in the case under consideration Devadatta's non-existence at home itself remains contradicted for until his existence outside home is assumed. This is how the Bhāṭṭa treats non existence at home as the means of presumption for knowing existence outside home. The Bhāṭṭa's view is just the reverse of the Prābhākara's view. Because the Prābhākara says that the fact of Devadatta's existence outside home is explained by the assumption of his non-existence at home.

The Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara differ from each other in their description of presumption. The Bhāṭṭa says that presumption primarily involves the contradiction between two well known facts, so that any additional element such as doubt must be out of place within the structure of this means of knowledge. The contradiction involved in presumption is the distinction between presumption and inference. The Prābhākara accepts that presumption involves an element of doubt, the doubt about the validity of two well known facts on account of their mutual contradiction. The removal of doubt is the function of presumption. The recognition of doubt as an element is the distinction between presumption and inference.

NON - APPREHENSION

In addition to the above mentioned means of right knowledge the Bhāṭṭa admits a sixth kind of the means, viz., non-apprehension [anupalabdhi], for the apprehension of the non-existence [of a thing]. E. g. 'There is no jar here on the floor'. This is not perception. For it is not caused by any sense-contact. The sense-contact either conjunction [saṃyoga] or inherence [samavāya] with non-existence is not possible. For, such relations are positive while the latter is negative. Even the relation of the qualifier and the qualified [viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyabhāva] is not possible; it disappears as the radical-relation whether conjunction or inherence is rejected. It cannot be reduced in any other means of right knowledge.

Sabaravāmin defines non-apprehension in the statement, 'Non-apprehension stands for the non-operation of the [five] means of right knowledge; and it is what brings about the apprehension that 'it does not exist' in regard to things not in contact with the sense organs'. [abhāvopi pramāṇābhāvah nāsti ityasya arthasya asaṅnikṛṣṭasya¹].

BHĀTTA VIEW

Kumārila defines non-apprehension as follows :— 'That is, in a case where the five means of right knowledge are not found to be operative towards bringing about the notion of the existence of a certain thing, we have the notion of the existence of the thing; and that means by which this notion is broughtout is called non-apprehension²'.

In this connection Pārthassārathi explains that every object can be viewed in two ways according to its existence and non-existence. That object when it exists somewhere

1 SBh, 1-1-5, p. 39

2 प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।

वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता ॥ SV, Abhāva, st. 1

in its own form [sadrūpeṇa], say, jug, is then regarded through perception as it is existing. But it somewhere non exists then perception, etc., (which manifest objects of positive character) fail to function even though all the accessories for the manifestation (of such positive existence) are present. For that purpose, to manifest the non-existence, non-apprehension should be accepted as a distinct means of right knowledge¹.

Non-existence is of four divisions, viz., 1) previous non-existence [prāgabhāva], e.g., the non-existence of the curd in the milk; 2) non-existence by destruction [pradhvartsābhāva], e.g., the non-existence of the milk in the curd; 3) mutual non-existence [anyonyābhāva], e.g., the non-existence of the cow in the horse and vice versa; and 4) absolute non-existence [atyantābhāva], e.g., the non-existence of horns on the head of hare. Here Kumārila observes that if non-existence were unreal it could not have such varieties, but it has four kinds, hence it cannot be unreal².

Criticism against the Bhāṭṭa's stand (on non-apprehension and non-existence) comes from two sides: the Naiyāyika who himself agrees with the Bhāṭṭa in treating non-existence as something existing side by side with the positive entities, argues that the ordinary means of right knowledge are competent to grasp non-existence and that therefore it is unnecessary to posit non-apprehension as an additional means of right knowledge alleged to be solely competent to grasp non-existence; the Prābhākara, who repudiated the idea of treating non-existence as something existing side by side with the positive entities, is even more emphatic in the rejection of non-apprehension as an additional means of right knowledge alleged to be solely competent to grasp non-existence.

The Bhāṭṭa's answer to the Naiyāyika's criticism is that non-existence is not known through perception, because we can know non-existence even in such cases where no employment of sense-organs has taken place. E. g., suppose somebody

1 सर्वं हि वस्तु सदसदात्मना द्विविधम् ... SD, p. 83

2 न चावस्तुत एते स्युर्भेदास्तेनास्य वस्तुता । SV, Abhāva, st. 8

asks one in the noon whether one had seen a man of such and such description there in the morning ; also suppose that one had not seen the man of that particular description there in the morning. Under these conditions one's negative reply to the question put to one will be a result of no employment of sense-organs on one's part. Certainly, one cannot employ one's sense-organs to perceive 'that man's non-existence there in the morning', nor will one be recalling 'that man's non-existence there in the morning' (and that is because one had no perception of 'that man's non-existence there in the morning'). The only possible explanation of one's knowledge of 'that man's non-existence there in the morning' will be that this knowledge is caused by 'absence of memory of that man's presence there in the morning' under conditions when such memory is possible¹. This explanation can be extended even to those cases where perception of some sort is taking place. E.g., When one is seeing empty floor one is having a knowledge of 'non-existence of jar on the floor', but this knowledge of 'non-existence of jar' is caused not by one's sense organs but by one's 'absence of perception of jar' under conditions when such perception is possible. The non-existence (of jar) itself is known neither through perception nor through memory but purely through the mind².

Non-existence is not known through inference, because non-existence is not known as the invariable concomitant of a probans. Thus one should not think that one can argue :—

Wherever there is presence of knowledgeable entity, i.e. an entity capable of being known and just now being sought to be known, there is knowledge of this entity.

Here there is no knowledge of such and such a knowledgeable entity.

1 योऽहनि प्रातःकाले गृहेऽवस्थितो माध्यंदिन ... SD, p. 86

2 गृहीत्वा वस्तुसङ्कावं स्मृत्वा च प्रतियोगिनम् ।

मानसं नास्तिताज्ञानं जायतेऽक्षानपेक्षया । SV, Abhāva, st. 27

Here there is no presence (or here there is no absence) of this entity.

For in order to have an invariable concomitance of the form ‘wherever there is no knowledge of a knowledgeable entity there is non-existence of this entity’ we must first somehow have the knowledge of the particular places where ‘non-existence of knowledge (of the knowledgeable entity) and non-existence of the knowledgeable entity, have been found to go together ; again, the inference in question requires also the knowledge of the place in question as possessed of ‘non-existence of knowledge’. That is to say, the formulation of this inference is preceded by many a case of knowledge of ‘non-existence’. Now this knowledge cannot come about through perception while we will be faced with an infinite regress, if another inference becomes necessary in order to arrive at¹. The only way out of these difficulties is that non-apprehension should be accepted as an additional means of right knowledge to grasp non-existence.

Kumārila explains the utility of the means of non-apprehension in the interpretation of the Vedic texts as follows. To explain that the fruits of one sacrifice is not produced by another, that one principal sacrifice is not accessory of another and that two accessories of a principle sacrifice are not accessories of each other requires the aid of the means of non-apprehension².

PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW

Prabhākara refutes the Bhāṭṭa view, i.e. non-apprehension is an additional means of right knowledge and that non-existence is a different category, and interprets the Bhāṣya

- 1 नाप्यनुमेः, अज्ञातेन तेन कस्यचिलिङ्गस्य
सम्बन्धग्रहणासम्भवात् । यदत्र कैश्चिदुच्यते … SD, p. 87
- 2 कर्मणि सर्वाणि फलैस्समस्तैः सर्वैः यथावच्च यदञ्जकाण्डैः ।
न सञ्ज्ञतानोहं परस्परं हि नाञ्जं तदेतत्प्रभवं क्रूनाम् ॥
SV, Abhāva, st. 56

sentence, 'Abhāvopi pramāṇābhāvah nāsti ityasyārthasya asannikṛṣṭasya¹' by way of supplement to the definitions of other means of right knowledge, and not to be the definitions of an additional means of right knowledge in the shape of non-apprehension². The Prabhākara argues that a means of right knowledge can be regarded as really so only if it brings about its effect, in the shape of the definite knowledge of its objective ; and this definite knowledge is always in the form of 'this' which implies exclusion of all other things. Since no such effect appears through non-apprehension, it should not be counted as an additional means of right knowledge. And non-existence involves, firstly, the denial of something and can not be said to be mere denial. The denial of something involves the apprehension of some thing that is other than that which is denied, whose place it has taken. Secondly, it might mean the apprehension of the non-existence at some place and time of some thing already apprehended and as such it is determininiton of non-correspondence with the past experience merely without a detailed investigation of the present experience.

The Prabhākara contends that the basis of negative proposition is the mere locus [kevalādhikarṇa]. For instance, in the proposition 'There is no jar here on this floor', the only thing which in fact, is referred to is the mere floor. If non-existence should thus be equated with the empty locus, it might easily be argued from the opposite camp that this is an evasive trick of the Prabhākara which could be easily seen through and that the concept of the 'mereness of the locus' inevitably presupposes non-existence. The Prabhākara, however, meets this difficulty by explaining that the phrase, 'mere locus' is only a description of the form of the knowledge underlying negative statement and that non-existence, stricktly speaking, is the knowledge of the locus, and of nothing else, in such

1 SBh, 1-1-5, p. 39

2 किमनेन पूर्वोक्तानां प्रमाणतां स्वरूपमवसीयते ? यत्पूर्वोक्तैरेव
स्वलक्षणैर्निविसीयते । सर्वस्वलक्षणाभिधानवाक्यशेषोऽयं ग्रन्थः ।
Bṛhatī, p. 121

circumstances as would necessarily lead to the counter-positive (pratiyogin) being cognised, were it present. Hence, Śālikānātha describes non-existence as ‘Non-existence is the cognition of that (locus) alone, when the counter-positive (the thing denied in a negative statement) ought to have been perceived where it is present’¹.

According to the Prābhākara, knowledge of things is of two kinds :— one takes place when a thing is viewed as accompanied by some other thing : the other when a thing is viewed as existing alone. The latter knowledge is again of two kinds :— one takes place when we have in mind a counter-positive of perceptible nature, the other when we have in mind a counter-positive of imperceptible nature. It is our knowledge of a thing as existing alone along with our having in mind a counter-positive of perceptible nature, that is called ‘non-existence (of knowledge) of this counter-positive’². Hence non-existence is not merely a knowledge of something as existing alone ; for that would not enable us to distinguish between one non-existence and another. It is only when we have a counter-positive of perceptible nature in mind that we know a non-existence. Thus when some thing is known and a particular counter-positive of perceptible nature is had in mind the knowledge of this thing is called ‘non-existence’ (of knowledge) of this counter-positive. ‘So when a man says’ ‘there is no jar here on this floor’ what he means is that he is seeing the mere floor while it was possible for him to have seen a jar as well.

When one knows a mere locus i.e. something that the Bhāṭṭa calls, ‘a locus containing some non-existence of one of the four types’ and has in mind a counter-positive of perceptible nature there ensues, according to the Prābhākara, a non-existence (of knowledge) of this counter-positive. The phrase

1 दृश्ये प्रतियोगिनिं या तदेकविषया बुद्धिः सा तदभावो व्यपदिश्यते...
PP, p. 291.

~ भावनामवगतिद्विविधा—एका तावद्वावान्तरसंसृष्टविषया, अपरा तदेकविषया । यापि च तदेकविषया बुद्धिः, सापि द्विविधा...
ibid, p. 287.

'is not' is indicative of a locus of this description : this is why it is said that the Prābhākara regards the word 'not' as connotative of the nature of the concerned locus¹.

Free movement on a thornless floor is also due to the knowledge of this floor as existing alone. And it is quite understandable why here there should be a desire to ascertain that the concerned counter-positive, viz., thorns, is of perceptible nature². Similarly, the cancellation of a perception and the cancellation of an inference are due either to the knowledge of something as existing alone or due to the cancellation of some usage. Thus what is cancelled is the usage of silver in relation to nacre or the usage of probans in relation to a fallacy. That is to say, in the view of Prābhākara, what is cancelled is never a knowledge but always a usage³.

The Prābhakara also accepts that the destruction of a previously existing thing is responsible to know a thing first as accompanied by some other thing (jar) and then as existing all alone. But that the coming about of a destruction is always the emergence of a positive entity (and not the coming into existence of an independent entity called non-existence by destruction). The only entities that exist are positive ones, but a positive entity may either exist as accompanied by some other entity or it may exist all alone. Thus the word 'destruction' stands for the emergence in to being of a positive entity as existing all alone. Even the Bhāṭṭa cannot escape this position. The Prābhākara's explanation easily applies to the cases of 'destruction without leaving a trace' but the subsequent knowledge of this cognition's locus (i.e., the soul wherein this

1 नास्ति शब्दश्च तादृशाधिकरणमात्रवाचकः । न शब्दश्च स्वरूपमात्रपर इति प्राभाकराः । TR, p. 18.

2 अपि च कण्टकादिविरहिणि भूतलादौ यो निशशङ्कः पादविन्यासादिव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते, स तावद् भूतलमात्रपरिच्छेदनिबन्धनो.... ibid, p. 285.

3 शुक्तिकायां रजतव्यवहारौ लिंगाभासे लिंगव्यवहारश्च बाध्यते । न हि ज्ञानं बाध्यते किन्तु व्यवहार एव, TR, p. 18.

knowledge arise) is at the same time a knowledge of the destruction of this knowledge¹.

Rāmānujācārya shows the blemish of ad-infinitum in the Bhāṭṭa view as that even the Bhāṭṭa, who accepts non-apprehension as an additional means of knowledge, cannot maintain that a mere non-origination of knowledge leads to knowledge of non-existence; for such non-origination takes place even during deep sleep. Again, when after first having not known a particular thing at a particular place we subsequently know this thing at this place, we say 'this thing was not (then) at this place'. Here the knowledge of non-existence must be due to the past non-apprehension recognized as distinct from the present non-apprehension; for the present non-apprehension is now destroyed by the present knowledge (while the past non-apprehension remains as it was). All this goes to show that non-apprehension as known (and not merely non-apprehension as an existent fact) causes knowledge of non-existence. But non-apprehension is itself a non-existence. Hence if the Bhāṭṭa maintains that all knowledge of non-existence is caused by non-apprehension he will land himself in an infinite regression². For, if knowledge of a non-existence requires a non-apprehension (as known), the knowledge of this non-apprehension will require another non-apprehension (as known), the knowledge of this second non-apprehension will require a third non-apprehension (as known), and so on ad-infinitum.

The admission of non-apprehension as an independent means of right knowledge is primarily based on the presupposition that non-existence is a distinct category. That being so, the Bhāṭṭa recognizes non-existence as a separate ontological category and also, enumerates non-apprehension as a distinct means of knowledge, the Prābhākara does not admit non-existence as a distinct category and also, from the nature of case, can not accept non-apprehension as a means of right knowledge.

1 यस्यापि मते प्रध्वं साभावस्त्वीक्रियते... PP, p. 288.

2 तथा चानपलब्धे रत्यभावरूपतया तद्वात्मव्यनुपलभ्यमित्यनवस्था। TR, p. 19.

PART - II

OBJECTS OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE CATEGORY

The Bhāṭṭa as well as the Prabhākara are upholders of realism and their reality of world is brought under certain categories [padārthas]. Unlike the Buddhist, they accept the things which really exist, namely, the basic elements and their products. Padārtha (category), literally, a thing to which words refer [padasya arthaḥ], or whatever is, is knowable [jñeyā] and nameable [abhidheya]. Even though any thing which is an object of right knowledge is called category, but due to convenience and comprehension, the Logicians classify the supposed realities underlying the universe under a few categories.

The Vaiśeṣika establishes six categories of reality, viz., substance [dravya], quality [guṇa], motion [karma], generality [sāmānya], particularity [viśeṣa], inherence [sāmivāya], and non-existence [abhāva]. Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda enumerate only six positive categories¹. Non-existence was latter added as the seventh category. Candramati, the author of Dasapadārtha sāstra, is the first to recognize non-existence as a distinct kind of being with categorial status. The Naiyāyika describes sixteen categories, viz., means of right knowledge [pramāṇa], objects of right knowledge [prameya], doubt [saṁśaya], purpose [prayojana], example [dṛṣṭānta], tenet [siddhānta], members of syllogism [avayava], hypothetical reasoning [tarka], ascertainment [nirṇaya], discussion [vāda], disputation [jalpa], wrangling [vitaṇḍā], fallacy [hetvābhāsa], quibble [chala], analogue [jāti], and points of defeat [nigraha sthāna]². Actually, these are not a classification of all sublunary things and they look like headings of chapters in a treatise in Logic.

1 KS, 1-1-1

2 GS, 1-1-1

The objects of right knowledge, according to the Naiyāyika, constitutes soul [ātman], body [śarīra], sense-organs [indriya], objects of sense-organs [artha], intellect [buddhi], mind [manas], activity [pravṛtti], faults [doṣa], transmigration [pretyabhāva], consequences of activities [phala], suffering [duḥkha] and emancipation [apavarga]¹. After eleventh century the Naiyāyikas absorbed the categories of the Vaiśeṣika in their treatises on Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣikas absorbed the Nyāya categories of means of right knowledge in its developed form in their treatises on Vaiśeṣika. The categories of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are thus combined together. The Sāṅkhya recognises only two ultimate realities, viz., nature [prakṛti] and spirit [puruṣa]. The Advaita vedāntin establishes only one fundamental category, viz., Brahman, together with the subordinate category of Māyā.

Sabaravāmin has referred to four categories in the Bhāṣya as follows :— ‘Among substances, qualities and actions that factor which is common to several individuals is the class²’ and ‘just as when it is said ‘give hundred to these’, what is meant is a hundred of only one kind of thing, not of several kinds of things such as substance, quality, action, constituent part and so forth’³. Inherence [samavāya] is mentioned in several places not only by the Bhāṣyakāra,⁴ but also by Jaimini. The same is true of non-existence.

Kumārila opposes the idealism [vijñānavāda] and the nihilism [śūnyavāda] of the Buddhists and insists on the objective reality of the external world. And, further, he follows the example of the Vaiśeṣika in making use of a number of ontological categories. Out of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika, Kumārila denies particularity [viśeṣa] and inherence [samavāya]⁵. Hence, we conclude that the remaining five

1 ibid, 1-1-9.

2 द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां सामान्यमात्रमाकृतिः, SBh, 1-3-30, p. 294.

3 यथा शतमाभ्यां दीयतामिति एकजातीयानां शतं न भिन्नजातीयानाम् । यथा द्रव्यं गुणः कर्मवियव इत्येवमादीनाम् । ibid, 10-3-44 p. 1886.

4 SBh, 12-1-1 and JS, 12-1-1.

5 SV, Pratyakṣa, st. 146-150.

categories, viz., substance, quality, motion, generality and non-existence are acceptable to Kumārila. The author of Pūrvatantra siddhānta ratnāvali accepts potency [śakti] as sixth category. Viśveśvarabhaṭṭa, the author of Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi, enumerates seven categories¹.

Prabhākara, like Kumārila, opposes the idealism and nihilism of the Buddhists and establishes the reality of the external world. And, further, he also follows the Vaiśeṣika view on the objects of right knowledge. He also, like Kumārila, rejects particularity but accepts inherence as a distinct category. He dismisses non-existence as a distinct category, and identifies it with its locus [adhikarana-svarūpa]. Further, he adds three more categories, respectively called, potency [śakti], similarity [sādṛśya] and number [saṃkhyā]. Hence it is clear that, according to Prabhākara, categories are eight, viz., substance, quality, motion, generality, inherence, potency, similarity and number. Nārāyaṇa, the commentator of PP, adds one more category, viz., sequence [krama]².

SUBSTANCE

Out of the five categories described in the preceding section, here we will discuss the first, i.e. substance. It is enumerated first, because it is the substratum of all the categories. The Buddhist denies substance as a distinct category and says that the sense-data—colour, taste, odour, and touch—are without any substratum, and that the attributes are the four elements which are perceived by visual, gustatory, olfactory, and tactile organs respectively. Kumārila argues against this view that substance is different from the qualities and it is perceived by visual and tactile organs³. The Buddhist doctrine, that non-difference of a substance from the qualities is proved by the absence of the perception of difference between them, is also false for the same reason. No one perceives a cloth as colour

1 BC, p. 17.

2 NS, p. 78.

3 द्रव्यमूर्तौ पुनद्विष्यां ... SV, Pratyakṣa, st. 170.

(e.g. this is colour), but perceives it as possessed of colour. Further, he says that substance is perceived before its qualities are perceived and they are perceived subsisting in a substance¹.

The Vaiśeṣika gives two definitions of substance as follows ; ‘Substance is the abode of qualities’² and ‘Substance is the cause having inherence’³ ; but all these are defective. There is the defect of overpervasion in the first, since the quality would fall into the scope of the definition because the quality of number, in ‘Qualities are twenty four’, resides in the quality which would be a substance. The second definition ‘Substance is the cause having inherence’ also defective because, when inherence itself is non-existent, the abode of inherence is rejected at a distance.

After refuting the definitions of substance given by the Vaiśeṣika, Nārāyana defines substance as follows : ‘Substance is the abode of magnitude’⁴. One should not think that there is the defect of non-pervasion in that, just at the moment of its birth, the substance is devoid of quality of magnitude ; because, the Bhāṭṭa accepts, for a quality and what has that quality origination at the same time. A substance whether a product or an eternal variety must posses magnitude, hence all the substances come under this definition. According to Kumārila, however, it is the substratum not only of magnitude but of all the properties that are attributed to a thing. Pārtha-sārathi defines it as follows :— ‘That which coheres in colour etc., which are of a fleeting nature and from which recognition [pratyabhijñā] arises, that is substance⁵'. It is apprehended through visual and tactal perceptions.

A substance is a composite structure consisting of component parts joined together. The Vaiśeṣika holds that a whole

1 तद्भवि यत्र वा ज्ञानं प्राप्त्वर्मग्रहणाद्वेत् । ibid, Pra, st. 152.

2 गुणाश्रया द्रव्यम्, NLV, p. 752 ; quoted in MM, p. 151.

3 समवायिकारणं द्रव्यम्, KS, 1-1-15 ; quoted in ibid, p. 151.

4 परिमाणगुणाधारं द्रव्यम् । ibid p. 151.

5 आगमापायिषु रूपादिषु यदनुयायिप्रत्यभिज्ञा जायते तद्द्रव्यम् । दर्शनस्पृशनाभ्यां चास्य ग्रहणम् । SD, p. 42.

is produced by its parts being conjoined with each other and it is something different from the parts. For instance, a cloth woven of threads is altogether a different substance from the threads. Pārthasārathi criticises this view on the ground of experience. In our experience, we see that the threads themselves by the peculiarity of their co-relation transforms themselves into a single substance, become a whole made of parts, and maintaining the genus of cloth, etc.¹ The difference between a whole and its parts is not absolute, as described by the Vaiśeṣika, but only identity-cum-difference. As a whole is concerned it is not different from its parts, e.g., a person is not different from his parts, 'hands, legs, etc'. As parts are concerned they are different from their whole, e.g., legs, hands and other parts are not person. But the parts themselves assume the form of a single substance due to a particular combination [sanniveśa].

The Vaiśeṣika enumerates nine substances, viz., earth [pr̥thvī], water [jala], light [tejas], air [vāyu], ether [ākāśa], time [kāla], space [dik], soul [ātman] and mind [manas]. Kumārila holds that direct object of apprehension is the characteristics of substance and darkness and sound are directly apprehended by visual and auditory organs respectively,² hence these two should be enumerated as distinctive substances. Hence, according to the Bhāṭṭa, substances are eleven with the addition of darkness and sound to the list admitted by the Vaiśeṣika.

Prabhākara, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, holds that substance is the inherent cause, and enumerates nine substances. Hence Nārāyaṇa, the commentator of PP, defines substance as follows ; 'Substance is that which is the inherent or material cause'³. Salikanātha denies darkness as a distinct substance and says it is only absence of light⁴. While describing ether

1 ibid, p. 42.

2 Darkness is not only a direct object of apprehension but is a substratum of black colour also.

3 समवायिकारणं द्रव्यमिति द्रव्यलक्षणम् । NS on PP, p. 154.

4 PP, p. 142.

as the substratum of sound, he rejects sound, as a distinct substance¹. He enumerates nine substances, viz., earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind.

EARTH

Of the substances, earth is that which has odour. The Vaiśeṣika divides it in two divisions, viz., eternal and non-eternal, and says that eternal is atomic [paramāṇurūpā]. The Bhāṭṭā does not accept [invisible] atoms, hence there is no two fold system. Earth exists in the form of the body, the olfactory organ, lump of clay, stone and so forth.

The body is that which is the abode of experience. It delimits the soul in which enjoyment takes place. The Vedāntin does not accept that the body is wholly made of earth. He argues that it is constituted of the five physical substances [pāñcabhautika], because it has not only odour [the distinctive quality of earth] but also viscocity, hot touch, breath and cavity, the distinctive qualities of water, fire, air, and ether respectively. The Bhāṭṭā's answer to this view is that even though the distinctive qualities of all the five physical substances found in the body, the material cause [samavayikāraṇa] of it is only earth and the other four substances are only its accessory causes [nimitta-kāraṇa]. The body is of four kinds, viz.,

- 1) womb-born [jarāyuja], bodies of men, animals, etc. ;
- 2) egg-born [aṇḍaja], bodies of snakes, birds etc. ;
- 3) sweat-born [svedaja], bodies of flies, gnats, etc. ; and
- 4) sprouts-born [udbhijja], bodies of plants, shrubs, etc.

The Prābhākara does not accept sprout-born bodies on the ground that they do not have sense-organs. The Bhāṭṭā criticises this view and says that it is against the statements of Codes [smṛtis] and Epics. E.g., the Code of Manu describes that one who abuses one's preceptor, is born as a tree resorted to by eagles and vultures in the burial ground. The Bhāgavata

¹ ibid, p. 145.

narrates the incident of Nalakūbara and Maṇigrīva who stood as a pair of Arjuna trees at Gokulam, due to a sage's curse¹. Śālikanātha contends that the statements of this nature in the Codes and in the Epics are not based on the Veda, because these do not describe things that are to be done [kārya]. Hence these are not authoritative. This contention is false, since the purport of the Veda is not only in things that are to be done, but also in those that are existent. Therefore, being based on that, these statements are authoritative.

The Bhāṭṭa says that the rejection of the vegetable bodies on the ground of their not being the abodes of sense organs is wrong, because there is found growth and decay which are conditioned by the presence and absence of nourishment, etc. and there is found the effect of loss of qualities, as for other bodies, by burning, cutting, etc., and the experience (of happiness and misery) is established ; the experience is not at all possible without having sense-organs, hence, having of sense-organs is certain².

Kumārila describes sense-organ as the instrument of perceptual knowledge³. Pārīhasārathi defines it as follows : 'That is called sense-organ which generates a clear and specific knowledge of the object with which it comes into contact'⁴. These sense-organs are material substances in as much as they invariably receive obstruction. Nothing can offer obstruction to a non-material ubiquitous substance. The sense-organs receive obstruction from wall, etc., and are therefore material substances. Among these, mind is the internal, and the rest are external. Among the external organs, the olfactory organ perceives odour and hence is composed of earth, because only the earthy substance is found to manifest smell ; E.g., when the paste of margosa bark [nimbatvaka] is applied to sandal, the odour of the sandal is manifested.

1 इमशाने जायते वृक्षः कङ्कगृधनिषेवितः ।

नलकूबमणिग्रीववासतुर्यमुलार्जुनौ ॥ MM, p. 154.

2 ibid, p. 156. 3 करणं चेन्द्रियं ... SV, Pra, st. 121.

4 यत्संप्रयुक्तेऽथे विशदावभासं विज्ञानं जनयति तदिन्द्रियम् । SD, p. 36.

Prabhākara, like the Bhāṭṭa, enumerates nine substances. Of these earth is the first, because it is, the material cause of the body. Nārāyaṇa defines earth as follows : 'Earth is that which possesses odour'¹. One should not think that there is the defect of non-pervasion in the definition, since stones are devoid of odour ; because odour can be perceived in their ashes. It is endowed with the qualities of odour [gandha], taste [rasa], colour [rūpa], touch [sparśa], magnitude [parimāṇa], weight [gurutva], artificial fluidity [sāmsiddhika drava], tendency [saṃskāra], conjunction [saṃyoga], disjunction [vibhāga], remoteness [paratva], and proximity [aparatva]. It is of two kinds ; eternal and transitory. Earth in the form of atoms is eternal²; and that in the form of products is transitory. It exists in the forms of the bodies, the olfactory organ, lump of clay, trees, stone, etc.

The bedy is the abode of the sense organs³. It is of three kinds :— 1) womb-born [yonija], such as the body of a human being or of an animal ; 2) egg-born [aṇḍaja], the body of a bird, a snake, etc. ; 3) sweat-born [svedaja], the body of a worm, a gnat, etc. The Bhāṭṭa accepts sprout-born bodies, but the Prabhākara rejects this view on the ground that there is no proof for the view that sprout-born bodies are possessed with the sense-organs. Jaimini and Sabara also favour this view. They both describe trees as insensate things. Jaimini's aphorism is as follows ; 'Because they are addressed to insensate things'⁴. Sabara's bhāṣya on the aphorism is as follows : 'The hymn⁵ contains a request addressed to an insensate object, the herb, certainly, the herb, which is insensate, could never understand the request'⁶.

Actually speaking, the four fold division of the bodies—of the Bhāṭṭa is more worthy than the three fold division of the bodies—of the Prabhākara, because the latter's view is

1 NS, p. 80. 2 ibid, p. 78. 3 PP, p. 330.

4 अचेतने अर्थबन्धात् । JS, 1-2-35

5 ओषधे त्रायस्वैनम्… Taittiriyasamhitā 1-2-1-1.

6 अचेतनेऽर्थे खल्वर्थं निबध्नन्ति… SBh, 1-2-35.

not only against to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view but also to the statements of Codes and Epics. Even the modern biological science also establishes that the trees' bodies having senses.

Unlike the Vedāntin, the Prabhākara also accepts that the body is made of earth, and the other four physical substances are its accessory causes. As has already been shown, the olfactory organ is composed of earth, because among colour and the rest it reveals only odour which is the specific quality of earth. The object is everything beginning with the dyad [dvyaṇuka] and ending with the universe. Thus, a body having odour, is the earthy body ; a sense-organ perceiving odour is the earthy organ, and an object having odour is the earthy object.

WATER

Water is the abode of natural fluidity¹. It has only sweet taste. One should not argue that, since bitter and other tastes are perceived in water, water may as well have bitter taste, etc., because the eating of the myrobalan, which is believed to have the efficacy of cleansing and stimulating the tongue and enabling it to bring out the natural taste of water, reveals the essential sweetness of water. Its colour is non-luminous white. It cannot be urged that since we observe blue colour in the waters of the Yamunā, water may as well have blue colour etc.: because the perception of blue colour in the waters of Yamunā is only super-imposed by the conjunction of earthy particles. Hence, it has only non-luminous white colour. The natural touch of water is cold. Due to heating, it looks like being warm, but that is merely temporary. After a sometime we will find the natural touch of it, i.e. cold.

It appears in the forms of gustatory organ and objects. The Vaiśeṣika accepts watery body as the third form of water and follows the mythological tradition that the body composed of water is in the world of Water god [Varuṇa], but the

1 स्वाभाविकद्रवत्वाधिकरणं सलिलम् । MM, p. 157.

Bhāṭṭa does not accept watery body on the ground that it is not perceptible. Gustatory organ is composed of water, because it reveals taste without revealing any other quality, analogically to the water that reveals the taste of fried barley dust. The objects are lakes, rivers, oceans, snow, hail, etc. One can not argue that since snow is solid, it must be earthy ; because when it melts under heat, it is perceived to be water.

The Prabhākara gives two definitions of water as follows :- ‘water is that which possesses taste, not produced by the application of heat’ and ‘water is that which has natural fluidity’. It is endowed with the qualities of taste, colour, touch, magnitude, heaviness, natural fluidity, velocity [vega], and viscocity [sneha]. The Prabhākara, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, accepts that water is of two kinds, viz., eternal [atomic] and transitory.

The transitory water appears in the forms of gustatory organ and objects. The Prabhākara, unlike the Vaiśeṣika, does not accept watery body. Both the Bhāṭṭa and the Prabhākara argue, on the same grounds, that gustatory organ is composed of water². The objects are seas, rivers, snow, hail, etc.

LIGHT

Light is that which has the quality of hot touch³. Here, one should not think that there is the defect of over-pervasion in the definition since it applies to the knowledge ‘this water is hot’, because such knowledge arises in water owing to the contact of fire with water. Also it cannot be urged that there is the defect of non-pervasion in the definition, since there is no hotness in the rays of moon, because the moon’s rays are suppressed by the water supposed to be present

1 अपाकजरसवत्वमबलक्षणम् । सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वं वा ॥

NS, p. 80.

2 See supra, p. 76.

3 उष्णस्पर्शगुणं तेजः । MM, p. 157.

in the moon. Its colour is glowing white. The white colour that is in fire is not perceived, as it is overcome by the earthy colour. Both the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara do not accept body composed of light which is, according to the Vaiśeṣika, exist in the solar region. Light appears in the forms of visual organ and object. Visual organ is composed of light, because it reveals the colour of others without revealing other qualities, like a lamp.

The object is of four kinds : 1) earthy, fire and the like ; 2) heavenly, lightning produced from watery fuel ; 3) gastric, cause for digestion of food eaten ; and 4) mineral, lustrous metals like gold, etc. It cannot be argued that gold is an earthy product, since it possesses yellowish colour and is weighty like turmeric, because earthy products, like ghee, vanish when extreme heat is applied, but when that is applied to gold, melted gold does not vanish.

The Prābhākara defines light as that which possesses hot touch¹. It is endowed with the qualities of colour, touch, magnitude, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, easiness [laghu] and velocity [vega]. It is of two kinds, viz., eternal (atomic) and transitory. The transitory is of two kinds, viz., visual organ and object. The Prābhākara, like the Bhāṭṭa, argues that visual organ is composed of light on the same grounds.² The objects of light are fire, gold, etc.

AIR

Air is that which has touch, while having no colour³. It has zig-zag motion and is to be perceived by tactile organ. The Vaiśeṣika denies perceptibility to air on the ground that it has no manifested colour. According to him, manifested colour is the cause in perceiving a thing. Further, he argues that air is inferred by touch. His argument is as follows. The

1 उष्णस्पर्शवित्तेजः । NS, p. 80. 2 See supra, p. 76.

3 अरूपत्वे सति स्पर्शवान्वायुः । MM, p. 159.

'neither-hot-nor-cold' touch that we feel on the blowing of the wind must reside in some substance as it is a quality, like colour. Earth cannot be its substratum, because all earthy substances having manifested touch have also manifested colour, while air has no manifested colour. Nor can it reside in water and light, because it is neither cold nor hot. Nor can it reside in the four ubiquitous substances (ether, time, space and soul), for if it resides in them, then it ought to be found everywhere. Nor does it reside in mind, because, if it did, the mind being atomic, touch residing in atom, cannot be felt, it being beyond apprehension by the sense organs. Therefore, that which is revealed to us as the substratum of touch is air.

The Bhāṭṭa criticises the Vaiśeṣika view, i.e., on the blowing of wind, we recognize only the mere touch nothing else, and says that it is certainly against experience. In our experience of jars of different colours, we have the recognition of one and the same substance, jar, in the form 'The jar is black', 'The jar is yellow,' 'The jar is white'. Same like, when particular touches, like cold touch, etc., are experienced there is the recognition of the same substance, air, in the form, 'The air is cold', 'The air is hot', 'The air is neither cold nor hot'.

The Bhāṭṭa holds that colour is not a cause in all perceptions of substances through the sense organs because there is no such evidence. By the method of agreement [anvaya] and difference [vyatireka], in visual perception colour is a cause, in tactal perception touch and so on². It may be pointed out here that some later Naiyayikas, following the Bhāṭṭa view, have repudiated that air is perceptible substance.

Air appears in the forms of tactile organ and objects. Tactile organ is aerial, since among colour and the rest it reveals only touch, as in the case of the breeze set in by a fan, which reveals the cold touch of water (perspiration) that clings to the body. Objects are the cause that shakes trees, etc.,

1 ibid, p. 159.

2 ibid, p. 160.

and vital breath [Prāṇa]. The air that circulates within the body is vital breath. It is only one, but owing to its different locations and different functions, it is known by various names. The air that is inhaled and exhaled through the mouth and the nostrils is Prāṇa. The air that presses down water, etc., is Apāna. The air that helps in the digestion of food, etc., by stimulating gastric fire in the stomach is Samāna. The air that takes the digested food upward from the navel is Udāna. And the air that courses through the nervous system is the vital air [vyāna]¹.

The Prābhākara defines air as follows ‘Air is that which has touch of neither hot nor cold and not changed through the application of fire’². Neither hot nor cold touch is also present in earth, therefore, to remove the defect of over-pervasion, the word ‘which is not changed through the application of fire. Touch which is not changed through the application of fire is also present in water, therefore, to remove the over-pervasion, the word ‘neither hot nor cold’. It is endowed with the qualities of touch, magnitude, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, easiness [laghu] and tendency [saṁskāra].

It is of two kinds, viz., eternal [atomic] and transitory. The transitory is of three kinds, viz., tactile organ, object and vital breath. Tactile organ, which perceives touch, is composed of air and that organ is found all over the body. Object is the air that has zig-zag motion and shakes trees and such other things. In agreement with the Bhāṭṭa, the Prābhākara accepts that air is perceptible. Air that circulates within the body is vital breath. Though one, it is denoted variously as Prāṇa, Apāna, etc., owing to different situations. Here it should be noticed that the Bhāṭṭa includes vital breath under mass, but the Prābhākara mentions it as a distinct kind of air being different from tactile organ and mass. We can find

1 हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानो समानो नाभिसंस्थितः ।

उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानस्सर्वशरीरगः ॥

2 अपाकजाऽनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवान्वायुः । NS, p. 80.

different opinions regarding the distinct status of vital breath in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system also. Praśastapāda and old-Naiyāyikas mention vital breath as a distinct kind of air being different from the organ and mass. While neo-Naiyāyikas generally include it under mass.

DARKNESS

Darkness is enumerated as the fifth substance by the Bhāṭṭa. His argument is as follows. According to the characteristic of substances, a substance should possess quality and action. Darkness has black colour and movement. Hence it should be counted as a substance. The usage, 'black darkness moves' and the Vedic revelation, 'black darkness stood clear' [tamah kṛṣṇam vyaktam asthita] also prove its existence, having black colour and movement¹. And it is quite distinct from all the above mentioned substances. Earth possesses odour but it does not have odour. Water has cold touch but it does not possess touch. Light is the abode of hot touch but it lacks hot touch also. Air has zig-zag motion and neither cold nor hot touch but it has neither touch nor constant motion. The remaining substances, viz., ether, time, space, soul and mind, do not have colour, but darkness has black colour. Hence it should be counted as a distinct substance.

The Logicians hold : darkness is of the nature of absence of light. Among the Logicians, Uddyotakāra says that darkness denotes things which are not apprehended due to the absence of light. Śrīdhara, the author of Nyāyakandali, mentions that darkness is a kind of the quality of colour and nothing more than the black colour imposed on something else. The Vaiśeṣika contends that darkness should not be accepted as a substance having colour for the simple reason that it is not tangible. The Bhāṭṭa criticises this view and says that the contention that in the case of every tangible thing there is

1 श्रुतिरपि तमसो नोलरूपतामनुवदति । MM, p. 167.

found colour too is false for, it would result that air is not tangible since it has no colour. Hence darkness should be accepted as a distinct substance.

The Prabhākara denies darkness as a substance and holds that it is absence of knowledge of light. His argument is as follows : When light is not seen, there is the remembrance of black substances generally. Because of the perception of the form of the self who is the apprehender. In respect of one who does not apprehend the remembrance-form of this, there is the empirical usage of darkness being black, conditioned by the non-apprehension of distinction between the two, the perception and the remembrance. The Bhāṭṭa criticises this view on the ground that it is against experience, i.e., when there is the non-apprehension of the distinction between the remembrance of blackness and the apprehension of the self, one should say 'I am black' not 'This is black', but while perceiving darkness all are saying 'This is black' not 'I am black'. Hence darkness should be accepted as a distinct substance.

THE CONCEPT OF ATOMS

Kumārila holds that a whole is composed of its parts conjoined with each other. Physical substances, viz., earth, water, fire, air and darkness, are divisible into parts, which are ultimately divisible into atoms which are supposed to be indivisible. Cidānanda says that the atom should be accepted as indivisible, i.e., not composite, otherwise if we assume an atom also to be composed of still smaller parts, it would result in the defect of infinite-regression¹. And the inevitable result of this would be that, all things being equally composed of infinite component particles, there would not be found

1 आत्मग्रहणस्य नैलस्मृत्या भेदाग्रहे सति 'इदं नीलम्'... ibid, p. 163.

2 तथा सति मातङ्गमशक्योरनन्तावयवपरिप्रापितत्वाविशेषेण—
वयवसंख्याभूयस्त्वात्पत्वनिबन्धनस्य महदणुभेदस्यानुपपत्तिः ।
NTV, p. 86.

any difference between an elephant and a mosquito as one is bigger and another is smaller. The idea is thus :— It is nothing but the greater or smaller number of atoms that makes one thing bigger and another smaller. A thing like an elephant is larger because it contains larger number of parts than a mosquito which is smaller to elephant because it contains lesser number of parts. To calculate these numbers we must have a common unit like an atom. If we do not postulate the atom as an indivisible unit and, instead, go on dividing ad infinitum, then, the number of parts in elephant and mosquito will be equal but the parts will vary in magnitude and the question why one is larger than the other will remain unresolved. This is solved thus : A thing is larger or smaller according to the magnitude of parts in them are larger and smaller.

The atom is visible. It appears in the form of finest particle of mote shining in the sun-beam proceeding through the opening of a window. The Vaiśeṣika holds that what the Bhāṭṭa say as atom is triad [tryaṇuka] which is produced by three dyads [dvyaṇuka], which are produced by two partless and indivisible atoms. Vidyābhūṣaṇa summarizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view on atoms as follows : ‘In the Nyāya-sūtra 4-2-16, it is stated that there can never come a time when there will be an utter annihilation of things. Even at the dissolution of the world [praṭaya] things will continue to exist in the form of atoms. The atom can not be divided into parts because it is pervaded by ether in its inner and outer sides. It is not tenable because the terms ‘inner side’ and ‘outer side’ are not applicable to an eternal atom which is altogether different from an ordinary thing a constituent of which encloses, or enclosed by, another constituent of it¹. Atoms do not perish even at the dissolution of the world. At the creation of the world, owing to the creative will of the God, motion is first produced in atoms. Then from the conjunction of two atoms a dyad is produced. Then as a consequence of conjunction of three dyads, a triad is produced. Similarly, with

¹ The History of Indian Logic, pp. 105-106.

four triads, a quadrate is produced, and so on and on until the great masses of earth, water, light and ether are formed.

Kumārila denies creation and dissolution of the universe¹ and observes that the physical universe, as a whole, ‘was never other than what it is now’ [na kadācid anidṛśam jagat]. The universe neither has had beginning nor end. It is self-existent, eternal and uncreated and consequently the ultimate substances never exist in the their state, i.e., in the form of disjoined super-sensous atoms. According to him, the smallest perceptible mote, which is seen in the sun-beam coming through the window and which corresponds to the triad of the Vaiśeṣika system, is the atom. The Vaiśeṣika considers it as triad (composed of three dyads) and divides it into dyads (composed of two partless super-sensous atoms) and finally into (partless and super-sensous) atoms on the ground of inference. The two axioms of the inference is as follows : ‘Every visible thing is composed of parts, for a thing in order to be visible must have three dimensions, length, breadth and thickness’ and ‘Every object having parts is divisible into any number of smaller parts’. Kumārila holds that the atoms as conceived by the Vaiśeṣika are non-existent inasmuch as we have no means of knowing them and criticises the use of inference for upsetting the result of well-established facts of perception. He says that the employment of logic or Yogic perception to defeat common sense are spurious. According to the Bhāṭṭa, composite substances, i.e. earth, water, light, air and darkness, are constituted by atoms, but that the atoms concerned are, like the particles of dust in the sun-beam, definitely perceptible.

The Prabhākara, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, accepts atoms as the ultimate constituents of the physical universe. These are indivisible and eternal. He establishes the existence of the atoms on the basis of inference² as follows :— ‘Triad is a composite of parts (three dyads), because it is a perceivable substance, like a cloth’ and ‘Dyad also is a composite of parts

1 प्रलयेऽपि प्रमाणं नः सर्वोच्छेदात्मके हि न । SV, sam, st. 68.

2 परमाणुदृव्यणुक्योः त्रसेरध्वादिकार्यद्रव्यलिङ्गकानुमानम् । NS, p. 81.

(two atoms), because it produces large magnitude, i.e., triad, like a thread'. Further, the atom, should not be divided into parts, because that would lead to the defect of ad infinitum. Even though the Prābhākara, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, admits atoms but, as against the Vaiśeṣika, rejects creation and dissolution of the world.

ETHER

Ether [Ākāśa] is a ubiquitous substance. We are thus immediately aware of ether everywhere around us as the locus of everything that we perceive. Also we mark the presence or the absence of flying bird up there. The obvious reference, here, is to a directly perceived locus, and this is ether. The texts of the Bhāṭṭa school have advanced a number of arguments in defence of the position that ether is a perceptible substance. One such argument, which is given in the Nyāyatatvāvirbhāva and substantially reproduced in the Mānameyodaya is as follows : 'whatever is ubiquitous and different from mind, is perceptible. Ether is such a thing. Therefore, ether is perceptible'¹. Ether is all-pervading,— i.e. possessed of largest dimension ; this being shown by the fact that its effect is found everywhere.

The Vaiśeṣika infers the existence of ether as the substratum of sound by the method of elimination [pariṣeṣa]. The subsistence of a certain quality in a number of things being suspected, when the impossibility of such subsistence in some of those things is proved, the notion that we have of the quality subsisting in the remaining things is what is called method of elimination. Sound being a quality, it should inhere in a substance. We see that sound is not a special quality of tangible substances (i.e. earth, water, light and air), because while having the conjunction of fire as its non-inherent cause, it is produced independently of the qualities of its cause, and is perceptible, as is the case with pleasure. Nor is it a quality

¹ NTV, p. 67 ; MM, p. 191.

of space, time and mind, because it is a special quality and space, etc., do not possess special qualities. Nor is it a quality of the soul, because it is perceptible to external organ. Thus ether, the substratum of sound, should be accepted as a substance by the method of elimination.

The Bhāṭṭa rejects the Vaiśeṣika view mainly on the ground that sound is a substance. He argues that it cannot be a quality, because it is perceived independently as a substratum¹. One of the criteria of quality is that it is perceived invariably as dependent upon a substance. It is only a substance which is independently and directly perceived and which can exist as a self-subsistent real. Thus the characteristic of quality being found lacking, and its affinity with substance being clearly observable, it stands to reason that sound should be held to be a substance. Cidānanda further argues that let sound be a quality, even then the existence of ether as the substratum of sound cannot be established, because according to the rule of parcimony—to assume a quality in an established substance is worthy than to assume a non established substance², it should be accepted as the quality of space or time not that of ether. Hence ether should be established on the proof of perception. As described above, it is perceptible to everyone immediately on opening the eyes.

The Vaiśeṣika holds auditory organ as composed of ether by the method of elimination. Kumārila rejects the Vaiśeṣika view on the ground that it is against the Vedic revelation³. The Veda says ‘auditory organ is from space’ [diśah śrotram], hence it should be assumed that auditory organ is the space enclosed in the ear-cavity.

The Prābhākara, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, infers the existence of ether as the substratum of sound by the method of elimination. Sālikanātha criticises the view of the Bhāṭṭa that sound is a substance and establishes that it is a special

1 तत्र गुणस्य सर्वत्र साश्रयतया प्रतीयमानत्वाद् ... MM, p. 223.

2 असिद्धद्रव्यकल्पनापूर्वकाश्रयत्वकल्पनात् ... NTV, p. 67.

3 दिभागे तु समस्तोऽसावागमात् विशिष्यते । SV, Sabda ni., p. 145.

quality on the ground of inferences as follows : 'Sound is a special quality, since it is perceptible to single external organ, as in the case of colour'. 'Now sound being a quality, is inherent in a substance, as is conjunction'. These inferences prove that sound inheres in a substance. It is not a quality of earth, water, fire, air, time, space, soul or mind. So it is a quality of ether. Thus ether, which is the substratum of sound, is established'.

Thus we find that ether exists, and we have already seen that it is and must be an all-pervading (ubiquitous) ; and being a ubiquitous, it must also be eternal, unproduced and indestructible. It is also absolutely motionless. For being a ubiquitous, it cannot be conceived as moving from one place to another, nor can it contract and expand. Finally, it is super-sensible, as it neither is, nor can ever be, perceived by the sense-organs. But although itself super-sensible, its special quality, sound is perceptible to the auditory organ.

The Bhāṭṭa denies sound as a quality and holds it as a distinct substance. And accepting ether to be eternal, indivisible and ubiquitous, he comes to regard that the question of the possibility of its being inferred cannot arise, and consequently, that it must be perceptible. The Prabhākara, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, says that ether is inferable on the ground of its being the substratum of sound regarded as a perceptible quality.

TIME

The Grammarian holds time and space as modifications of the subtle sound [śabdatanmātra]. The Buddhist says that these are merely forms of momentary and fleeting consciousness [vijñāna]. The Sāṃkhya includes these under ether. Neo-Naiyāyikas like Raghunātha Siromāṇi identify these with God. The Mīmāṃsaka, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, regards these as independent substances. Kumārila describes time as

one, ubiquitous and eternal entity, like the word, its divisions are derived from its association with the limiting adjuncts [upādhī] in the form of moments, hours, days, months, years and the like¹. Time is also apprehended as a qualifying element [viśeṣaṇa] in the form of events as nearness [para], remoteness [apara], simultaneity [yaugapadya], succession [ayaugapadya], slowness [cira], quickness [kṣipra], etc. One should not confuse nearness and remoteness of time with those of space, because the nearness and remoteness due to time is brought about by the sun's movements ; while those pertaining to space are not brought about by the movements of the sun.

Though time is really one only, yet through certain conditions in the shape of present, past and future actions, it comes to bear the names of present, past, and future ; as a man, through his different types of actions of dancing, singing and the like comes to be known as a dancer, singer and the like. The time determined by action is present, and the time determined by the pre non-existence of action is past, and the time determined by the past non-existence of action is future.

The Naiyāyika contends, that time is invisible because it lacks the condition of perceptibility, i. e., possession of colour. The contention is false because a colourless object (i.e. ether) is perceived. So time is perceived. A moment is perceived. A day is recognized. Time is perceived as a qualification of the perceived objects. Pārthsārathi says that if time were not immediately given in experience, such characteristics of events as existence, succession, etc., would never come within our perception. Since these perceived determination of events necessarily involve a direct reference to time, it must be held that time is invariably presented as a qualification [viśeṣaṇa] in our perception of events². Cidānanda proves its perceptibility on the ground of inference as follows : 'Whatever is ubiquitous while being different from mind is

1 कालश्चैको विभूतित्यः प्रविभवतोऽपि गम्यते ।

वर्णवत्सर्वभागेषु व्यज्यते केनचित्कवचित् ॥ SV, Sabda ni., st. 303.

2 NR on SV. Sabdanitya., st. 303.

a perceptible substance, like the soul, Time is such a thing. Therefore, time is a perceptible substance¹.

The Prābhākara, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, holds that time cannot be perceived because it lacks the necessary characteristics of perception, i. e., infinite magnitude [mahatva], dimension and manifest form [udbhūtattva]. The notions of nearness, remoteness, etc., are determinate subjective phenomena, and their emergence can be explained only on the supposition of their being causally related to a specific objective ground, and this is time. Time, therefore, is to be inferred as the cause of certain notions which are found to be associated with events, and which cannot be explained otherwise. It is endowed with the qualities of magnitude, dimension conjunction and disjunction. It is indivisible, eternal and ubiquitous².

The Bhāṭṭa holds that time is eternal, indivisible and ubiquitous and arrives at the view that it, like ether, is reluctant to the possibility of its being inferred, and must be amenable to direct and immediate apprehension. The Prābhākara, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, holds that time is inferable.

SPACE

Kumārila holds that space is eternal, one, ubiquitous and amenable to the direct apprehension of nearness and remoteness and so forth. Pārthasārathi says that even though space is not perceived as independent by auditory organ yet while sound is perceived, space also is perceived by the organ as sound's qualifying adjunct³. We have the notions as nearness and remoteness, etc. These will prove the existence of space as a distinct substance. The nearness and remoteness pertaining to space and those pertaining to time are found to come into being under more or less similar conditions, and to

1 अमनस्त्वे सति विभुत्वादात्मवदिति तत्प्रत्यक्षत्वं ... NTV, p. 41.

2 दिक्कालावानुमेयावेव । परिमाण संयोगवियोगवन्तौ ... NS, p. 81.

3 रावे गृह्यमाणे तद्विशेषणतया दिगपि शोत्रेण .. SD, p. 139.

this extent they are alike. They are however clearly distinguishable from each other. For, when an old man is near us,—though on account of his nearness to us he is capable of being spoken of as near, yet the notion that he actually gives rise to is that of remoteness from us. Conversely, when an young man is at a distance from us,—even though this fact of his being at a distance renders him liable to be spoken of as remote, yet the notion that he actually gives rise to is that of nearness. What happens in these cases is that the man who is near us in space is remote in point of time, and vise versa.

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers hold that there is one eternal ubiquitous space which is not open to perception, but it is only inferred from the spatial characteristics of nearness, remoteness, etc. But spatial properties and relations like distance, size, etc., can be perceived directly through touch, sight, etc. The Bhāṭṭa criticises this view on the ground that it is against experience, because space is perceived as content in the concepts of before, behind, etc., which are dependent solely on visual organ¹. Hence space should be accepted as perceptible. Some Naiyāyikas also [like Jayanta], following the Bhāṭṭa, regard space as perceived by visual organ.

Space is a ubiquitous substance. Any limit that we set to space is therefore only a convenient fiction necessitated by purely pragmatic consideration. Space is eternal, since it is an incomposite substance and does not depend on any thing for its existence. And it is one. It would therefore be wrong to suppose that corresponding to our ideas of directions as east, west, south, north, etc.—ten in all—there are ten different spaces. The distinctions of space are derived from its association with the limiting adjuncts [upādhi], in the form of east, west, south, north and so on². Space in the direction of mount Udaya is known as east; in the direction of mount Asta is known as west; in the direction of mount Meru is known as north; in the direction opposite to mount Meru is known as south.

1 दिशोपि पूर्वपिरादिप्रत्ययानां नेत्रमात्राधीनत्वाद् ... MM, p. 194.

2 दिशोपि पूर्वपिराद्युपाधिवशाद् भेदव्यहारः । ibid, p. 195.

The Prābhākara, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣika, holds that space is inferred from the notions of priority and posteriority, and not directly those of mere remoteness and nearness. Space is a ubiquitous, eternal, indivisible substance and possessed of the qualities of infinite magnitude, conjunction and disjunction. Even though space is one, under certain conditions it comes to bear the terms like east, west, north and south.

THE NATURE OF THE SOUL

The Materialist holds that the body itself is soul and no soul apart from the body. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the body. Consciousness is not found in the constituent elements of body individually like red colour in betel leaf, nuts and lime. But it is found in the body due to a particular combination of the elements like red colour in the combination of betel leaf, nuts and lime¹. The Jaina maintains that living being is the soul. Soul is the principal of vitality and life in the world. It persists throughout all the changes and is not the product of body. In the growth of a soul from that of a child to that of a young man, there is no creation of a new or destruction of an old one. It is a fusion of the old in the new. The essence of the soul is consciousness which underlines all the phenomenal changes of mind and body. The Jaina accepts that even stones and metals have souls. Regarding the consciousness in stones etc., he says that it is indormant state in them, whereas it is in waking state in other living beings. The Buddhist believes that the soul is a mere bundle of sensations in a succession. Soul as a mere succession of bits of sensations, ideas, emotions and desires, etc. This succession is in perpetual movement and the feeling of identity or same ness of individuality is caused due to ignorance in exactly the same way in which a revolving fire stick gives the appearance of a red circle.

1 पृथिव्यप्तेजो वायुरिति तत्वानि । तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञा ।
तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं किणवादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवत् । Br̥haspati sūtra.

The Sāṅkhya establishes the soul as pure spirit, different from body and unchangeable. He argues that if it were liable to change, knowledge would be impossible. As its character is consciousness it helps to bring the products of the evolutionary chain into self-consciousness. It illuminates the entire sphere of thought and feeling. The Naiyāyika recognizes some elements like desire, aversion, sympathy, awareness as non-corporeal ones. These are not substances but the qualities of a substance which is named as soul. The Naiyāyika proves its existence by means of inference. Uddyotakāra, however, accepts perceptibility to the soul. According to him, the object of the notion of 'I' is the soul. Again the recognitions of different cognitions as mine proves the continued persistence of the soul. Soul is a permanent spiritual substance endowed with pleasure, pain, cognition, desire, merit, and demerit. However, consciousness is not its essence but an accident. It acquires consciousness in conjunction with the body and the mind. The Vedāntin says that the soul has empirical status but the soul [jīva] has not been granted any ontological reality. Soul is pure consciousness, pure bliss but when the mind-body complex through illusion [avidyā] affects it, it becomes the soul [jīva]. The soul is Bramhan.

The question of existence of the soul has been treated most elaborately by Sabarasvāmin. While discussing the Vedic sentence, 'The sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial utensils goes to heaven'¹, he says that the demonstrative pronoun looks like pointing to the actually perceived body as going to heaven ; since the body is consumed in the fire, journey to heaven should not be ascribed to the body ; but only to the soul whose body this is. The existence of the soul is inferred through the acts of breathing, etc. One should not think that breathing, etc., belong to the body because they do not continue to exist as long as the body lasts².

The Buddhist holds that consciousness [vijñāna] alone is the soul. Being self-effulgent it is sentient ; knowledge,

1 स एष यज्ञायुधी यजमानोऽजसा स्वर्गं लोकं याति ।

2 मनु शरीरमेव प्राणिति अपानिति च । न, प्राणादयः... SBh, 1-1-5.

pleasure, etc., are its various forms. Sabara argues that this view is wrong, because the entity spoken of by the phrase 'he knows' [jānāti] is the nominative agent of the act of cognising, i.e., the soul, not consciousness. Hence it is proved that the eternal soul is different from momentary consciousness¹. The soul is an object of such perceptions as 'I know' and 'I am happy', etc. The self is spoken of as 'self-luminous' [ātmajyoti] in the Vedic sentence 'Herein the person is self-luminous'² which means that the self is cognised by itself, not by another self. However, the self can be pointed out through analogy as follows— 'just as you perceive your own self, so on the same analogy, please understand that I also perceive that self in the same manner'³.

Kumārila, following the Bhāsyakāra, establishes that the self is distinct from the body, sense organs and vital forces. Pārīthasārathi explains that if there is no soul other than the body then the injunctions 'Let him sacrifice who wishes heaven' etc., are inexplicable unless there is one who is other than the body, who is fit to enjoy the things of the other world and who is the agent. The self is not the sense organs because even after the sense organs are destroyed or the objects of sense organs are removed, we say that we have seen such thing. If there was no soul, how could the synthetic presentation of the sensation through multifarious sense organs take place. Thus the soul cannot be identified with the body and sense organs. Though Sabara prefers to follow the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika arguments regarding the existence of, the soul Kumārila prefers the Sāṅkhya arguments. He says that the aggregate of things must exist for the sake of another⁴. Even as a bed which is an assemblage of different parts is for the use of the person who sleeps on it, so this world which is an assemblage of elements is for another's

1 यदि विज्ञानादन्यो नास्ति कोत्र हि 'जानाति' SBh, 1-1-5.

2 अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिर्भवति Br. Upa, 4-3-9.

3 उपमानाच्चोपदिश्यते – यादृशां भवात्... SBh, 1-1-5.

4 सङ्घातसन्धिवेशौ च न स्तः पारथ्यवर्जितौ SV, Ātmā, st. 114.

use. There is a self for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body and the rest has been produced.

The Sāṅkhya holds that nature [prakṛti]¹ is the agent, and the soul [puruṣa] is unattached like the lotus leaf, but sentient. Kumārila criticises this view and says that the soul is not only knower and enjoyer but also active agent. He regards the soul as the substrate of the entire gamut of mental phenomena, including pleasure, pain, desire, merit, demerit, etc. The Naiyāyika holds that pleasure, etc., are the qualities of the soul but the Bhāṭṭa accepts these as the modifications of the self.

Soul is the nature of knowledge and is known by itself. It is a knower [jñātā], active agent [kartā] and enjoyer [bhoktā]. Knowledge is its essence and attribute. It is an attribute which determines its essence. When the Śruti speaks of the self as a knower, knowledge is both the essence and an attribute of the self. If it were not of the nature of knowledge, as the Prabhākara holds, it would be insentient. So the self is not mere knowledge. Knowledge manifests an object. It manifests itself as 'I'. It is not manifested as such. It is never manifested as mere knowledge. It is manifested as 'I' in deep sleep also, since a person has the recollection in waking from sleep, 'I slept happily'. The Prabhākara accepts that the soul is self-luminous or self-revealed. Pārīhasārathi criticises this view of the Prabhākara on the ground that self is absent during dreamless sleep, and agrees with the Naiyāyika in holding that the self is the object of I-consciousness or mental perception².

Prabhākara establishes the soul as distinct from the mind, sense-organs and body. Sālikanātha says that the soul is different from mind [buddhi], because the latter is inert and absent during sleep and yet we have cognitions during sleep.

1 Prakṛti which is insentient, is constituted of three Guṇas and is otherwise termed Pradhāna and it changes into the world form beginning with Mahat and ending with particulars.

2 तस्मादहं प्रत्ययगम्यो ज्ञाता SD, p. 123.

Nor can sense-organs be the soul, because in that case, there cannot occur the recollection 'I who saw the pot is the same I now touching' for, what was experienced by one in the past cannot be recollected by another. Therefore the soul is quite distinct from sense-organs. Nor can the body be the soul, because the latter is cogniser and has consciousness. If consciousness were a property of the body¹, we could not find bodies devoid of consciousness and there would be no reason for us to see dead bodies. And the body is composed of various parts of earth. If beyond the body there is no soul, then the moral law would be without any significance since no sin can pursue us in subsequent lives as the body is destroyed after death.

The Prābhākara, following the Bhāsyakāra, considers the self's knowledge itself as an object to be an absurdity, and, consequently, holds that there is no such thing as I-consciousness and that the self is known as the subject of all cognitions of objects. The Bhāṭṭa denies self-lumination to the soul and holds that there is such thing I-consciousness and that the self is known as the object also. The Prābhākara argues that a cognition and a soul endowed with the quality of cognition are distinct from each other. A soul is substratum while cognition is a quality.

The Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara hold the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of the self, but where as the Bhāṭṭa regards knowledge as the mode or activity of the self, the Prābhākara regards it as a quality of the self. Sabara holds that the self is self-luminous (known by itself nor by others) and the object of I-consciousness. The Bhāṭṭa while denying self-lumination to the soul holds that the self is known through 'I-consciousness'. The Prābhākara accepting self-lumination to the soul holds that there is no such thing as I-consciousness.

1 बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरेभ्य भिन्न आत्मा विभुद्धुवः PP, p. 316.

THE SIZE OF THE SOUL

About the size of the soul, the Jaina says that the soul is of the size of the body. The soul of an elephant must be larger than the soul of an insect. He illustrates his conception of dimension of soul by saying that if soul was fixed in a certain corner of body, how could the entire body feel the touch. Hence the soul must be co-extensive with the body. On the death, the soul contracts and assumes the form of a seed to resume its future size according to the body given to it in next life.

The Naiyāyika holds that the soul is infinite and unlimited in size. It cannot be larger than the body because the body cannot hold a thing whose dimensions are larger than itself. The soul cannot be smaller than the body because the spread of consciousness all over the body cannot be explained if consciousness is limited to a certain portion of it. It cannot be of the same size because when a child is born, it should be small and when the child grows into man, the self cannot cope with the increasing dimensions of the body. If the soul is changing with the body, then its functions of recognition and memory would be inexplicable. The Sāṅkhya regards that the self is not of any finite size since then it would be made of parts and so be destructible. It is not atomic since then it would not be in a position to cognise the affairs of the entire body. The Advaita Vedāntin holds, on the part of the Sruti assertion i.e., the soul is eternal and ubiquitous, that the soul is all-pervasive. The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntin says that the soul is atomic in size. The soul departs by its nature on the destruction of its body. The Veda also supports the view saying that the soul is atomic and knowable by the mind and being the hundredth part of the tip of a hair. Though the soul is atomic and resides in the heart, it can experience sensations through the body or its attributive knowledge, like light, which can expand.

In the Bhāṭṭa view, the soul is all-pervading, since its effects are found to be present everywhere and the Sruti asserts it to be eternal and ubiquitous. It is pervasive, since its

knowledge, desire, volition, pleasure and pain are produced by objects in many places. If it were atomic, it would not experience them everywhere. If it were assumed to move to objects in all places, the view would violate the law of parcimony.

The Jaina maintains that the soul is co-extensive with its body. Kumārila refutes this view on the ground that the soul being itself immaterial, can never be mixed with material elements i.e. the body. If it were co-extensive with its body, it would undergo increase and decrease with its body and it would become invested with parts; and it would be necessary to presume a multiplicity of parts and also presume that in the bodies of an insect and an elephant the whole of these parts which are neither more nor less would undergo extreme shrinkage and expansion¹. Such a postulation is not sound. So it cannot be co-extensive with its body.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitavedāntin maintains that the soul is atomic. Kumārila refutes this view on the ground that if it were atomic, its qualities pleasure, pain, etc., would be experienced only by that part of the body where the soul is located, and headache and pain in the foot, etc., would not be experienced simultaneously. The Sruti speaks of the size of a grain of corn, etc., of the soul in the sense that it is of extreme subtlety, which has been elsewhere declared to be omnipresent². One should not think that it is of the size of the thumb, on the basis of Bhārata sentence, 'Yama pulled a person of the measure of the thumb from Satyavān's body'³, because the sentence is to be taken as a laudatory passage [arthavāda]. And the same Vyāsa asserts it to be ubiquitous as follows 'The soul is eternal, omnipresent, eversteady and everlasting and all pervading.'⁴ It is ubiquitous and eternal. So the doctrine of the atomic size of the soul is false.

1 अथ शरीरपरिमित अर्हतपक्षेणाभ्युपगम्यते .. TV, 2-1-2.

2 यदा ह्यणुमात्र अत्मा भवति तदा यावानेव... ibid, 2-1-2.

3 अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चकर्ष बलाद्यमः । MBh, Vana, 296.

4 नित्यः सर्वगतः स्थाणुरचलोऽयं सनातनः । BhG, 2-24.

THE DOCTRINE OF MANY SOULS

The Sāṃkhya lays stress on the numerical distinctness of the streams of consciousness as well as the individual unity of the separate streams. If the self were one, all would attain freedom when one might become free. The Vedāntin holds that the soul is one with God as the sparks issuing from fire are not different from the fire. So the individual souls are not different from the supreme reality. He argues that it is not possible that one can ever attain identity with another altogether distinct. The Upaniṣads say that the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. Hence the knower must be one with Brahman. So the Vedāntin holds the identity of the self with the Brahman and the doctrine of the souls' difference due to limiting adjuncts.

The Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara, in general agreement with the Sāṃkhya, accept the doctrine of many souls. The Mīmāṃsaka gives his approval to the arguments given by the Sāṃkhya. There are many selves, since experience shows that human beings are so much different from each other in physical might, intellectual attainment and moral perfection. Thus there are many conscious beings in the world, each regarding the world in its own way and with an independent experience of its subjective and objective processes. The various selves have different bodies and undergo separate births and deaths. One goes to heaven and the other goes to hell. If all the selves were one, all of them would have attained freedom when anyone attained emancipation.

Pārthaśārathi expounds the concept of many individual souls as follows. There are many souls with different cognitions, recollections and the like. If the soul were one, Yajñadatta would recollect the object perceived by Devadatta. From this, it is known that Yajñadatta's self is different from that of Devadatta because the former is not the substratum of the recollection of the latter's apprehension. And one soul does not experience the pleasure or pain brought about by the Dharma or Adharma of another soul. Thus the souls

are different from one another. The difference of the mind alone cannot account for the difference in experiences determined by different bodies. The difference of the souls alone account for the difference in their experiences. The Śruti, the Smṛti and the Purāṇa texts speak of the singleness of the soul in the sense that the souls are similar to each other. The Śruti, and the Smṛti passages describe the plurality of the soul as follows, ‘The Yogin freed from all desires attains the highest resemblance (with me)’, ‘They have attained to equality in attributes with me’ and ‘But the supreme person is another called the Supreme soul.’ Parthasārathi says that the scriptural passages which support monism should be interpreted as referring to the non-difference of the souls, otherwise it would lead a conflict with the scriptural passages which support pluralism. As for the Śruti texts, like ‘Thou art that’, that teach oneness in the state of emancipation, they only speak of similarity [of the soul with Brahman] on account of (its) being free from pain, etc., as when a priest has accumulated great wealth, we say that he has become a prince².

THE CONCEPTOIN OF GOD

The Materialist does not accept any thing that is not perceived by the sense-organs. Hence there is no acceptance of God. The Jaina does not recognize God. He thinks that the existence of the universe could be explained without there being any creator God. The Buddhist says that he cannot perceive any thing corresponding to the notion of God, no God exists. But the Mahāyāna Buddhist believes in the existence of Ādi Buddha, an omnipresent God who can help man with his infinite compassion to attain Nirvāṇa. The Hinayāna Buddhist regards Buddha merely as an example of Arhathood and thinks that this ideal stage

1 निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ; मम साधर्म्यमागताः,

उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः BhG, 15-7; SD, p. 125.

तत्त्वमस्यादिश्रुतयः पुरोहितोऽयं राजा संवृत्त इतिवत् ।

can be attained without the help of Buddha or any super-worldly power. The Sāṃkhya does not accept creator God. He says that the world is not the result of any act of God, but is the product of an unending influence on Prakṛti. The Yoga philosopher says that God is not the creator of the world. God is a unique self, untouched by the taint of imperfection and above the law of action. He suggests that devotion to God is an optional practice for those who would follow Yoga.

The early Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas did not accept the existence of God. It was not until a later period that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika changed to theism, although neither ever went so far as to assume a creator of world. Later thinkers of these schools found it awkward to explain the world by the operation of Karma. The Naiyāyika proof of the existence of God consisted mainly of 1) an argument from innate reasoning in man, that when there is a pot, there must be a potter behind it as its maker ; 2) an argument from the wonder of creation, namely, that no work of artistic skill is explicable otherwise than by an intelligence with its plan or design ; and 3) an argument from the authorship of the Vedas ; Vedic truth contain unquestionable reality and by accepting those truths we attain happiness in life and salvation hereafter. The suprarational truths cannot be perceived or inferred by man. Hence the Veda must have been produced by God. The Vedāntin says that God is Brahman, with the adjunct of Avidyā. He creates and destroys the world as a spider throws out and retracts its web. Hence He is both the efficient and the material cause of the world.

Kumārila criticises the Naiyāyika view that God creates the world like a weaver weaving a cloth and destroys it like a boy breaking a pot, as follows. According to the maxim even a fool does not undertake an action without some purpose¹ every action must have some purpose. But we cannot see any purpose in the creation and destruction

1 प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते । SV, sām, st. 55.

the world by God. Again if the world was created by God, then He must have a body. If He had a body then, that body could not have been created by Himself. Admission of a body which is all-pervasive and intangible is unjustified, for, this is opposed to the ordinary notion of a body. Since there cannot be an eternal body, even God must have His body created. If another body is required to creat His body, then this will lead to an infinite regress. If He is formless, then how could He have a desire to create the world? If He creates the world out of mercy, then there should be happiness everywhere. Out of mercy and compassion, He cannot cause misery to the human beings. If He creates, the world for his recreation [lilā] or his play, then, He cannot be regarded as one who has all desires fulfilled. It cannot be understood how God without the help of any instruments or other accessories of any kind can create this world. If there were instruments apart from God, then we are caught in a duality of realities which contradicts with the supremacy of God.

The Naiyāyikas and other philosophers accept that God is omniscient [sarvajñā]. The Jaina and the Buddhist say that Lord Mahāvīra and the great Buddha are omniscients. Kumārila criticises the concept of omniscience as follows. It is our experience that, with the visual organ, one cannot taste or smell or hear respectively. The power of the sense-organ is restricted to certain objects even where some speciality is seen in respect of a potency. For, a man may possess very powerful eyesight able to see very small things or distant objects or he may be capable of smelling odours from a very great distance, but this does not mean that he is able to smell odours with his visual organ¹. The existence of omniscient is not proved by any means of right knowledge: The omniscient is not apprehended by any body. Nor is there any probans which could infer him. Nor he is described by the Veda. The means of analogy cannot prove his

1 यत्राप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थीतिलङ्घनात् ।

दूरसूक्ष्मादिदृष्टौ स्यान्न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तिता । ibid, Codanā, 114.

existence. Because we do not see any such omniscient person, we cannot think of similarity of unseen persons with Him. And the so called omniscient person cannot teach Dharma [which is not described by the Veda] hence we cannot presume any body as omniscient. The instruction of Dharma can be otherwise explained on the basis of the Veda. One should not argue on the basis of Upaniṣad passages that omniscient exists because these passages are only laudatory passages.

Kumārila says that there has not been a point of time when the order of the universe, as it exists today, was not in existence. Hence, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, there is neither creation nor destruction of the world. Day to day creation and destruction are, however, acceptable to the Mīmāṃsaka. The destruction of all product substances is known as the intermediary dissolution [avāntarapralaya]. The destruction of all positive categories is known as the great dissolution [mahāpralaya]. The Mīmāṃsaka does not accept the great dissolution of the world on the ground that if accepted ; that will lead to cessation of the existence of Veda which is the source of Dharma (merit). Even though Kumārila denies creator God, he accepts the super-soul [paramātman]. He declares, at the end of the chapter on the soul, that 'sound knowledge of the soul is to be obtained from the Vedānta'!. This becomes further clear in one of the opening verses of SV in which he offers obeisance to God Śiva.

The Prabhākara, like the Bhāṭṭa, criticises the Naiyāyika argument, i.e., 'the creation and destruction of the world are the results of an agent, because they are the results of intelligent action, like the creation and destruction of a jar', and denies the great creation and utter dissolution of the world. It should be understood that the Prabhākara endeavours to point out syllogistic process of the Naiyāyika only but does not dispute the existence of God. Bhavanātha says 'It must not be misunderstood that by disowning complete dissolution, he does not believe in the existence of God'.

1 दृढत्वमेतद्विषयप्रबोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणे । ibid, Ātmā, 148.

This becomes further clear with the Prābhākara's statements. Bhavaṇātha says, 'The Prābhākara is not prepared to accept the Naiyāyika arguments on the existence of God, but not the existence of God'.¹ Nandiśvara says, 'Inferential existence of God has been challenged, and God is not denied'.² Ravideva, the commentator of Nayaviveka, says, 'The existence of God has been established by the Srutis and the Smṛtis. So any attempt to discard the existence of God will stand in direct opposition to the Vedic statements, and will transpire to be an unwarranted assertion'.³

LIBERATION

The Materialist says that there is nothing like eternal bondage, rebirth and liberation [mokṣa]. Dependence is, however, a relative bondage and independence is release. Actually speaking, he says, liberation means death, since all kinds of misery disappear in death. He says that the life is full of pleasure and pain. Because pleasure is mixed up with pain, we should not be frustrated to discard the pleasure in toto. No body knows what is beyond this life. Hence let us enjoy the world fully in this very life. The Bhāṭṭa criticises this view on the ground that the soul is quite distinct from the body and death is only for the body, not for the soul⁴. The Jaina believes that the soul, in its purity, is infinite knowledge and bliss. But our attachments and involvements go on accumulating Karma matter which veils the purity of the soul. In the bondage stage, the soul acquires new qualities and thus suffers a continuous change though remaining the same in substance. In the liberated stage the sufferings of the soul do not create any change in

1 एवं चेश्वरे परोक्तमेवानुमानं निरस्तम्, नेश्वरो … NV, p. 199.

2 एत्रं चानुमानिकत्वमेवेश्वरस्य निराकृतम्, नेश्वरो … PV, p. 82.
न चैवं श्रुतिस्मृतिनिषिद्धेश्वरनिरासापत्या साधु बहिष्कार्यत्वापत्तिः,
NV p. 199.

4 ibid, 212.

its form. The man is Anantavirya, while exercising his power he can overcome all Karma and finally become liberated. Right faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct are essential to get liberation.

The Buddhist narrates four Noble truths : 1) There is suffering, 2) The suffering has a cause, 3) It can be eliminated and 4) There is a way to stop it. Meditation on these four Noble truths leads man to liberation [Nirvāṇa]. One who wants to get liberation, should follow the eight fold path, 1) Right belief, 2) Right aspiration, 3) Right speech, 4) Right conduct, 5) Right mode of livelihood, 6) Right effort, 7) Right mindedness, and 8) Right rapture. Nirvāṇa is the elimination of passions and desires to liberate the mind of its attachments. The Bhāṭṭa refutes this view on the ground that series of cognitions remain by itself devoid of context; also because, the series of cognitions are intermittently being produced and destroyed moment after moment, the experience of the fruit, liberation, by any one, is unintelligible¹.

The Naiyāyika describes liberation as the absolute cessation of the twentyone forms of pain. These are : 1) the body (2-7) the six sense organs (8-13) the six objects of the sense organs (14-19) the six cognitions obtained through the sense organs (20-21) pleasure and pain. Pleasure is called pain in the same manner as honey mixed with poison is called poison. Through the true knowledge of the sixteen categories viz. Pramāṇa, etc., a person is able to remove his misapprehension and also able to acquire true knowledge of the reality. The person with knowledge gets detachment with the worldly things and stays in his own natural condition, i.e., free from all the qualities, i.e., cognition, pleasure, pain, volition, merit and demerit. The Bhāṭṭa denies this view on the ground that if liberation consists in the state of blisslessness then it would not be object of human pursuit [puruṣārtha], and no one desires to get such senseless state of stone like existence².

1 ibid p. 213.

2 ibid, p. 213.

The Sāṃkhya regards the knower as the self [puruṣa] and the known as the nature [prakṛti]. The self is defined as pure spirit, different from the body and the nature. The self is inactive but it identifies itself with the activities of the nature through egoism. Then the intellect [buddhi] comes into contact with the objects through the senses and assumes the form of the objects, etc. The intellect is reflected in the self and the self is reflected in the intellect. The self, though it remains aloof from the intellect, falls, into the misconception of identifying itself with the intellect and of ascribing the states of the latter to itself. Realization of the truth that the self is different from the intellect leads to liberation. Puruṣa's release from the clutches of nature and from all kinds of passions is liberation. The Śruti 'the soul should be known' asserts that the discriminative knowledge of Prakṛti and the soul leads to liberation.

The arguments of Kumārila against this view is as follows. Knowledge does not annul the past Karma. The past karma should be experienced. Only experience can clear the past karma. Knowledge being purely negative in character, can stop only further karmic residua, and not entire karma. And there is no Vedic revelation on the point that the knowledge leads to liberation. Hence knowledge is not the means to liberation. The Śruti 'the soul should be known' asserts about the knowledge viz. that the soul is distinct from the body, which is said to help man to perform the sacrifices whose results accrue to the man in another birth¹.

The yoga philosopher says that the eight fold path frees a man from mental attachments and destroys ignorance, the cause of bondage and suffering. Practice and non-attachment are the necessary steps for accomplishing yogic sādhanā so that the fluctuating tendency of the human mind may be brought under control. Isolation of self from mind and its modes is liberation.

1 आत्मा ज्ञातव्य इत्येतन्मोक्षार्थं न च चोदितम् ।

कर्मप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वमात्मज्ञानस्य लक्ष्यते ॥ SV, Sambandha, st. 103

The Vedāntin describes liberation as the cessation of the world i.e. of Saṁsāra. Nescience creates the world. The soul is the substratum behind all the psychical status. Likewise Brahman is also the substratum of all objectivity. This is why sentient beings like beetles emerge from insentient things like cowdung and insentient things like nails and hair grow out of sentient human beings. If we posit two paralled realities, one explaining the consciousness and the other explaining unconscious objectivity, we have to face an irreconcilable dualism. Hence the knowledge of Brahman [identity of Brahman and the soul] is the only solution to reconcile nescience. The Vedāntin quotes the Sruti : ‘For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another ; where verily, everything has become just one’s own self, then whereby and whom would one see...!’, supporting this view. Pārthasārathi interprets the Sruti in the sense of absence of outside relation to the soul and says that the cessation of the world is not liberation, but the dissolution of the world contact, because the world is not created by nescience. According to the Mīmāmsaka, the world is real and eternal. The world binds man in three ways : Through 1) the body, which is the abode of pleasure, etc., 2) the sense organs, which are instruments of pleasure, etc., and 3) the objects, which are fit to be enjoyed.

The Saṁsāra is the chain of causation in a cyclic order, which leads to bondage, suffering, extinction, birth, attachment, frustration and repeated sufferings. In this chain of causation, some causes refer to past life ; 1) the acts done in the past, whose consequences the man must suffer in the present life ; the karmas to expiate which one has taken the present birth. They are the ripe [prārabdha] karmas. Some causes are due to present life ; 2) the karmas done in the past, but which are not ripe, and will have to be expiated in some future life. They are the stored [sañcita] Karmas. And some causes lead

यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तद्बितरं इतरं पश्यति यत्र त्वस्य।

सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तकेन कं पश्येत् । [Br. UP. 2-4-14] SD, p. 125.

to future life 3) The karmas which a man creates in one's present life, and which have to be expiated in future. They are the fresh [āgāmi] Karmas. Of these, the fresh Karmas can be stopped, by doing every action in a spirit of service. Even the ripe karmas can be expiated while undergoing such experiences. But the stored Karmas, which are unripe to yield their fruit, will not free the Sādhaka from their clutches and the Sādhaka is not ready to wait for future lives in order to get rid of them.

Kumārila says that the past Karma can be stopped by performing the rites without any intention. The smṛti text, 'performance of one's duty without attachment to action fruits constitutes both Yoga and renunciation'¹ also supports this view. The rites are of four kinds, viz. optional (kāmya), prohibited [niṣiddha], regular [nitya] and occasional [naimittika]. Those which fulfil the desires for worldly happiness and heavenly happiness are called optional rites. Those which are prohibited by the Veda and whose practice leads man to hell are prohibitory rites. The Agnihotra, iṣṭi, etc., are regular rites, since the Sruti texts like, 'one should perform the Agnihotra as long as one lives' and 'one should perform the homa in the evenings' and 'one should perform the homa in the mornings'² we know that such rites are to be unfailingly performed every evening and morning by a person as long as one lives. The Pathikṛd iṣṭi, occasioned by the non-performance of the New-moon-day and Full-moon-day sacrifices at the proper time, and such other rites are occasional rites, as we know from the Vedic texts like, 'One should offer puroḍāṣa, baked on eight potsherds, to Path-maker Agni'³.

Of these rites, the seeker of liberation should not perform optional rites and also should not commit prohibited actions. Both these makes him struggle with Karmic residua.

1 अनाश्रितः कर्मफलं कायं कर्म करोति यः । Bh, G, 6-1.

2 यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति ; सायं जुहोति ; प्रातर्जुहोति ।
TBr, 2-2-7-8.

3 अग्नये पथिकृते पुरोडाशमष्टाकपालं निर्वपेत् । TBr, 1-4-4-10.

And he should perform regular and occasional rites without fail, because the negligence of both the rites leads to demerit [pratyavāya]¹. Hence regular and occasional rites should be performed by all to avoid the sins of omission. Regarding the result of regular and occasional rites, the Prābhākaras say that non-performance of these rites inevitably leads to demerit, but their performance produces no result. The Bhāṭṭa say that the destruction of demerit itself is the result of their performance.

Both merit [puṇya] and demerit [pāpa] are unfavourable for liberation. Merit and demerit lead man to happiness and misery respectively. So, both merits and demerits should be destroyed by the constant performance of regular and occasional duties with detachment i.e. as duties, which produce neither merit nor demerit. The seeker of liberation should discard desires and, also for that, optional and prohibited rites which lead to bondage. Thus, the ascetic is free from merit and demerit, because he performs regular and occasional duties without fail. Since he does not perform optional rites, the future merits (which result from the performance of optional rites), will not eventuate. Since he avoids prohibited rites, the future demerits (which result from the performance of prohibited actions) will not eventuate. Because the causes that help one's taking on the body are absent, one remaining disembodied when the body already acquired falls, attains liberation².

The Bhāṭṭa's view on the place of knowledge in the scheme of the means to liberation, may now be discussed. Kumārila is favourably disposed to Saṃyoga-pṛthaktva-nyāya or the principle of two-in-oneness, according to which, the knowledge of self serves two functions, viz., being 1) helpful to the sacrifice [kratvartha] 2) helpful to man [puruṣartha]. Because unless one has the knowledge that the soul is different from

1 मोक्षार्थी न प्रवर्तेत तत्र काम्यनिषिद्धयोः ।

नित्यनैमित्तिके कुर्यात्प्रत्यवायजिहासया ॥ SV, Sambandhā, 110.

2 असति शरीरारम्भे पूर्वशरीरनिपाते ... SD, p. 130.

the body one, cannot undertake the performance of sacrifices whose results are said to accrue to the person in another birth. And the Sruti texts, "the self free from all evil.... is to be sought after...." 'one should worship the self¹' etc., reveal that the knowledge of self will give the fruit of all the eight perfections of Yoga. And the Sruti, 'passing his life thus he, after death, reaches the regions of Brahma, and from there he never returns²' asserts that liberation can be found through due knowledge of the self. Thus according to Samyoga-prithaktva, knowledge is conducive not only to sacrifice, but also to man.

Kumārila's intention is that the knowledge which the Sāṃkhya system enjoins, is of no value to the attainment of liberation, but meditation on the self (cf. ātmānam upāsita) is indispensable for one who longs for liberation. Pārtha-sārathi clearly says that for liberation both knowledge and ritual practice are essential. He recognises the value of knowledge as an aid to liberation. It is known by the name jñāna-karma-samuccaya. Nārāyaṇa holds that not only knowledge but also the path declared in the Vedānta should be followed by the seeker of truth³. The Vedāntin also accepts the jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda and in the view of Maṇḍana the means to liberation (i.e., jñāna-karma-samuccaya) consists in the combination of repeated contemplation of the indirect knowledge of the secondless absolute derived from the Upaniṣadic Sabda and also the ritualistic discipline of the prescribed sacrifices and such other rites⁴.

The author of Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha speaks of the Bhāṭṭa as upholder of the view of liberation as a state of happiness. His statement is as follows: 'In the state of final deliverance, there occurs, even in the absence of the objects of the senses, the experience of the highest bliss. Through this experience of eternal bliss, all those who are desirous of the

1 य आत्माऽपहृतपापमा ... बोद्धव्यः ... तथाऽत्मानमुपासीत ।

2 स सर्वैश्च लोकान् ... न स पुनरावर्तते – TV, 1-3-8 p. 28.

3 कुवणिस्यात्मभीमांसां वेदान्तोक्तेन वर्त्मना । MM, p. 217.

4 Br. Siddhi, pp, 2-3 : see also int. p. xxxiii.

final release, become freed from attachment to the objects of the senses, and reach that condition of final deliverance from which there is no returning¹. Raghunātha śiromāṇi refers to the Bhāṭṭa view on liberation as a state of happiness and refutes it. Nārāyaṇa, the author of MM, describes liberation as a state of happiness : 'When there is the absolute routing out of misery, the mental experience of the happiness that already existed in the soul is said to be liberation by the Bhāṭṭa'². But the Bhāṭṭas, except Nārāyaṇa, do not accept liberation as a state of happiness. Pārthasārathi criticises this view of experience of bliss in liberation and says that liberation consists in the state of cessation of misery. Gāgā-bhāṭṭa, the author of Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, rejects this view of liberation as a state of happiness. Hence liberation, according to the Bhāṭṭa, is not of the nature of positive bliss, but is a mere negative state of being free from misery.

The Prābhākara believes, like the Bhāṭṭa, that Saṃsāra is a beginningless series of births and deaths. Action produces consequences which are either merit or demerit. There is no escape from the consequence of action. The worldly pleasure such as is derived, from hearing songs, love-embrace, sight of the moon, tasting sweets, scenting fragrance, etc., is ephemeral and connected with pain. The quest for release from pain frustrates a person in life and this leads to go beyond and transcend the limitations of one's empirical existence³. The cycle of births and rebirths will have to be checked in order to attain this end. Disinterested performance of duties is the means of liberation.

So, the seeker of liberation should discard optional and prohibited rites, which are cause for heaven and hell. He should perform regular and occasional rites whose non-performance produces sins of omission of the rites. He should perform regular and occasional duties with detachment. While undergoing experiences of results of merit and demerit, he becomes

1 Sarvasiddhānta saṅgraha, p. 38.

2 MM, p. 215.

3 यः खलु सांसारिकेभ्यो दुःखेभ्य उद्विग्नः, तवनुषङ्खलेभ्यश्च
सुखेभ्योऽपि विगतस्पृहो मोक्षाबोपतिष्ठते ... PP, p. 341.

free from karmic residua. While practising the knowledge of self along with mind control, sense-restraint, etc., he will attain the state of liberation, which is described by the śruti text, 'He never returns to this world of Samsāra' as unreturnable to the ditch of Samsāra.

The Prābhākara, like the Bhāṭṭa, describes liberation as a state in which there is no pain. This becomes further clear with these references : Sivāgrayogin says that according to the Prābhākara, liberation consists in the state of total disappearance of pain¹. Gāgābhāṭṭa refers to the definition of the Prābhākara on liberation as follows : 'The prāgabhāva—absence before appearance—of pain along with the total absence of pain²'. Nārāyana describes the doctrine of the Prābhākara that there is release when the soul remains in its own nature, after all the specific qualities like knowledge are destroyed³.

MIND

The word Manas (mind) might have been derived from the root 'Manu avabodhane' or 'Manu jñane'. From the meaning of the root 'Man' and from the experience of the workings and activities of mind we can say that mind is the abode of all knowledge gained by organs. Mind can remember past things when it comes up to the level of those things. It is the experience of every body that one remembers past things when the mind comes up to the level of the past times when they took place. The mind has many cells to collect past as well present experiences and knowledge of things of the world.

Mind is described by Kumārila as a sense-organ which apprehends pleasure, etc. Nārāyana defines it as follows :

- 1 आत्यन्तिकदुःखानुत्पादो मोक्ष इति गुरवः । S, Bh. p. 475.
- 2 आत्यन्तिकदुःखप्रागभावो मोक्ष इति प्राभाकराः । Bh, C, p. 42.
- 3 सकलबुद्ध्यादि विशेषगुणविलये सत्यात्मनः
स्वरूपावस्थानम् मोक्ष इति प्राभाकरमतम् । MM. p. 214.

"Mind is the internal organ, assumed to be a sense organ as the means for the direct experience of happiness etc., all-pervasive in size, and motionless"¹. The assumption of the mind as a sense organ is made to explain subjective experience.

There is a rather interesting controversy between the Bhāṭṭa and other schools about the size of mind. The Vedāntin accepts mind is of medium size [madhyama parimāṇa] ; thus it can assumes the shape of any object under its consideration. It traverses through the channel of the sense-organ to grasp the object and assumes its shape. In the perception of a pot, e.g., the mind assumes the form of the pot. This stage of the mind assuming the form of the object is called Vṛtti, In grasping the object far away from the visual organ, the mind takes a journey via the route marked by the sense organs, as the water of a tank, going out through a hole, and entering fields through channels, comes to have, even like those fields, a quadrangular, or other figure². The Bhāṭṭa refutes the Vedāntin's view on the ground that if mind is presumed to be of intermediary magnitude, then, it will become non-eternal.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prabhākara say the mind is of atomic size. Their argument is as follows. If the mind has been possessed of magnitude, it could have come in contact with many sense organs at a time so that many knowledges could have taken place simultaneously. As many knowledges are never produced at once, the mind must be admitted to be atomic. The Bhāṭṭa refutes this view on the ground that if it be atomic, it would follow that in the case of happiness, present on the body and produced by sandal paste, there could not arise the experience as simultaneous ; this establishes the size of the mind as all-pervading.

1 मनस्त्वन्दियत्वेन प्रत्यक्षा धीस्सुखादिषु ।

मनसा संप्रयुक्तो हि तान्यात्मा प्रतिपदते ॥ SV, pra, st. 83.

सुखाद्यपरोक्ष्यसाधनेन्द्रियत्वेन कल्प्य … MM, p. 217.

2 तत्र यथा तटाकोदकं छिद्रान्निर्गत्य कुल्यात्मना वैदारान्प्रविश्य
चतुर्षकोणाद्याकारं भवति … VP, p. 13.

The Naiyāyika says that if mind is presumed to be all-pervading, then there will occur no cognisability on account of the absence of the non-intimate cause that brings about the contact between the soul and mind. The Bhāṭṭa refutes this view and says that it has been established that for space, ether, etc., though all-pervading, there is a reciprocal contact, which is of their very nature, in the form ‘the eastern sky’, ‘the western sky’. And there are syllogisms :— “Two all-pervading substances have reciprocal contact, because while they are substances neither producible nor producing, there is no intermediate space, like a jar” ‘Ether is in contact with time, because, while it is distinct from time, there is no intermediate space, like a jar’¹. And that our experience is inconclusive and cannot be said to be such as would rule out the possibility of several knowledges arising at the same time.

The Prabhākara, like the Naiyāyika, establishes the mind on the grounds of succession in experience and experiencing thoughts and feelings as follows. The soul being all-pervading, there is no reason why things should be known in succession. This succession of knowledge can be explained by the fact that knowledge is got by the movement of mind, which now connects with this thing, and now with that ; and this enables the soul to know things one after another. Then again it is observed that the soul is conscious of not only the sensible objects, such as colour, odour, and so on, but also pleasure and pain, that is to say, of the objects of the nature of feeling. And, if in the case of every one of the sense objects, the soul has to use an organ, by means of which alone, it can perceive its object, it is only reasonable to infer that, in the case of the objects of other classes also, of which the soul is conscious, it has to use a sense organ. So the mind is needed as a sense organ for experiencing thoughts, feelings and so on.

This mind, in each sentient being, is only one as indicated by the fact that we can be conscious of things in succession.

1 विभुनी द्रव्ये परस्परसंयागिनी अनारभ्यारम्भकद्रव्यत्वे सति
निरन्तरत्वाद् घटवत् । MM, p. 221.

There must be an infinite number of minds, as there are an infinite number of souls, one in each experiencing entity. The mind is atomic. If mind is presumed to be all-pervading, then there will occur no cognisability on account of the absence of the non-intimate cause that brings about the contact between the soul and mind. Nor can it be argued 'Let there be contact between two all-pervading substances. What is wrong with it ?' Because, if this view is accepted, the occurrence of absolute absence of deep sleep has to be accepted in as much as the contact between two all-pervading substances is eternal. The contact of soul and mind always exists except in a small region of the nerve centre. The mind can enter the nerve centre only if it is of atomic size, and cause sleep. When the mind emerges out of the nerve centre, cognition arises ; this establishes the size of the mind is atomic¹. Even some of the Bhāṭṭas, like Maṇḍana miśra², Vācaspati miśra³ and others, accept that the mind is of atomic size.

The Bhāṭṭa accepts the mind as all-pervading, thus differs from the Prabhākara and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of it as atomic. The Prabhākara, in agreement with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, accepts the mind as atomic, but would not accept the view that the soul is the object of mental perception.

SOUND

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that sound is produced by conjunction, by disjunction and by sound⁴. The first kind of sound is produced by the contact of stick with drum ; the splitting sound that is produced when a bamboo is halved, is the second kind of sound ; all subsequent sounds reaching the ear from the place where the sound is produced first, is the third

1 अणुत्वमेव तस्य द्रव्यस्याश्रियते । PP, p. 149.

2 मनोभूतपरिस्पन्द आत्मनस्तत्प्रयत्नजः । BhV, st. 49.

3 इन्द्रियभावस्त्वणुन् एव मनसः ... Nyāyakaṇikā.

4 संयोगादा विभागादा शब्दनिष्पत्तिः । VS, 2-2-3.

kind of sound. The production of sound series takes place in the manner of waves or in the manner of Kadamba buds. Thus, at the first step, sound, such as 'ka' is produced by the conjunction of the throat, etc. From the first sound, another sound covering the ten quarters, is produced by the very sound. By that, another sound enveloping it is produced. In this order sound is produced in the ear, when it is perceived. So, sound in the alphabetic form is also transitory. The notion that "the sound 'ka' is produced, and the sound 'ka' is destroyed" also supports this view. The recognition that 'this is that ka' apprehends only its belonging to the same class, as we notice expressions like, 'The very medicine that I made was made by another also'.

Kumārila criticises this view on the ground that it will create many unverifiable assumptions—heard sound is different from the said one, acceptance of multiplicity of sounds, sound creates another sound similar to it, and so on¹. And we can see many wrong assumptions in this view as follows :— The first sound is produced through the conjunction of throat, etc, remaining sounds are produced through the first sound ; the sounds other than the last are destroyed by the sound wave next to itself, and the last one is destroyed by itself. So, to remove all the mistakes better to accept the theory of eternity of the letters. Śabara puts forth the manifestation of sound as follows. The air particles disturbed by the sound provoking stroke strike against the stagnant air-particles and produce conjunctions and disjunctions (ripples) on all sides, which go on spreading as long as the momentum lasts ;— the conjunction and disjunction (ripples) are not perceived because the air is imperceptible ; and as for the sound, it is heard only so long and so far as the ripples do not cease, and after they have ceased, the sound is not heard. Thus there is no incogruity at all, It is for this same reason that the sound is heard at a greater distance when the wind is favourable. So, when a person wishes to express something, the air inside the body is moved out of one's mouth. This air

1 अदृष्टकल्पना तस्मिन्पक्षे बहुत्री प्रसज्यते । SV, Sabda ni. st. 90.

is helped by the conjunction and disjunction of one's palate, tongue, etc, manifests the sounds¹. So, sound in the form of alphabetic is eternal but only the audible sound [dhvani] is transitory².

The Grammian says sound is neither letter nor sound [dhvani]. It is 'Sphoṭa' manifested by the letter or sound. That is, the sound and the letter are the suggestors of the suggested Sphoṭa. E.g., that by manifesting which through conglomeration of the letters 'ghaṭah' the idea of pot is obtained, is śabda or Sphoṭa. However, in usage, the term sound denotes letters or sound [dhvani]. This is to be understood only in a secondary sense. So sound is Sphoṭa only. Pārthasārathi rejects the Sphoṭa theory by the proof of non-perception. Because of its non-perception it is concluded that Sphoṭa has no factual existence. He says that in ordinary usage the mental impressions are reminders of past experience and here they bring to mind the previous Varṇas which together with that heard last, manifest the sense, where as according to the Grammian the mental impressions manifest Sphoṭa— this function of theirs is unverifiable assumption³. So this should not be accepted.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts sound as a quality of ether. The Bhāṭṭa rejects this view on the ground that it is perceived independently of a substratum. One of the criteria of quality is that it is perceived invariably as dependent upon a substance. It is only a substance which is independently and directly perceived and which can exist as a self subsistent real. Thus the criterion of quality being found lacking, and its affinity with substance being clearly observable, it stands to reason that sound should be accepted as a substance³. It is all-pervasive. Here the inferences are as follows. 'Sound is all-pervasive, because it is an intangible substance' and 'Sound is all-pervasive, because it is substance without parts, like soul'.

1 अभिवातेन हि प्रेरिता वायवस्तिमितानि ... SBh, 1-1-13.

2 प्रयत्नाभिहतो वायुः कोष्ठचो यातीत्यसंशयम् ।

स संयोगविभागी च ताल्वादेरनुरूप्यते । SV, Sabda ni. st. 122.

3 न संस्कारान्तरं कल्पयितव्यम् ... SD p. 94.

The sound is eternal. Here the syllogism is as follows :— ‘Sound is eternal, because while it is existent, it has no cause, like ether’. So is established its eternity. The notions ‘The sound ‘ka’ is produced and the sound ‘ka’ is destroyed’ are conditioned by the existence and non-existence of the proximity of a manifester, so these do not sublate the eternity of sound. The recognition ‘This is that ‘ka’ also proves the eternity of sound. So articulate sound is eternal.

The Prābhākara, like the Bhāṭṭa, accepts eternity of sound. Śālikanātha criticises the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, view— i.e. sound is transitory and establishes that sound is eternal¹. He says that the notions, ‘The ga is originated, and the ga is destroyed’ should be understood in the meaning of the audible sound [dhvani] manifesting the letter. The recognition ‘this is that ga’ is also establishes the eternity of sound. Only the difference between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara regarding sound is the former accepts it as a independent substance and the latter establishes it as a quality of the substance ether.

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